View source for Sectarianism as Counter-Revolution: Saudi Responses to the Arab Spring

The title is an article by Madawi Al-Rasheed<ref>Madawi Al-Rasheed  is Professor ofAnthropology of Religion at King's College London. Her research focuses on history, society, religion, and politics in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. She is the author of several books including Politics in an Arabian Oasis: The Rashidi Tribal Dynasty   (LB.  Tauris,  1991),  Contesting  the  Saudi  State:  Islamic  Voices from  a  New Generation (Cambridge University Press, 2007), and A History of Saudi Arabia (Cambridge University  Press, 2010).
</ref> published in the journal “Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism”<ref>King's College London</ref>,  Vol.  11,  No.  3,  2011. The following is the article.<ref>https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1754-9469.2011.01129.x</ref>

==Introduction==

Saudi Arabia  is  a wealthy  oil producing  country  with  a  small  population  not exceeding twenty-five million, one third of which are foreigners. The authoritarian Al-Saud ruling family has controlled the country since 1932 (Al-Rasheed 2010). Historically, the Saudi rentier state used economic largesse in return for loyalty to the regime  (Gause  1994;  Luciani  and Beblawi  1987). Yet the  literature on the rentier  state does not highlight  other  strategies  that  are often  deployed to gain loyalty and force the population into submission. Sectarianism as a regime strategy is often ignored in the literature on the rentier state especially in countries where there is religious diversity.

In  response  to  the Arab  Spring,  sectarianism  became  a  Saudi  pre-emptive counter-revolutionary  strategy that exaggerates religious difference and hatred and prevents  the  development  of national  non-sectarian  politics.  Through  religious discourse  and  practices,   sectarianism  in  the  Saudi  context  involves  not  only politicising  religious  differences,  but  also  creating  a rift between  the  majority Sunnis and the Shia minority. At the political  level, the rift means that Sunnis and Shia are unable to create joint platforms for political mobilisation. Neither essentialist arguments about the resilience of sects nor historical references to seventhcentury  Sunni-Shia   battles  over  the  Caliphate  (Nasr  2007)  can  explain  the persistence  of antagonism and lack of common political platforms among Sunnis and Shia in a country  like Saudi Arabia.  Sectarian conflict between  Sunnis and Shia can never be understood  without taking  into  account the role played by an agency much more powerful  than the sects themselves,  namely the authoritarian regime.  In addition  to massive  oil rents,  the  Saudi regime  has at its  disposal  a potent religious ideology,  commonly known as Wahhabism,  that is renowned for its historical  rejection  of the Shia as a legitimate  Islamic community  (Steinberg
2001).
	
But  it is too  simplistic  to reduce  relations  between  the regime  and  the  Shia minority  to oppression  alone,  which  in tum contributes  to the consolidation of their sectarian identity. The Saudi authoritarian regime deploys multiple  strategies when it comes to its religious  minorities  and their leadership. Wholesale  systematic  discrimination  against  the  Shia  may  be  a characteristic   of one  particular historical  moment,  but  this  can  be  reversed. A political  situation  may  require alternatives to repression. Sometimes repression  is combined with co-optation  and even promotion  of minority  interests  and rights.  Furthermore, the regime  may repress  the  Shia  in order  to  address  issues  relevant  to the  Sunni  majority,  for example to appease them, respond to their grievances, or simply seek their loyalty at a time when this cannot be taken for granted. Therefore,  it is important  to note that there is no regular and predictable  strategy deployed by Saudi authoritarianism against  the Shia.  Each historical  moment  requires  a particular  response  towards this community, ranging  from straightforward  repression  to co-optation  and concession. The Arab Spring and its potential impact on the country pushed the regime to reinvigorate  sectarian discourse against the Shia in order to renew the loyalty of the Sunni majority.

This article explains how the Saudi regime used sectarian divisions to widen the gap between the two communities  during the Arab Spring. The regime claimed that external agents were determined  to undermine  the country's stability and security. The regime called upon Wahhabi religious  interpretations - in particular  sectarian discourse against the very politically active Shia minority, estimated at two million (Jones 2009)--in order to abort the development  of 'national  politics' that crosses sectarian,  regional, ideological,  and tribal  boundaries. By constructing  calls for demonstrations on the 'Day of Rage' on 11  March as a Shia conspiracy  against the Sunni  majority  with  the  objective  of spreading  Iran's  influence  in  the  Sunni homeland,  the  regime  deepened   sectarian   tension  and  undermined   efforts   to mobilise the youth in various cities, including those where the Shia live. The Saudi regime frightened  its own Sunni majority by exaggerating  the Iranian expansionist project  in the region  and its  rising  influence  among  the Shia of the Arab world, including  Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries.

The regime propaganda  succeeded  in thwarting  protest that by all expectations would not have amounted  to an Egyptian-style fully-fledged  revolution.  Instead, the very minor peaceful  protests  that started  in 2011  in Saudi cities would have marked  merely  the beginning  of political  mobilisation  without  amounting  to a revolution. Even without  the pre-conditions for a revolution  in Saudi Arabia, an authoritarian  regime was compelled to take pre-emptive  counter-revolutionary measures  in anticipation  of the domino effect of the Arab  Spring.

Recent  Saudi  sectarianism  must  also be understood  in light  of events  in the neighbouring island  of Bahrain,  where  a Sunni  royal  family  rules  over a Shia majority (International  Crisis Group 2011; Kerr and Jones 2011 ).  Sectarian  discourse proved to be successful  in suppressing  the Bahraini pro-democracy movement. Saudi troops moved into Bahrain  in February  2011 in support of the ruling Al-Khalifa  family  against the protestors. This allowed the Saudi regime  to send strong signals not only to its own politically  agitated Shia minority, many of whom have religious,  social,  and kinship  ties with the Bahrainis,  but also more importantly to the Sunni majority inside Saudi Arabia. The regime compelled its Sunni majority,  long  brought up on a sectarian discourse that denounces the Shia as heretics, to consider their government as a protector against Shia conspiracies and foreign agents allegedly acting in the name of Iran,  a rival regional power.  The regime hoped that the Sunni majority would abandon calls for political change at least at this critical moment of the Arab Spring.  Under the pressures of a tense regional  context and internal  virtual and real mobilisation,  it seems that many Saudis have postponed their confrontation with the regime but continue to call for political reform. Moreover, the economic benefits distributed by the king in March 2011  seem to have satisfied the immediate economic and social grievances of the population, without addressing political reform.

==Saudi Sectarian Politics: An Historical  Overview==

In Saudi Arabia, deliberate, well-documented political exclusion and systematic religious discrimination against the Shia pushed this community to rally around its own sectarian leadership, which provides support and resources  denied in the national arena (Al-Rasheed 2010; Ibrahim 2006; Jones 2010; Louer 2008). Both exclusion  and discrimination  contribute  to the  consolidation  of Shia internal sectarian boundaries  and cohesion. Moreover, while freedom of association  is restricted and there is a ban on the formation of political parties and civil society, the religious  sphere remains  relatively  open.  In addition  to being a place  of worship, the mosque has become increasingly a platform for public mobilisation around religious symbols and identities.

Since the  1970s,  a large  Sunni  and Shia Islamist trend has replaced earlier limited politicisation that invoked secular nationalist and leftist ideologies in Saudi Arabia. This was in line with other Arab countries  where secular leftists and nationalist movements declined and Islamism was on the rise. Both Saudi Sunnis and Shia found in Islamism inspiration for oppositional politics and mobilisation. The two communities remained divided in their political opposition, and none was able to cross the sectarian divide and contain the other group. The only exception was the brief period of the 1950s and 1960s when labour mobilisation in the oil region resulted in protest not only across the Saudi sectarian, tribal, and regional divides, but also across nationalities  since the oil  industry attracted  labourers from all over the Arab world (Vitalis 2007). Following the early and short-lived labour protests in the 1950s and 1960s, the government banned trade unions and demonstrations.

From  the  1970s   onward,  no  labour  mobilisation  was  possible  under  the increased appeal of Sunni and Shia Islamism (ibid.). This was a product of a combination  of factors. The Iranian revolution of 1979, after which Islamism triumphed in Iran,  and the Saudi regime's promotion of Islamism as a counter ideology to nationalism  and leftist political  trends, led to the strengthening  of political Islam not only in Saudi Arabia but also across the Arab world. National politics and mobilisation  across the Sunni-Shia divide became impossible with the rise of Islamism and the weakening of the nationalist and leftist opposition groups.

Inspired by the success of the revolution in Iran in 1979,  Saudi Shia mobilised themselves as a repressed and discriminated against religious minority. They were highly active in demanding religious, political, and economic rights and an end to discrimination  in employment and education.  For a long  time, they were denied religious freedom and access to a wide range of professions  in education and the military.  Their  religious jurisprudence   was  not  represented  at the  level  of the judiciary.  They had greater experience  in staging demonstrations  than the Sunni majority,  as some of their  activists  had been  involved  in leftist  and nationalist agitations  in the Eastern  Province  in the  1950s  and  1960s.  Encouraged  by the success  of the Iranian revolution and the establishment of the Islamic republic in1979,  Saudi Shia started  an uprising  that was brutally  suppressed (Al-Rasheed 2010; Ibrahim 2006; Jones 2010). Many of their opposition leaders went into exile following a wave of repression in the Eastern Province where they lived.

In 1993, there was reconciliation with the government, followed by the return of the main  exiled  Shia opposition  figures (Al-Rasheed  1998). The reconciliation took place after the government promised to allow the Shia more religious freedom and increase their economic integration. There remained, however, a group of Shia activists abroad who continued  to mobilise  their followers inside Saudi Arabia. Inspired by the Arab Spring, the exiled  Shia opposition,  together with religious scholars and activists inside the country, called for demonstrations  demanding the release  of political prisoners. They also called for supporting  the Bahraini prodemocracy  movement in its struggle against the Bahraini Sunni regime and the withdrawal  of Saudi troops from Bahrain.  While the Shia are a minority in Saudi Arabia,  they are a majority  in Bahrain.

The Saudi Sunni Islamist opposition (Al-Rasheed 2010; Lacroix 2011), known since the 1990s as al-Sahwa, remained grounded in Salafi discourse especially that which  demonises  the  Shia as a heretic  group,  thus  endorsing  official  religious teachings. While Saudi Islamists denounce the official religious scholars for their dependence on the state and their loss of autonomy,  they agree with them on the Shia question. They believe that the Shia enjoy sufficient religious freedoms and employment in the oil region. According to one Salafi scholar associated with the al-Sahwa Islamist camp, the Shia are not the worst off in the country. Sunnis in the marginalised  southwestern  area of Asir are worse off in their poor villages  (AlRasheed  2007).  Some  Islamists  think  that  Shia  political  prisoners  are  often released under internal  and external pressure while Sunni Islamists remain in jail for long periods. This Sunni resentment resurfaces  whenever the regime releases Shia political prisoners, a step understood as a concession to a heretical minority. In this respect, the  state,  the official religious  establishment,  and the Islamists remain  in  agreement  over the  Shia  question.  While  only  a  small  minority  of Islamists prefer not to discuss the Shia question  openly, the majority  would not hesitate to denounce them in public.

==Timid Protest==

In light of the 2011  Arab Spring that brought down autocratic regimes in Tunisia and Egypt and is currently threatening  Bahrain,  Libya,  Syria, and Yemen, Saudi virtual  activists  called  for  a  Day  of Rage  on  11   March.2   New  youth  groups appeared on the internet under names such as the National Youth Movement and the Free Youth Movement.  Both  called  for demonstrations  against  the regime. 3

Their demands centred on freedom, fighting corruption, oppression, injustice, unemployment,  release of political prisoners,  and other grievances, all of which are non-sectarian  in nature.4   Many of these virtual  forums  attracted  supporters without any evidence of whether they had real followers on the ground.  Nobody inside Saudi Arabia  could openly claim authorship  of virtual  anti-regime  statements without  risking  arrest.  Muhammad  al-Wadani, a young activist, posted  a video  clip  of himself denouncing  the  regime  and  announcing  his  intention  to demonstrate  on  11  March. He was arrested  as he prematurely  participated  in a minor protest after Friday prayers on 7 March.5

Only two real Sunni opposition groups supported the Day of Rage. The Movement of Islamic Reform in Arabia (MIRA) and the newly founded Sunni Umma Party issued statements endorsing the call for demonstrations. 6  Since 2005, MIRA occasionally called upon its supporters to stage minor protests after Friday prayers in various cities.  On rare occasions,  such calls materialised  in very small crowds who would emerge from the weekly prayer chanting 'God is Great'. On 11  March, MIRA  and the Umma  Party  hoped that a spontaneous youth protest  movement would spread to all Saudi  cities.

Among the Shia,  the exiled opposition  abroad   mainly Khalas (Deliverance) led  by  personalities   such  as  London-based   Shia  opposition   veterans  Hamza al-Hasan and Fuad Ibrahim - called upon their followers to respond to the call for demonstrations  on 11  March.7  However, the main impetus came from Shia activists inside the country. Before 11 March, these activists mobilised their community to  demonstrate  regularly  after  the  peaceful  protests  in  Bahrain  were  heavily repressed with the help of Saudi troops.

Before the Day of Rage, Saudi Sunni and Shi a groups used YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter to spread the message that they supported the virtual protest. This was the first time for Sunni and Shia opposition groups to call for demonstrations  on the same day.

On 11  March, the Day of Rage failed utterly, thus pointing to the limitations of so-called Facebook and Twitter revolutions in the absence ofreal organisation and civil society willing to engage in protest (Morozov 2011 ). Al-Sahwa, the important and much larger Sunni Islamist movement inside the country referred to earlier, as well as other recently founded political groups, distanced themselves from the call for protest. As the slogan for the demonstration was 'the people want the overthrow of the regime', made famous in Cairo's Tahrir Square, no Saudi could declare his support without being arrested. In fact, many  Sunni Islamist activists inside the country renewed their loyalty to the regime and denounced the chaos associated with demonstrations. They pointed to the need for reform but not the overthrow of the regime. With the al-Sahwa  Islamist  movement withholding  its  support,  the demonstrations  did not materialise.

Despite  the total  failure  of the national  Day  of Rage,  in the oil rich Eastern Province, the Shia minority continued to stage their own demonstrations  demanding  equality  and  an  end  to  discrimination  against  their  community.  The  Shia demonstrations gathered hundreds of supporters who called for the release of their political  prisoners.  Women joined the  protest  and  marched  with  candles  over several  nights  to draw  attention  to the plight  of prisoners. They  called  for the release of political activists held for more than sixteen years under a campaign to support the  'forgotten  prisoners'. They  also called  for the withdrawal  of Saudi troops sent to Bahrain to suppress the Bahraini pro-democracy uprising that started on 14 February. In Shia areas, repression was more obvious in response to the size of the demonstrations. The Shia were able to mobilise their own people in support of their own demands, thus adopting a narrow Shia agenda, and in sympathy with their co-religionists in Bahrain, only sixteen miles away from Saudi Arabia across a causeway. The security forces were swift in repressing the demonstrators. 

After  11   March,  in  Sunni  majority  areas,  Saudi  men  and  women  regularly gathered on special days around the Ministry of Interior demanding the release of political prisoners. Unemployed  graduates  assembled  around relevant ministries expressing economic grievances and calling upon government officials to honour the king's promises to increase employment opportunities and speed up the placement  of graduates  in public  sector jobs. The king made these promises  in February when he returned to the country after receiving medical treatment in the United States. Although none of these local protests amounted to real  demonstrations, they were a novelty in a country where demonstrations  are totally banned. With the exception of the Sunni protest in support of political prisoners, the regime allowed these minor assemblies to take place. But between February and March, it was reported that the security forces made more than 160 arrests, two ofthem were lonely demonstrators who responded to the call for the Day of Rage and there was one well-known  political activist  involved  in  human  rights  issues.  In July, two women were held by the Ministry of Interior because of their participation  in and organisation of a demonstration  in support of political prisoners.  Demonstrations in  the  Shia Eastern  Province  were  more  brutally  suppressed.  The  government allowed small protests around economic grievances but was very swift with demonstrators  who expressed political demands or criticised the regime's repression (Human Rights Watch 2011).

The  constitutional  monarchy  movement,   since  2003  notorious  for  sending regular  petitions  to the  leadership  demanding  political  reform,  refrained  from endorsing the demonstrations, thus preferring  to respect the government ban on mass peaceful protest in the country. Saudi Sunni activists within this group expressed their political demands in on-line petitions  calling for a constitutional monarchy.8  Both Islamists and liberals within this movement signed several petitions renewing their allegiance to the regime before they presented their political reform agenda. By June 2011, three petitions were proposed to the leadership. All focused  on political,  economic,  and  social  reform.  The  petitions  were  highly critical of the Ministry oflnterior whose head, Prince Nayif,  is the king's brother.

As the day of the demonstrations  approached, several supporters of the constitutional monarchy  movement  distanced  themselves  from the Day  of Rage  and confirmed their loyalty to the regime.9 The constitutional monarchists proved to be a loyal opposition  whose declared  objective  is to reform  the regime rather than overthrow it. While there is no clear proof, it is assumed that this loyal opposition operates under the patronage  of certain  Saudi princes who have been calling for constitutional monarchy since the 1960s. The constitutional monarchy movement should therefore be seen in the context of power struggles within the Saudi royal family  (Al-Rasheed  2005).  Their  mode  of operation  is restricted  to circulating petitions,  mainly praising the king and denouncing the severe and harsh policing methods  of his brother  in the Ministry  of Interior.  Several activists within  this movement had been jailed  following the circulation of several petitions in 2003- 2004.  While the constitutional  monarchists  include Sunni and Shia personalities known to have been associated with nationalist, leftist, and liberal trends, it also includes moderate Islamists.  It seems that the constitutional monarchy movement is caught in the power struggle between members of the royal family,  mainly the king,  and his rival brothers. The movement continues to praise the king and urge him to intervene now before he dies. There is a sense of urgency as the current king is eighty-seven years old. The desired intervention focuses on curbing the powers of the Minister oflnterior, who may become king after the death of King Abdullah given the deteriorating health of the current crown prince.

Reports on Saudi cities on 11  March portrayed deserted neighbourhoods  where only security agents and vehicles roamed the streets (BBC 2011). The regime's overreaction to the virtual call for demonstrations  may have been an expression of a deep fear of the spread of the euphoria ofthe Arab Spring to this oil rich kingdom. It was also a show of force. Despite the generous economic package announced by the king in March 2011, estimated at £36 billion,  the leadership knows that there are serious unmet political demands and economic  grievances related to unemployment,  low wages,  high inflation,  lack of housing,  and rising food prices. The regime perhaps was not entirely confident that economic handouts, in the form of additional monthly salaries, one year unemployment benefits, more health centres, housing projects and loans, jobs in the security sector (Ministry of Interior), and expansion of the religious bureaucracy  would absorb widespread  dissatisfaction among  a very young population  with very few employment  opportunities. The king's handouts were meant to appease the population  by addressing some of its urgent specific  economic grievances.  But political  reform remained out of reach.

While security measures may have intimidated many Saudis, they cannot solely explain why the demonstrations failed to materialise; this failure reflects the limitations ofFacebook and Twitter mobilisation. It had underlying causes.  Saudis did not have a consensus over the overthrow of the regime. As mentioned earlier, the mainstream  Islamists inside the country, such as al-Sahwa, did not lend their support  to the protest. They are still in a position  to benefit from state largesse, spent on religious and educational institutions dominated by their activists. Moreover, tribal and economic  elites  in the country  are still tied to the regime through networks ofpatronage (Hertog 2010). They both fear populist politics that would threaten their historical links with individual princes and their patron-client relations with important figures in the regime.

The euphoria surrounding the new communication  technology, social networking,  and virtual  connectivity  proved  its limitations  in the  Saudi  context.  On a practical  level,  it  seems  that  the  state  was  able to  manipulate  such  electronic networks and control the outcome. Several Facebook pages emerged prior to the 11 March  demonstrations  confusing  potential  protestors,  spreading rumours  about outside  agents,  and  promoting  the  government  propaganda  messages  against exiled activists. Shia activists who had more cohesion and contact with their followers in the real world instigated the minor frequent protests that were reported in the Eastern  Province. There were known  Shia religious  scholars and activists who led the protest on the ground while the exiled opposition gave organisational and logistical  electronic support from abroad.  But the Shia demonstrations  failed to spread to other cities. As such, they remained a Shia protest that resembled their previous uprisings,  especially that of 1979.
The  regime,  its  religious  establishment,  and  the  majority  Sunni  population denounced  Shia demonstrations. The fragmentation  of the opposition,  a strong sense of regionalism around three main provinces  (Najd, Hijaz,  and Hasa), and Sunni-Shia  schisms  prevent  any  cooperation.  More  importantly,  it  seems  that many Saudis have not reached that critical phase to call for the overthrow of the regime.  While there are serious economic inequalities  and political exclusion of the population coupled with serious repression, for the moment most Saudis prefer security and the promise of economic prosperity at the expense of political liberty.

Although old well-known exiled Sunni Islamists such as the Movement for Islamic Reform  in Arabia  (MIRA), the new Islamist party  (the Umma Party), and Shia activists called for protest on 11  March, the regime identified such calls as a Shia conspiracy and uprising backed by outside agents, mainly Iran. The state strategy aimed to achieve two objectives. First,  it allowed the state security  agencies  to move  quickly  into  Shia  areas  to  suppress  early  signs  of protest,  which  was described as a Shia group revolt, totally isolated from other national groups and opposition trends calling for political reform. The fact that the majority of the Shia live in the Eastern Province and their demonstrations  have in the past taken place in predominately Shia cities like al-Qatif, Seyhat, andAwamiyyah  made it easy for government  discourse to appear plausible. This allowed the security agencies to consider the Shia as the initiators of the call to demonstrate.

Second, by invoking the discourse of an Iranian-backed  Shia regional revolt in the oil rich province, the state rallied the Sunni majority, including those who had serious  grievances  and  had  called  for  political  reform.  The  state  propaganda machine described calls for protest as a foreign attempt to cause chaos, divide the country, and undermine  its security. The population  was led to believe that any protest would result in the fragmentation  of Saudi Arabia and the resurgence  of regionalism,  sectarianism,  and  tribalism.  This  response  was  not unique  to the Saudi  state.  During  the Arab  Spring,  other Arab  regimes  resorted  to the  same rhetoric  when they faced mass protest, as Salwa Ismail's article  in this volume demonstrates.

Saudi official  religion was the main strategy to be deployed against the possibility of protest. The regime mobilised its main religious figures to support it at the critical moment of the Arab Spring in two different ways. First, Wahhabi religious scholars used the minarets to warn against the wrath of God, inflicted on the pious believers if they participated  in the peaceful demonstrations planned immediately after the midday prayers of 11  March.  On 7 March, the Council of Higher Ulama, the highest official religious authority, issued afatwa (religious opinion) against demonstrations." The old opinions  of famous  Sheikhs Abdul Aziz Ibn Baz and Muhammad  al-Uthaymin (Al-Rasheed  2007) regarding obedience to rulers were resurrected  to give impetus to recent religious  opinions against demonstrations. All local newspapers  favourably reported  on the current fatwa against peaceful protest.  Thousands  of hard  copies  were distributed  in mosques  and neighbourhoods, in addition to dissemination  on the internet.''  Saudi intelligence services infiltrated  internet discussion  boards  and posted  the fatwa on many discussion forums with several supporting  statements. My observations  of several internet discussion boards during the period of the Day of Rage clearly indicated heightened official propaganda.' Thefatwa against demonstrations was a political rather than a religious statement in support of the regime and against those who call for protest.

Second,  Saudi  official  religious  scholars  warned  of an  Iranian-Safavid-Shia conspiracy directed by Saudi Shia and Sunni exiles in London and Washington to cause fitna (chaos)  and divide Saudi Arabia. They relied  on sectarian  religious opinions against the Shia,  historically depicted as heretics and more recently as a fifth  column acting as agents of Iran. They reminded the believers of the need for ijma, consensus around the pious rulers of the country,  and warned that fragmentation,  tribal  warfare,  civil war,  and  bloodbaths  were to be expected  if people responded  to calls  for  demonstrations.  Wahhabi  scholars  who  are  not directly associated  with  the official  Council  of Higher  Ulama,  and  dubbed  as the neoWahhabis,  for  example  Muhammad  al-Urayfi  and Yusif al-Ahmad,  had  more freedom to denounce the Shia in local mosques, lectures,  and sermons, recorded and publicised on YouTube. Old al-Sahwa veteran Sheikh Nasir al-Omar joined the battle against the Shia,  thus giving an added force to the opinions  of the young ulama (religious scholars) generation. While many of those scholars are critical of the king regarding new gender policies that relax the laws on mixing between the sexes in education and the workplace, they are supportive against the Shia, who are seen  as  alien,  heretic,  and  loyal  to  Iran.  Depicting  local  protest  as  a  foreign conspiracy had already been tried during the Arab Spring.

The Saudi regime and its  ulama echoed well-rehearsed  rhetoric of other Arab autocrats  such as Zein  al-Abdin  Bin Ali  in Tunisia,  Hosni  Mubarak  in  Egypt, Hamad  al-Khalifa  in Bahrain,  Muamar  al-Qadhafi  in Libya,  Bashar al-Assad  in Syria,  and Ali Abdullah  Salih in Yemen.  The  Saudi regime mobilised  its  digital intelligence  services to spread rumours that the Iranians were behind the demonstrations and, if the Sunnis wanted victory, they should not respond to suspicious outside  calls for protest.  My observation  of several  internet  discussion  boards, such  as al-Saha  and the  Saudi  Liberal  Network,  clearly  demonstrated  unusual pro-regime postings that demonised the Shia and warned against foreign conspiracies. The Saudi religious strategy consisted of enlisting divine wrath and invoking sectarian difference and hatred to thwart the prospect of peaceful protest demanding  real  political  reforms.  So-called  independent  religious  scholars  served  the regime's interest as much as the official bureaucracy. While official ulama played a role, other preachers  found an opportunity on the internet to denounce  the Shia and boost  their  popularity among  a young  population. Facebook, YouTube,  and Twitter  became  the  new  digital  battlefield  against  the  heretical   Shia  and  their Iranian backers.

While the double religious  strategy of obedience  to rulers and sectarianism was unfolding, the Saudi-controlled so-called liberal press published  articles denouncing sectarianism. Liberal authors attacked those so-called  sectarian hate preachers and many journalists and activists celebrated  national  unity, wataniyya,  that  is, belonging  to a nation rather than a sect or tribe. The pages ofthe official local press such as al-Riyadh, al-Jazeera, and al-Watan, together with pan-Arab  al-Hayat and al-Sharq al-Awsat, became platforms  to launch attacks on those backward  forces who undermine national  unity.13  This, however, does not mean  that those  liberal authors  were in favour  of close ties with the  Shia or in support  of real political protest  as a means to political  reform. They were simply defending the regime  in another way, mainly by dividing and confusing  Saudi public opinion, an important strategy in aborting  a national  consensus  in favour of mobilisation and protest.

During  the Arab  Spring, Saudis were exposed  to two contradictory discourses both sponsored  by the state: a religious  one in support of Sunni unity against Shia heretics, and a so-called  liberal discourse  denouncing  religious  scholars  and their sectarianism. Saudis are confused and tom between those two contradictory interpretations of the  crisis. The  confusion  can  only  serve  regime  interests  by delaying the need to make political concessions. The strategy maintains  divisions in  society  between   so-called   liberal  intellectuals   and  the  hate  preachers,   and between  Sunnis and Shia.  In this confusion,  the regime  confirms  in the minds of people that it alone can mediate between the various camps, reining in the excesses of liberals, Islamists,  Shia, and  Sunnis. The  regime  fosters  the impression  that, without its  intervention, the country  will enter a Hobbesian  state of nature where tribes,  sects, and regions unleash  their fanaticism  and violence  on each other and undermine  the security  of all Saudis,  possibly  inviting foreign  military intervention to secure the energy sources that are so important  not only to Saudis but also to the rest of the world.

In a country where there is weak nationalism and strong Islamism  and sectarian tension, state  strategy  to depict  protests  as a Shia conspiracy  was successful  in pushing  the Sunnis to renew their allegiance  to the regime. Because  Saudi Arabia does not have an organised national civil society such as trade unions, professional associations,  or political parties,  its  opposition groups  have never worked  across the  sectarian  divide  in  recent  times.  The  Shia  opposition worked  on  its  own since the  1970s while  Sunni  Islamism  never  appealed  to non-Sunni  groups,  for example  the Ismailis  in the  southwest  and the  Shia  in the  east.  If Saudi  Sunni Islamists had their own Islamic  awakening, the Shia also developed  their political opposition  around their own religious  scholars  and political  activists.

Saudi  authoritarianism's main  concern  is to control  both  the  Sunni  and  Shia population and prevent  them from pursuing  political  rights that would eventually lead to the overthrow  of authoritarian rule.  For the foreseeable  future,  the Saudi regime will continue  to frighten the majority with the Shia/Iranian  threat to delay political  reform. The real threat to Saudi authoritarianism is the development of a national opposition composed of both Sunnis and Shia, and Islamists and secularists. This has already begun to appear in limited forums, prompting the government  to  clamp  down  on virtual  Sunni  protest  and  the  minor  but  real  Shia demonstrations.  If the new constitutional  monarchy  movement, which  brings together  Sunni  and Shia liberals,  develops further  and become  a force to be reckoned with, the sectarian discourse will be confined to hard-line official Salafi circles, which so far have remained loyal to the regime. A national opposition that rejects sectarianism will be difficult to suppress, despite decades  of sectarian discourse under the patronage of the authoritarian state.

Without a student movement,  women's  movement,  and professional  associations, a Saudi revolution is unlikely to move out of the virtual world into reality. While students who are on generous government subsidies and scholarships await employment, the women's movement regards the state as its main patron and is unlikely to withdraw its support of the current king. Many Saudi women activists consider the state as the only agent capable of checking the power of the ulama. The weak professional associations,  such as the Chambers  of Commerce  and journalist  associations, remain  loyal to the state, which protects  them against populist politics. The economic and technocratic elite is tied in to the public sector and enjoys great rewards for its loyalty. Moreover, the main tribal groups are beneficiaries of the regime through employment in the military sector and regular subsidies and handouts.  Many tribal groups  are linked to the regime through marriage networks. Only drastic and prolonged economic decline would trigger mass protest. If ever there are signs of a Saudi mass protest, counter-revolutionary strategies other than sectarianism may have to be deployed to suppress a wide national movement calling for serious and real political change.

==Reference==

References are available on the URL address of the areticle.

==Notes==