Draft:Ayman al-Zawahiri

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Ayman al-Zawahiri

Name	Ayman Muhammad Rabi' al-Zawahiri
Place of Birth	Cairo, Egypt
Date of Birth	19 June 1951
Education	PhD in Surgery
Known for	Successor to bin Laden
Religion	Sunni Salafi
Death	Shrouded in ambiguity

Ayman al-Zawahiri, the successor to bin Laden and the second leader of the al-Qaeda organization, embodied the extremist jihadist ideology emerging from Egyptian jihadist Salafists within al-Qaeda. He prioritized fighting within the Islamic world against the rulers of Muslim countries. By establishing numerous armed Salafi branches under the pretext of combating the West, he generated a wave of unrest, massacre, and destruction across the Islamic world. Al-Zawahiri considered himself subordinate to the Taliban movement and operated under its protective umbrella. Periodically, he released audio or video files to articulate his positions regarding global developments, calling upon armed Salafists to unite and remain steadfast in the path of jihad. This Egyptian surgeon, hailing from an educated family in Cairo, Arab Republic of Egypt, became the leader of an organization whose branches had become disconnected and whose activities were in decline. The life and thoughts of this militant and takfiri figure encapsulate the essence of extremist and armed Salafi movements; studying and examining them reveals multiple facets of this nature.

Birth and Education

Ayman al-Zawahiri was born on 19 June 1951 in Cairo, the capital of Egypt. His family possessed a distinguished scientific and social background in Egypt. His grandfather, Sheikh Rabi' al-Zawahiri, was one of the scholars of Al-Azhar, while his father, Muhammad Rabi' al-Zawahiri, was a professor at the Faculty of Medicine at Ain Shams University in Egypt and one of the renowned physicians of the region. One of his ancestors was also among the Sufi scholars of Egypt who was appointed as Egypt's ambassador to several countries and was nicknamed the "Sufi Ambassador."

His mother, Umayma Azzam, belonged to the famous Azzam family, whose most prominent figure was Abdul Rahman Pasha Azzam, the great-uncle of Ayman al-Zawahiri, who served as the first Secretary-General of the Arab League. Ayman al-Zawahiri's mother was the daughter of Dr. Abdul Wahhab Azzam, a professor of Oriental Literature at Al-Azhar University, who translated the Shahnameh into Arabic.

After entering the Faculty of Medicine at Cairo University, Ayman graduated with highest honors in 1974. He subsequently obtained his master's degree in surgery in 1978 and later earned his PhD in surgery through further studies at universities in Pakistan.

Religious-Political Activities

Ayman al-Zawahiri's youth coincided with the peak activities of jihadist and dissenting Islamist movements in Egypt. Salafi-jihadist thoughts, flourishing within Egypt's Islamic sphere, profoundly influenced al-Zawahiri's spirit and intellect.

In 1966, he joined a religious movement led by Ismail Tantawi. However, Tantawi's travel to Germany in 1975 caused the movement to disintegrate. Subsequently, al-Zawahiri founded an Islamic movement himself. In 1981, he met Tariq al-Zumar and Aboud al-Zumar and joined the Jihad Organization, which was led by engineer Abd al-Salam Faraj.

Based on radical and militant Salafi ideas, this organization was considered one of the most active jihadist movements in Egypt. Its charter, titled "The Islamic Action Covenant," stated:

Our Cause: To gain the pleasure of our Lord, blessed and exalted, to be sincere to Him, and to realize obedience to His Prophet.

Our Creed: The creed of the righteous predecessors (Salaf), both generally and in detail.

Our Goal: 1- To realize the worship of people for God alone. 2- To establish the rightly guided Islamic Caliphate.

Our Path: Calling to God, enjoining good and forbidding evil, and jihad in the way of God through a disciplined group whose activities are based on the true Sharia.

Our Provisions: Knowledge and piety, certainty and reliance on God, patience and gratitude, asceticism regarding the world, and self-sacrifice for the Hereafter.

Our Allegiance: To God and His Messenger.

Our Enmity: Against the oppressors.

Our Unity: Under a single intellectual banner, with one cause and one creed.

Ayman al-Zawahiri continued his political and militant activities in Egypt until 1980, when he traveled to Peshawar, Pakistan, accompanied by two friends who specialized in medicine, anesthesiology, and plastic surgery, to provide aid and treatment to wounded Afghan mujahideen. However, due to the disruption of the situation for militants in Egypt, he returned a few months later, where he was arrested and imprisoned by the Egyptian government.

Ayman al-Zawahiri spent three years in Egyptian prisons on charges of involvement in the assassination of Anwar Sadat. Given the conditions within Egyptian prisons at the time and the ideological discussions prevalent among Islamist prisoners, it was natural for al-Zawahiri's thoughts to be driven with greater intensity toward extremism and takfir.

Battle in Afghanistan

Following his release from prison in 1985, Zawahiri entered the battlefield in Afghanistan, exhibiting noticeable changes in his behavior, thoughts, and writings.

He regarded this arena as a suitable environment for the growth and strengthening of armed Salafists, deeming it appropriate for promoting extremist and militant Salafi ideology. Consequently, he sought to mobilize Arab-Afghan forces to bolster the human resources of jihadist Salafists.

Arab fighters entered Afghanistan for various reasons and with differing motivations, the primary among which were:

• Fighting alongside Afghan mujahideen against the Soviet Union and fulfilling the religious duty of jihad,
• Engaging in relief and humanitarian aid activities within Afghanistan and in areas hosting Afghan refugees in Pakistan,
• Joining Arab military camps in Afghanistan for military training after 1992,
• Fleeing their home countries to live in Afghanistan, either out of fear of imprisonment or because they were subject to legal prosecution on multiple charges.

Among them, Ayman al-Zawahiri, who had prior experience with organizational activities in Egypt, expanded his ideological and field operations in 1987 with financial assistance from Osama bin Laden and other funding received from Arab countries. By establishing the Jihad Office in Peshawar as the secretary of the Afghan mujahideen, he collected financial contributions from certain Arab states and charitable organizations, directing these funds toward jihad in Afghanistan. He also published a periodical titled al-Fath.

Al-Qaeda Field Command

In keeping with the name of his publication, he bestowed the title "Tala'i al-Fath" (Vanguards of Victory) upon the Arab-Afghan forces and, alongside bin Laden, undertook the organization and management of these troops. By 1987, coinciding with the beginning of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, he initiated the transfer of Al-Qaeda's fighting forces to other conflict zones across the Islamic world, dispatching some of them to Yemen in coordination with certain Yemeni factions.

He sent Muhammad Makawi as his representative to forge an alliance with Yemeni forces present in Afghanistan. In recognition of bin Laden's services, the Yemenis agreed to train Al-Qaeda members in their military barracks, which had been established with the support of the Hashid Yemeni tribes. Consequently, several Al-Qaeda operatives of various nationalities traveled to Yemen to receive military training in the Jabal al-Muraqashah region, under the control of the Hashid tribes, in preparation for deployment to Somalia to confront American forces there.

In early 1993, during a meeting of Al-Qaeda leaders held in Sudan, Ayman al-Zawahiri was appointed as the organization's field commander, effectively assuming responsibility for overseeing its major field operations. Immediately thereafter, he undertook covert trips to Kenya to reorganize the group's activities in East Africa, establishing the country as a hub for meetings and coordination of Al-Qaeda forces in the region.

He did not limit his activities solely to managing forces; through numerous travels to various countries, he sought not only to secure financial support for Al-Qaeda but also to recruit and manage its operatives across different parts of the world.

During the 1999 trial of Islamists in Cairo, Khaled Abu al-Dhahab stated that Ayman al-Zawahiri had traveled to the United States in 1995 under the pseudonym Dr. Abd al-Mu'izz to raise funds ostensibly for victims of the war in Afghanistan. He subsequently diverted part of these funds to carry out the terrorist bombing of the Egyptian embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan, in 1995.

Ayman al-Zawahiri was one of the principal architects behind a statement in which extremist Salafists issued direct and explicit threats against all Christian, Jewish, and American individuals, citizens, and interests.

In February 1998, six leaders of armed Salafi groups attracted widespread attention by signing a declaration announcing the commencement of a comprehensive struggle. The statement was signed by bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Rifa'i Taha (a member of the Shura Council of Egypt's Islamic Group), Munir Hamzah (representative of the Assembly of Pakistani Scholars), and Fazlur Rahman (leader of the Jihad Movement in Bangladesh). By signing this document, the signatories proclaimed the formation of the World Front for Fighting Jews and Crusaders, emphasizing that killing Americans and their Western allies—whether military or civilian—is an individual obligation (fard 'ayn) incumbent upon every Muslim capable of doing so, until the Al-Aqsa Mosque and the Grand Mosque (Masjid al-Haram) are liberated from their grasp and their armies are expelled humiliated from Islamic lands.

After leaving Sudan and entering Afghanistan, although bin Laden established his base there, al-Zawahiri decided to travel to Chechnya to participate in the jihad against Russia in that region. However, apart from bin Laden and a small number of Al-Qaeda leaders, no one was aware of this journey. The trip nearly turned into a disaster when al-Zawahiri, accompanied by two of his associates—Mahmoud al-Hanawi and Ahmad Salama Mabruk, both senior Al-Qaeda figures—were arrested by Dagestani security forces on charges of illegal entry using forged passports. At the time, the Dagestani forces were unaware of the detainees' true identities. Envoys sent by bin Laden attempted to secure their release by bribing Dagestani security personnel. Following his release, al-Zawahiri returned to Afghanistan, while Ahmad Salama Mabruk departed for Azerbaijan and al-Hanawi remained stationed in the Caucasus.

Although al-Zawahiri was considered bin Laden's right-hand man during bin Laden's lifetime, he nonetheless surpassed bin Laden in terms of media presence and propaganda output. Over a span of nine years, more than sixty audio and video files featuring him were published on websites affiliated with Al-Qaeda.

Succession of bin Laden

Following the official announcement on May 1, 2011, by Barack Obama, then President of the United States, that the U.S. had killed bin Laden along with one of his sons (Khalid) in a region of Pakistan, al-Qaeda immediately moved to appoint a new leader and pledge allegiance to the new leadership.

The al-Qaeda organization temporarily placed Saif al-Adel, a former officer of the Egyptian Special Forces and one of the group's leaders, in charge of its affairs until the formal appointment of Ayman al-Zawahiri could be officially announced.

In fact, Saif al-Adel's role was to coordinate among al-Qaeda's branches to secure allegiance to Ayman al-Zawahiri and pave the way for his ascension to leadership.

Approximately one month later, with the announcement of Ayman al-Zawahiri's replacement of bin Laden as the leader of al-Qaeda, public opinion and experts turned their attention increasingly toward this Salafi figure, and his speeches and statements received heightened scrutiny. Nevertheless, he never possessed bin Laden's charisma, and his influence among enthusiastic young Salafis was considerably less than that of bin Laden.

Many moderate Salafis, who had admired and supported bin Laden due to his hostility toward the West and America, did not accept al-Zawahiri, viewing him as a source of deviation in al-Qaeda's operational motivations. This is clearly evident in online user comments posted alongside news reports of al-Zawahiri's succession: many bin Laden supporters rejected al-Zawahiri, even considering him responsible for diverting bin Laden's path, while others described him as a bloodthirsty individual who made no distinction between ordinary civilians and Western military personnel, asserting that his primary objective was the destruction of governments in Islamic countries.

Nevertheless, most armed Salafi movements affiliated with al-Qaeda pledged allegiance to him, and groups such as Al-Shabaab in Somalia welcomed Ayman al-Zawahiri's leadership.

Armed movements in northern Mali also united under a single group named Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin and pledged allegiance to Ayman al-Zawahiri as the leader of al-Qaeda.

Robert Gates, then U.S. Secretary of Defense, commenting on the news of Ayman al-Zawahiri's succession, stated: Al-Zawahiri lacks bin Laden's leadership qualities and does not possess his stature or expertise in commanding operations.

The most significant group that welcomed Ayman al-Zawahiri's leadership was the Pakistani Taliban movement; Ihsanullah Ihsan, spokesperson for the Pakistani Taliban, described al-Zawahiri as a powerful figure capable of leading al-Qaeda toward victory over the West.

However, it was clear to all parties that even before bin Laden's death, al-Qaeda had been moving toward isolation and weakness, and his demise would accelerate this trend; al-Qaeda could not, under Ayman al-Zawahiri's leadership, return to its peak period of activity.

One of the most significant indicators of Ayman al-Zawahiri's inadequacy and al-Qaeda's weakness emerged through disputes among the organization's branches in Syria.

When ISIS, initially considered a branch of this organization and aligned with the Taliban, engaged in a prolonged conflict with the Al-Nusra Front, which was officially recognized as al-Qaeda's representative in Syria, the dispute escalated to include military clashes, massacres, and mutual assassinations.

Al-Zawahiri repeatedly issued audio and video recordings of his speeches calling for unity among armed Salafi movements in Syria, urging ISIS to remain in Iraq and leave Syria to the Al-Nusra Front. However, the words of al-Qaeda's leader lacked their former influence and appeal. Indeed, in one of his statements, al-Zawahiri described ISIS members as worse than the Kharijites.

More importantly than that portion of his speech was the segment in which Ayman al-Zawahiri formally declared al-Qaeda's subordination to the Taliban and called upon other movements to cooperate with and support the Taliban movement.

Ideologies

Al-Wala' wa-l-Bara'

Loyalty and disavowal (al-wala' wa-l-bara') constitute one of the most fundamental ideological principles of armed Salafi groups, which base the justification for obligatory jihad upon this doctrine and emphasize its centrality.

Ayman al-Zawahiri addressed his views on loyalty and disavowal in a book titled Al-Wala' wa-l-Bara': Aqidah Manqulah wa Waqi' Mafqud (Loyalty and Disavowal: A Transmitted Creed and a Lost Reality).

He enumerated the core pillars of al-wala' wa-l-bara' in Islam as follows:

1. Prohibition of forming alliances with unbelievers,

2. Harboring hatred toward unbelievers and abandoning affection for them,

3. Prohibition of developing intimacy with them or disclosing Muslims' secrets to them,

4. Prohibition of appointing unbelievers to significant positions of authority,

5. Prohibition of venerating the symbols and customs of unbelievers or praising their false practices,

6. Prohibition of aiding unbelievers against Muslims,

7. The command to wage jihad against unbelievers, which becomes individually obligatory (fard 'ayn) when they dominate Islamic lands (in this context, he also substantiates and elaborates the legitimacy of jihad against rulers of Islamic countries due to their apostasy),

8. The command to maintain loyalty toward believers and provide them with assistance.

Views Regarding Rulers of Islamic Countries

Ayman al-Zawahiri spent his youth and the formative period of his ideological development amidst the rise of thoughts propagated by Sayyid Qutb, Abd al-Salam Faraj, Shukri Mustafa, and others concerning the apostasy of rulers due to their judgment by laws other than what Allah has revealed; consequently, he consistently emphasized in his writings the disbelief and apostasy of these rulers, describing them as mercenaries of the unbelievers.

In his book Al-Wala' wa-l-Bara, he identified the rulers of Islamic countries as the most deviant groups regarding the principle of loyalty and disavowal, considering them individuals outside the bounds of Sharia who have seized control over Islamic territories.

He characterized the deviation of these rulers as compound deviation, stating: On one hand, they do not implement the rulings of Sharia (judging by other than what Allah has revealed), and on the other hand, they maintain loyalty toward the enemies of Islam and have submitted themselves to them.

Furthermore, in his book Al-Hiwar ma'a al-Tawaghit: Maqbarat al-Du'ah (Dialogue with the Tyrants: The Graveyard of Preachers), while declaring the rulers of Islamic countries as unbelievers, he cited judgments of disbelief issued by certain Salafi scholars such as al-Shinqiti, Muhammad Hamid al-Faqi, Ahmad Shakir, Mahmud Shakir, and Muhammad ibn Ibrahim, the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia.

In the same book, Al-Hiwar ma'a al-Tawaghit: Maqbarat al-Da'wah wa-l-Du'ah, regarding the excommunication of Arab rulers, he wrote: "As for their being apostate unbelievers, this is based on Allah's statement: 'And whoever does not judge by what Allah has revealed – then it is those who are the disbelievers.'" Drawing upon the ideologies of Ibn Taymiyyah and Sayyid Qutb, he declared existing governments in Islamic countries as unbelievers, citing the following reasons for this judgment:

Failure to govern according to divine Sharia and the amalgamation of divine laws with other man-made legislation.

Belittling and mocking divine Sharia by prioritizing other laws over religious legislation.

Democracy, which in itself constitutes disbelief; because, according to Abul A'la Maududi, democracy signifies rule by the people, thereby placing them in the position of God.

Permitting what is forbidden and prohibiting what is lawful in Sharia. For instance, although all scholars agree that jihad against Israel in the occupied Palestinian territories is obligatory, Islamic governments, by enacting laws and refraining from war against Israel, act contrary to the religion of God.

Based on the aforementioned reasons, al-Zawahiri emphasized the necessity of waging jihad against existing governments in Islamic countries.

In his book Al-Jihad wa Fadl al-Shahadah (Jihad and the Merit of Martyrdom), he ruled permissible the killing of women and children present among unbelievers, and even deemed it allowable to kill Muslims found among them. He wrote that if the intended targets are polytheists, and there is knowledge of the presence of some Muslims among them, targeting them remains permissible, and no blood money (diyah) or expiation (kaffarah) is incumbent upon the mujahid for killing such Muslims. In support of this ruling, he also cited the opinions of Ibn Taymiyyah.

The Near Enemy and the Far Enemy

Due to his conviction regarding the disbelief of rulers in Islamic countries, Ayman al-Zawahiri described them as the "near enemy" (al-'adu al-qarib) in contrast to the "far enemy" (al-'adu al-ba'id), namely the West and America. Based on the Quranic verse "O you who have believed, fight those adjacent to you of the disbelievers and let them find in you harshness...", he regarded jihad against these rulers as a paramount obligation.

In 1995, in the magazine Al-Mujahidin, affiliated with the Egyptian Islamic Jihad organization, he published an article titled "The Road to Jerusalem Passes Through Cairo," in which he claimed that Jerusalem would not be liberated until after the victory of Islamists in Egypt and Algeria.

On May 20, 1996, criticizing the Egyptian Islamic Group (al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya), al-Zawahiri stated: "The main mistake of the Islamic Group is distinguishing between the internal and external enemy. They differentiate between Britain and King Farouk, between America and Gamal Abdel Nasser, and between the Soviet Union and Gamal Abdel Nasser." He added: "Fighting the near enemy takes precedence, because Allah says in the Quran: "Fight those of the disbelievers who are nearest to you" – fight those unbelievers who are closest to you.

When Hamed Abu al-Nasr (d. 1986), the Supreme Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, stated that jihad is only permissible against foreign enemies, Ayman al-Zawahiri responded: "It makes no difference whether the unbelieving enemy is a compatriot or a foreigner; the reason obligating war against him is his disbelief, not whether he is a foreigner or a compatriot. Moreover, an unbeliever, by virtue of his disbelief, has become alienated from his fellow Muslim compatriots, as evidenced by the noble Quranic verse: "[Allah] said, 'O Noah, indeed he is not of your family; indeed, he is [one whose] work was other than righteous...'" Those who distinguish between a foreign unbeliever and a domestic one are like those who differentiate between domestic and foreign intoxicants (al-khamr)." He further added: "The individual obligation (fard 'ayn) of jihad against these rulers means that anyone who, knowing its obligation, refrains from fulfilling it commits a major sin."

Iran and Shi'ism

One of the most significant disagreements between Osama bin Laden and al-Zawahiri concerned Iran; al-Zawahiri prioritized confronting Iran in al-Qaeda's activities, believing Iran sought regional dominance and the propagation of Shi'ism among Sunnis. He consistently accused Iran and Iraqi Shiites (including Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani) of collaborating and maintaining ties with the West and Americans. In contrast, bin Laden rejected al-Zawahiri's views on Iran, considering a hostile stance toward Iran impractical.

Responding to bin Laden's position regarding Iran, al-Zawahiri stated: "It is of no concern to me that two of bin Laden's sons (Saad and Abdullah) have been living in Iran since 2003. I consider Iran the ideological and doctrinal enemy of al-Qaeda, because the increasing influence of Shi'ism in the world is far more dangerous than the spread of communism."

In the Islamic year 1415 AH, during an interview, he explicitly and comprehensively articulated al-Qaeda's official stance toward Iran.

In this interview, Ayman al-Zawahiri was asked: "Media outlets frequently accuse Islamic movements of accepting support and assistance from Iran, and Egyptian media in particular accuse them of following Shia Iran. What is your opinion?"

He replied: "These accusations are pure slander. We maintain a clear and explicit position toward Iran, based on creedal and scholarly facts. As we have stated, we adhere to the methodology of the Pious Predecessors (al-Salaf al-Salih); therefore, clear differences and divisions exist between us and the Shiites. The Twelver Shia sect, in our view, is one of the innovating sects that introduced creedal innovations into the religion, leading Shiites to:

Assert the disbelief of Abu Bakr, Umar, the Mothers of the Believers (the wives of the Prophet), the Companions, and the Successors, openly cursing and reviling them.

Claim the distortion (tahrif) of the Quran.

Assert the infallibility of the Twelve Imams, claiming they attained a status unreachable by any prophet or archangel.

Claim the occultation (ghaybah) and return (raj'ah) of the Twelfth Imam, along with similar beliefs.

These are beliefs such that anyone who adheres to them after evidence has been established against them is an apostate; however, one who is ignorant and holds these beliefs based on hadiths they presume authentic, or who is a layperson, is excused.

Ayman al-Zawahiri then commented on Iran's position following the Islamic Revolution:

The leaders of the Iranian Revolution, after overthrowing the Shah due to his deviation from Islam, claimed their revolution was Islamic rather than Shia, asserting they would stand alongside oppressed Muslim nations regardless of sectarian differences between Sunni and Shia. However, unfolding realities demonstrated this claim to be mere rhetoric; Iranian leaders only take positions beneficial to Shiites, and elsewhere, even in conflicts between Islam and disbelief, they feign ignorance. Examples include:

Their stance toward the Syrian revolution, where they sided with Hafez al-Assad and labeled the Muslim Brotherhood as American mercenaries.

In the Afghan jihad arena, they provided assistance exclusively to Shia groups.

Their feigned ignorance regarding the expulsion of Arab mujahideen from Pakistan; they took no action and offered no welcome to any Arab mujahid on Iranian soil.

No support came from Iran regarding jihad in Egypt and Algeria; they abandoned the mujahideen to fight bloody battles against tyrants alone.

They cooperate with any movement aligning with their agenda. In summary, our position toward Iran is that we are not subordinate to Iran.

He further addressed jihadist movements operating within Iran's sphere, stating: "This approach benefits you not; in exchange for minimal Iranian support, you are condemned as Iranian proxies and lose your respect among Sunnis."

The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt

Through his book Al-Hasad al-Murr: Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun fi Sittin 'Aman (The Bitter Harvest: The Muslim Brotherhood in Sixty Years), al-Zawahiri severely criticized the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. He deemed their cooperation with apostate and oppressive Egyptian governments, under the pretext of political struggle, contrary to Islamic rulings, accusing the Muslim Brotherhood of undermining and rejecting the obligation of jihad.

Suspicious and Ambiguous Death

Window of the building from which he was shot dead

Al-Zawahiri was killed on July 31, 2022, shortly after 6:00 a.m. local time, in a drone strike conducted by the United States Central Intelligence Agency in the upscale Sherpur neighborhood of Kabul. A senior government official stated in a press briefing: "The United States conducted a counterterrorism operation over the weekend against a high-value Al-Qaeda target in Afghanistan. The operation was successful and resulted in no civilian casualties." The United States Department of Defense denied responsibility for the attack, while the United States Central Command declined to comment. On the evening of August 1, 2022, following a two-day delay to thoroughly verify the operation's success, President Joe Biden announced at the White House that the U.S. intelligence community had identified Al-Zawahiri after he relocated to downtown Kabul in early 2022, and that he had authorized the strike one week prior. Biden further stated that the operation caused no civilian casualties and that no members of Al-Zawahiri's family were harmed.

Another intriguing account reports as follows: Following the Taliban's return to power in Afghanistan, Ayman al-Zawahiri deemed conditions suitable for resuming a normal life. He secured a large residence in the heart of Kabul, near foreign embassies, where he occasionally used the terrace for fresh air. In fact, this freedom of movement resulted from Al-Zawahiri's pledge of allegiance to the Taliban; ultimately, these appearances on his home terrace led to his demise. It now appears that Saif al-Adel, Al-Qaeda's representative in the Horn of Africa, who is 33 years old, is preparing to assume leadership of the organization.

References

• Peter L. Bergen: Osama bin Laden, translated by Abbasgholi Ghaffarifard, Tehran: Ettela'at, First Edition, 1390 SH.
• Abdulrahman Mazhar al-Halawish: Al-Shaykh wa al-Tabib; Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, Lebanon: Riad al-Rayyes, First Edition, 2011 CE.
• Abdulrahim Ali: Hilf al-Irhab: Tanzim al-Qa'ida min Abdullah Azzam ila Ayman al-Zawahiri, Cairo: Markaz al-Mahrusa, Second Edition, 2005 CE.
• Abdulrahim Ali: Tanzim al-Qa'ida: Ishrun Aman... wa al-Ghazw Mustamirr, Cairo: Al-Mahrusa, First Edition, 2007 CE.
• Fawaz Gerges: Al-Qa'ida: Al-Su'ud wa al-Aful, translated by Muhammad Shiya, Beirut: Markaz Dirasat al-Wahda al-Arabiya, First Edition, 2012 CE.
• Group of Authors: Al-Salafiyya: Al-Nash'a, al-Murtakizat, al-Hawiyya, Beirut: Ma'had al-Ma'arif al-Hikmiyya, 2004 CE.
• Muntasir al-Zayat: The Road to Al-Qaeda: The Story of Bin Laden's Right-Hand Man, translated by Leila Rashidi Rostami, Tehran: Azadmehr, First Edition, 1385 SH.

Websites:

• Al Jazeera:

http://www.aljazeera.net

• Raialyoum:

http://www.raialyoum.com

• Arabi21:

http://arabi21.com/