Sectarian identity and national identity in the Middle East: Difference between revisions
Sectarian identity and national identity in the Middle East (view source)
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imported>Peysepar (Created page with "The title is an article by Fanar Haddad<ref>Fanar Haddad, Middle East Institute, National University of Singapore. Email: meifh@nus.edu.sg</ref> published in journal “Nation...") |
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Keywords: Nationalism, Middle East, sectarian identity, Sunni, Shi'a, Iraq | Keywords: Nationalism, Middle East, sectarian identity, Sunni, Shi'a, Iraq | ||
= | =Introduction= | ||
Since at least 2003, the question of sub-state identities in the Middle East (and particularly in the Mashriq) has been disproportionately associated with the Sunni-Shi'a divide under the problematic label of "sectarianism." The elasticity and rudderless usage of the term has led to the reification of a number of misplaced normative assumptions. Chief amongst these relate to the presumed relation between sectarian identity and national identity. Most often this positions the two as mutually exclusive concepts: The rise of an ill-defined sectarianism supposedly signifies a weakness or absence of nationalism, and hence, a normatively "good," "modern," and territorialized national identity is framed as the antidote to a normatively "bad," "pre-modern," and transnational sectarian identity. This article seeks to offer a corrective to these assumptions and in so doing makes three interrelated claims: | Since at least 2003, the question of sub-state identities in the Middle East (and particularly in the Mashriq) has been disproportionately associated with the Sunni-Shi'a divide under the problematic label of "sectarianism." The elasticity and rudderless usage of the term has led to the reification of a number of misplaced normative assumptions. Chief amongst these relate to the presumed relation between sectarian identity and national identity. Most often this positions the two as mutually exclusive concepts: The rise of an ill-defined sectarianism supposedly signifies a weakness or absence of nationalism, and hence, a normatively "good," "modern," and territorialized national identity is framed as the antidote to a normatively "bad," "pre-modern," and transnational sectarian identity. This article seeks to offer a corrective to these assumptions and in so doing makes three interrelated claims: | ||