Neither a Religious War nor Ethnic Hatred Bosnian Muslims between Partition Plans: The Superpowers and Islamic Solidarity (Book section)

The title authored by Catherine Samary is a section of the book “The Islamic World and the West: An Introduction to Political Cultures” edited by Kai Hafez and Mary Ann Kenny

Introduction

The war which ravaged Bosnia-Hercegovina is sometimes referred to as a religious war. While acknowledging that hostilities also divided Orthodox Serbs and Catholic Croats, is it correct to interpret the Bosnian war as a massive collision between Christianity and Islam? The "Islamic manifesto" drawn up by Alija Izetbegovic in 1970 and reissued by him in 1990 clearly outlines the religious and political goals of Bosnia's President, which were to win back souls for Islam with the ultimate aim of political supremacy. But is this sufficient reason to believe in the existence of the fundamentalist threat outlined by Serbian propaganda and further emphasised by the Belgrade-backed leader of the Bosnian Serbs, Radovan Karadzic? Does it justify Serbian policies in Bosnia-Hercegovina or the forced secession of the Republic Srpska and the attendant practice of "ethnic cleansing"? Can it, finally, excuse the destruction of cultural and religious symbols dating back to the Ottoman era?

Like his Serbian counterpart, the Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, supported the "ethnic cleansing" of the Muslim population of Herceg-Bosna. He promoted the annexation of the Croatian-Muslim federation by Croatia as a means "of assimilating Muslims into Europe." Serbia and Croatia joined forces in attempting to convince the international community that the division of Bosnia-Hercegovina along ethnic lines would protect the Christian West against the eventuality of a Muslim state in Europe.

While several Islamic states came to the aid of Bosnia-Hercegovina, this does not fully explain either what was at stake or the ambiguity of each "camp." The Bosnian President Izetbegovic had to defend, at least on an official level, not only an Islamic polity and the Muslim victims of the war, but also the multinational state of Bosnia. A general fixation on what was allegedly a religiously motivated "civil war" diverted attention from the socio-economic and political causes of the crisis. 1 The war which ravaged Bosnia and which could flare up again at any time-was not a religious war. Religion was manipulated in order to deepen divisions and to justify plans to partition the country. Nor were the hostilities the product of some deep-seated ethnic hatred. Such enmity was fed on fears arising from past wounds and present uncertainties in order to copper-fasten partitions. The resulting war was the worst consequence of the crisis in the former Yugoslav federation.

While an in-depth analysis of the Yugoslav one-party system is not possible here, it can be said that, despite Tito's attempts at decentralisation, the system displayed all the usual failings of real existing socialism: officialdom, a corrupt government elite, a wasteful use of resources linked with a lack of transparency, and an absence of pluralistic control over decision-making processes. Individual ethnic groups secured national rights, thereby encouraging nationalist forces and demands, which were in turn manipulated by those in power. The 1980s was a period of economic, spiritual, political and institutional stagnation. Privatisation and the stringent cost-cutting programmes enforced by the International Monetary Fund dealt the final blow to the social foundations of the system, increasing the gap between richer and poorer republics and leading ultimately to the dismemberment of the communist Yugoslav federation.

Religion and the genesis of national identities under the Ottomans Tito's recognition of the Muslims as a separate nation in 1968 continues to arouse general disbelief. It should not be forgotten, however, that religion has always been an essential ingredient in national identification both in Yugoslavia and in the rest of the Balkans. Language also plays a role, for example in the distinction between Slovenes and other South Slavs. But the most important factor for all those who speak one of the varieties of Serbo-Croatian has always been their religious orientation.

A number of factors contributed to the rapid Islamisation of Bosnia's Slavic peoples, who came under the Ottoman rule in the fifteenth century. There were three Christian faiths in Bosnia at the time, each with limited influence: Orthodox, Catholic and the so-called Bosnian-or "heretic"-Church. Allegiance to the dominant religion of the Turkish Empire was linked to a certain privileged exemption from tax, for example, and ease of access to positions of power in the provinces-and many people converted to Islam, irrespective of whether they belonged to the Orthodox, Catholic or Bosnian Church. Followers of the latter faith were further drawn to the religion of their new rulers by the prospect of protection from persecution by the rival Christian Churches. At the same time, all three faiths were granted religious freedom and a certain degree of autonomy in matters of justice and education under the "millet" system. This combination of rights and privileges led to a classification of people along religious, professional and cultural lines and even to differences in apparel and housing. Like all religions, the Churches in Bosnia forbade mixed marriages and were more influential in rural areas than in the cities.

Religious differences were reinforced by political and social factors. Those who remained true to the Orthodox faith under Turkish rule developed a separate Serbian identity with subordinate social status. When Bosnia-Hercegovina came under Austrian rule in 1878, 90 percent of the landowners were Muslim, while an equal the proportion of serfs belonged to the Orthodox religion. The war which eventually destroyed Bosnia was to some extent a peasants' revolt: Orthodox peasants took their revenge on the Muslim population, who for so long had represented the oligarchy. It should not be forgotten, however, that industrialisation had also created an ethnic mix, altering ethnic consciousness to such an extent that many Muslim and Serbian intellectuals living in the cities of Bosnia today feel a stronger affinity with one another than with their brothers in rural areas.

In the context of the nineteenth century, when the international superpowers were confronted with the rise of nationalism, the national identity of the different Bosnian communities became an issue involving not only the big empires, but also Serbia, Croatia and the various occupying forces in Sarajevo. The declaration of Serbian independence in 1830 was viewed positively by the Bosnian Serbs. Likewise, the Bosnian Croats welcomed the granting of a certain degree of political autonomy to Croatia within the AustroHungarian empire. At the same time, many Bosnian Serbs and Croats, together with the Muslim intelligentsia, were attracted to the ideal ofYugoslavism. But Muslim enthusiasm was to wane when the first Yugoslav state turned into a Serbian-dominated "unitarian" dictatorship. As a reaction to its intolerant and centralist orientation, many Muslim deputies declared themselves Croats, only to be faced by new identity conflicts under Croatian Ustasha fascist rule during the Second World War.

Who are the Bosnian Muslims?

The end of the first Yugoslav state came about when German and Italian troops invaded the country during the Second World War. What followed was a combination of civil war and the struggle for national liberation. The different ethnic groups engaged in a fierce and bloody struggle, fomented by a number of different political forces with their own state-building plans. As was the case in the recent conflicts, political forces tried to manipulate existing differences between the communities, fanning the flames of hatred in order to implement the political project of "ethnic states."

This is what happened in the newly created Croatian state, which was headed by the extreme right-wing and nationalist leader Ante Pavelic. While formally independent, it was in fact a Nazi puppet state. "Greater Croatia" included Bosnia-Hercegovina which even today is considered "historically Croatian" by Croatian nationalists, in the same way as it is considered "historically Serbian" by Serb nationalists. The Ustasha regime defined as "Croat" followers of the Catholic faith and those who had converted to Islam from Catholicism or the heretic Church. All others-Orthodox Serbs,Jews and Gypsies-were forcibly assimilated, driven into exile or killed. Even the Nazis regarded the "ethnic cleansing" perpetrated by the Pavelic regime as particularly savage and ruthless.

Many of those persecuted under Ustasha rule were attracted to the communist-led resistance movement. The appeal of Tito's "Partisans" can be explained in part by the loathsomeness of the alternative "Chetnik" resistance group. Predominantly Serbian and heavily armed, the Chetniks supported the exiled Serb government in London, and were both anti-fascist and anti-communist. They stirred up ethnic hatred by holding entire ethnic groups accountable for historical aberrations. They blamed (and continue to blame) all Croats for the atrocities committed by the fascist Ustasha, while the Bosnian Slavs, who were Islamised during the centuries of Ottoman rule, were (and still are) seen as Orthodox Serbs who converted to the religion of the Turkish oppressors and betrayed their Serbian identity. In the recent conflict, Radovan Karadzic, leader of the "Republika Srpska," translated the "historical revenge" on the "Turks" into bloody action, in the tradition of Chetnik ideology. 3

Tito and his Partisans made Bosnia-Hercegovina the centre of their multi-ethnic resistance movement. The growing popularity of the Partisans was due to a number of factors. Firstly, their ideology of brotherhood and mutual recognition united all of Yugoslavia's peoples in a common struggle against fascism; secondly, they were extremely critical both of the old unitarian Yugoslav state and of the nationalist claims of different ethnic groups. They established a new, federative Yugoslavia in the liberated territories with a People's Army comprising several hundred thousand fighters from all ethnic groups. Thirdly, and finally, the communists secured the support of the impoverished peasants by giving them land and by paying their debts.

These unifying factors far outweighed the religious and ethnic divisions which had become more pronounced over the centuries. They were also stronger than the hatreds which had been incited by a number of competing forces. Nevertheless, the new Yugoslavia was marred from the beginning by congenital defects and inherited wounds, compounded by emerging problems. Tito attempted to stabilise the fledgling state and undermine the forces of nationalism through a combination of repression and genuine reform. The latter included a system of self-management, a marked improvement in living standards up to the end of the 1970s, and recognition of a number of different identities and nationalities.

By distinguishing between Yugoslav citizenship and an individually chosen, ethnic-cultural "nationality," it was hoped to preserve ethnic diversity while creating a feeling of solidarity common to all Yugoslavs. In a communist country like Yugoslavia, such solidarity could only be established on the basis of secular, anti-clerical structures. When the Communist Party came to power, it separated church and state, and opposed all religious ideologies. The hard line it adopted towards the churches was in part a result of the latter's opposition to the new regime and their willingness to come to an accommodation with the occupying forces during the war. Islamist organisations were also banned as was the veiling of women. Izetbegovic was prosecuted for belonging to an organisation of young Islamists in the 1950s. (He was convicted again at the beginning of the 1980s for his "Islamic manifesto.") However, religious freedom was recognised as a basic right of the individual. With the growing consolidation of the regime, relations with the different church leaders were normalised with a view to integrating the churches into society.

Bosnia's Muslims had conflicting feelings (as Islamised Slavs) about their national identity. During the period of their association with Turkish rule, they called themselves "Turks"but they also defended their specific interests within the Ottoman empire. Following the demise of the empire, some adopted the label "Serbs," others referred to themselves as "Croats," while many more resisted all attempts at assimilation into either nationality. While they were attracted to Yugoslavism, they rejected its unitarianism. Under Tito, they were free to choose between Serbian and Croatian nationality or to identify their nationality as "undetermined." Most opted for the latter alternative.

The decentralisation introduced from 1960 onwards was an expression of the Titoists' abandonment of their initial hope of merging the different nationalities into one Yugoslavian people. The Muslims were recognised as a distinct nationality for the first time in 1968, and this was enshrined in the constitution in 1974. The term "Muslim" was no longer used to designate members of a religious community, however. Rather it represented a distinct ethnic and national identity. This was in line with Tito's policy of "non-alignment" and was an important signal to the Islamic world. The new approach provided for equal treatment for the three Bosnian communities, who, while speaking the same language, belonged to different religious cultures.

Thus Bosnia-Hercegovina-like Yugoslavia-was defined as a multinational state which distinguished between Bosnian citizenship and the following nationalities or peoples: Serbs, Croats and Bosnian Muslims, known as Bosniaks today. The three groups were treated as equal, notwithstanding their numeric inequality. In 1990, 43. 7 per cent of Bosnians identified themselves as Muslim in the ethnic-national sense, but only 16.5 per cent in the religious sense. 31 per cent were Serbs (but only 20 per cent were Orthodox) and 17.3 per cent were Croats (but only 15 per cent Catholic). 46 per cent of the Bosnian population did not belong to any faith. None of these ethnic groups had their own distinct settlement areas. A map showing the population distribution in Bosnia-Hercegovina from the year 1990 resembles a leopard skin, which would only be transformed into a uniform fabric as a result of war and mass expulsion.

Crisis in the "artificial" ugoslav state Federal structures in Yugoslavia preserved (a) a diversity of identities and a balance between the communities and (b) a multinational state which protected private ownership ofland combined with social ownership (belonging to every citizen and no one in particular) in industry and services. The collapse of the federation and the uncertainties of the "transitional period" were to have a catastrophic effect on the key question of transforming ownership. The population was consumed by a growing fear of being on the wrong side of the fence, deprived of state protection for their land, their work, their identities and their very lives.

When the Party began to decline, the main beneficiaries in each of the republics were the nationalist parties. They manipulated already existing fears, identified scapegoats for the crisis and offered their own form of protection to their communities, who were invariably defined as victims of "the other." The crisis of the federation nurtured plans to transform Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia into separate nation states. However, the leaders ofBosnia-Hercegovina and Macedonia did everything in their power to prevent the disintegration of Yugoslavia. In this they had the support of Turkey. Contrary to the "Islamic conspiracy" theory, Ankara was anxious to maintain regional stability,' particularly as the two republics-Bosnia and Macedonia-had begun to come to the attention of expansionist forces in neighbouring countries. When the nationalists rejected the "artificial boundaries" created by Tito, they also began to question the legitimacy of the "artificial peoples." The weakest and most threatened of these were the Bosnian Muslims, who were targeted by the Serbian and Croatian nationalist parties ofBosnia-Hercegovina and also by Belgrade and Zagreb, who had plans to expand Serbia and Croatia and to carve up Bosnia-Hercegovina between them. This began as an external offensive, arranged before the war between the Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and the Croatian President, Franjo Tudmann. Before long, they were joined by warlords within Bosnia who sought to expand their territory and increase their control.

The Muslim population, confronted by such Serbian-Croatian plans, had no territory to call their own. The only state they possessed was Bosnia-Hercegovina. For a long time they hoped for military action by the international community. But "there was no oil" in Bosnia, and the Wes tern governments had no significant or immediate strategic reason for intervening in Bosnia. Nor was there a definitive answer to the question of who or what should be defended and to what end. Many observers saw the division of Bosnia- Hercegovina as a matter of fate, while many more focused on containing the war and obviating the "fundamentalist threat."

The superpowers and a "Palestine in the heart of Europe" The international community did not have a common policy on the crisis in Yugoslavia and Bosnia. During the 1980s, most powerful countries (with the exception of Germany) were in favour of the continued existence of the Yugoslav state, yet they gave their full backing to policies which would eventually corrode this society. With the threat of war in the Balkans, the United Nations deployed troops to Macedonia, and Albania became NATO's main base in the region. But President Izetbegovic's requests that troops be stationed in Bosnia-Hercegovina before the conflict could spread were ignored. This amounted to an unscrupulous act on the part of the international community, if not an implicit endorsement of the SerbianCroatian destruction of Bosnia-Hercegovina.

When the Yugoslav federation finally fell apart, the Western governments agreed on a number of issues: to avoid being drawn into a war in the Balkans; to combat Islamic fundamentalism; and to retain some form of partnership with Russia. But their policies were also influenced (at least at the beginning of the crisis) by their specific interests and their respective "historical alliances" with the various nations involved in the war.

France and Great Britain agreed with the Serb President that a strong Serbia was needed to counteract German influence in the Balkans. The Muslim cause was further weakened by the identification of "Muslims" with "fundamentalists," and by the confusing merging of Muslim nationality and Muslim religion. Ultimately it was hoped that an alliance between Milosevic and Tudjman would provide a solution. Bosnia-Hercegovina was eventually carved up by the Bosnian Serb leader, Radovan Karadzic and the Bosnian Croat leader, Mate Boban, who established the Republic Srpska and the Republic of Herceg- Bosna respectively. The leaders of these states took part in international negotiations. And it was their conquests which determined the relentless logic of the "peace plans," leading to the initial "cantonisation and the ultimate dismemberment of Bosnia-Hercegovina.

Under these conditions, the Muslims were forced to crowd together in a rump state, which consisted of "safe havens"-similar to the "Bantustans" in South Africa-declared as such by the UN, who did not, however, defend them. Understandably, the Islamic countries displayed solidarity with the Muslim victims of a conflict which came to be seen as a modern-day Crusade by the Christian West against the Muslim population of Bosnia-Hercegovina. 5 It was common in the Islamic world to compare the war to the situation in Palestine and to liken Western support for Serbia with its backing of Israel. Serb propaganda encouraged this interpretation, invoking an actual and imagined, past and future, "anti-Serbian genocide." The Serbs referred to themselves as the 'Jews of the 21st century" in order to justify "the re-conquest in self-defence" of all "historical territories" including Serbia's Jerusalem," Kosovo."

The perception of the war as a Christian Crusade was strengthened when the Muslims were forced to fight on two fronts in 1993 and again in spring of 1994. At a time when UN aid convoys were permanently blocked and the besieged Muslim population was often forced to survive for weeks on donations from Islamic charities, it became increasingly apparent that more Muslims were attending the mosque and more Muslim women were wearing the veil. Later on, the Islamic world had renewed cause for outrage when besieged Muslim enclaves were not only left undefended by UN troops, but were actually disarmed by UNPROFOR forces. At the same time, media footage from Chechnya showed a Muslim population being butchered while the Christian West looked on in indifference. The reaction of the United States to the Bosnian crisis was influenced by a number of factors. The US agreed with Germany that the war was a manifestation of Serb aggression and it correctly believed that the isolation of the Bosnian Muslims would strengthen, rather than diminish, the fundamentalist threat. Foreign policy considerations included defending America's diplomatic interests and spheres of influence in the Arab and Islamic world, and appeasing Russia (and Yeltsin in particular). Domestic considerations were coloured by the "Vietnam and Somalia syndrome," which favoured foreign-policy isolationism and a perception of the war in Bosnia as a purely European affair. At the same time, public outrage at the horrific footage of the war gave rise to demands for immediate intervention. When the US called for a removal of the arms embargo against the Bosnian army, it gained a lot of favour-particularly with the Organisation of the Islamic Coriference (OIC), which had been pushing for the same thing. At the same time, however, the US had gone over the heads of Russian and European negotiators and endangered the latter's troops on the ground.

The Bosnian question became an issue in the US election campaign, with the Republican opposition taking credit for the removal of the one-sided arms embargo. Clinton for his part was determined to secure a diplomatic success at all costs by ending the martyrdom of the Muslim population and reinforcing the USA's position of leadership (with the aid of NATO).

Rather than ending the arms embargo on the Sarajevo government, Washington opted for a different policy. It reinforced the Croatian army (thus enabling it to fulfil its project of cleansing Croatia of its Serbs) and it forced President Tudjman to form the CroatianMuslim bloc advocated by Turkey and Iran, 7 further increasing the paranoia of the Bosnian Serbs fighting for a secessionist line. The Dayton agreements counterbalanced these developments by consolidating the role of the Serb President Milosevic against his former ally, Radovan Karadzic, and by recognising both the "sovereignty" and the ethnic division of Bosnia. Thus Dayton did not put an end either to the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia or to the bilateral fronts (be they Croatian-Serbian and anti-Muslim, or Croatian-Muslim and anti-Serbian) which continue to destroy the country's multinational reality today.

What do the Bosnian Muslims want now?

Izetbegovic's Party for Democratic Action (SDA) was the loser at Dayton. The party's objectives included the continuing existence of Bosnia-Hercegovina, but under its own dominance-an objective which contributed to the destruction of Bosnia. The SDA was a composite of different elements, and had splintered on several occasions. While it may not have committed as many crimes as the Serb and Croatian nationalists, it did behave like the former Communist Party and like all nationalist parties, setting itself up as a ministate in which party members reaped the economic and political benefits. (This explains its appeal to former members of the communist nomenclature and to businessmen like Fikret Abdic, who later fought against the army of Sarajevo for the secession of Bihac). Within the SDA, there were two separate factions: the religious and the Bosniak-nationalist. The former aimed to establish an Islamic state and to re-Islamise the Muslim population who were spending more time on "Western" pleasures than in the mosque. It oriented itself to the Islamic world, and Iran in particular, and was personified by Izetbegovic. The other faction represented the secular Bosniaks who had become more detached from their religious faith. Although it was intent on creating a laicist Bosnian state, it was often more interested in recapturing the "occupied" territories than in convincing the population that multiethnic coexistence was possible. This became obvious during the existence of the Croat-Muslim federation: its 200,000 Serbs were treated as second class citizens. The laicist group looked toward the USA and Turkey and was generally associated with the former Prime Minister Haris Siladzic, who later broke with the SDA to form the Party for Bosnia. Alija Izetbegovic's contradictory position may be summed up by the fact that he represented the Bosniaks-and within that the Islamist faction-at a time when he was President of the multiethnic state of Bosnia-Hercegovina and was entering into weak alliances with the non-nationalist opposition and with Haris Siladzic.

The ambiguity of the "Muslim cause" has aroused confusion in the Islamic world. Most Bosniaks were more interested in protecting Bosnia's cultural diversity than in retaining their own religious identity. What they wanted was recognition as Europeans. Consequently, the assistance offered by the Islamic countries was politically inopportune, while the response of the Western powers left them feeling betrayed.

Footnotes

1 Malcolm 1994

2 Samary 1995.

3 The term "Turk" is a reminder of the position of power held by Bosnian Muslims during the Ottoman era.

4 Gallagher 1995.

5 Gallagher 1995.

6 Gallagher / Khan 1994; Mitri 1993.

7 The first Serbian state came into being in the Middle Ages in Kosovo, where 80 per cent of the population today is Albanian. On this point see the writings of the former Yugoslav President and Serb author Dobrica Casie, published by Editions!'Age d'Homme, Lausanne.

8 Gallagher 1995.

Bibliography

The bibliography is available in the book.