Fundamental Misconceptions: Islamic Foreign Policy: Difference between revisions
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</ref> No. 105 (Winter, 1996-1997), pp. 76-90. The following is the article | </ref> No. 105 (Winter, 1996-1997), pp. 76-90. The following is the article | ||
== | ==INTRODUCTION== | ||
For all the furor surrounding Islamic fundamentalism, there has been surprisingly little attention given tfundamentalist foreign policy. True, Iranian foreign policy has been analyzed and excoriated, and generalizations have been made on the basis of this one case. It is often assumed that fundamentalists approach foreign affairs with the same set of goals as chose that drive domestic policy: namely, rejection of the secular state and the establishment of religious law as the foundation of society. It is further thought chat lurking behind Islamic fundamentalist foreign policy is a commitment tholy war (jihad) with the non-Muslim world. And there seems t be a consensus among Western powers that fundamentalism poses a threat tthe international system. | For all the furor surrounding Islamic fundamentalism, there has been surprisingly little attention given tfundamentalist foreign policy. True, Iranian foreign policy has been analyzed and excoriated, and generalizations have been made on the basis of this one case. It is often assumed that fundamentalists approach foreign affairs with the same set of goals as chose that drive domestic policy: namely, rejection of the secular state and the establishment of religious law as the foundation of society. It is further thought chat lurking behind Islamic fundamentalist foreign policy is a commitment tholy war (jihad) with the non-Muslim world. And there seems t be a consensus among Western powers that fundamentalism poses a threat tthe international system. | ||
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Finally, the United States can afford to pay less attention to lslamic fundamentalism. If fundamentalist foreign policy is understood to be inherently circumscribed, then fundamentalism in the worstcase scenario is confined to one region. Policymakers have been able to normalize relations with communist China because China is not expansionist. So too could policy be normalized with fundamentalist governments. The United States can afford to accommodate fundamentalism, and it should. The attempt to contain it will almost certainly fail, and there is no better way to guarantee continued tension between political Islam and the West. | Finally, the United States can afford to pay less attention to lslamic fundamentalism. If fundamentalist foreign policy is understood to be inherently circumscribed, then fundamentalism in the worstcase scenario is confined to one region. Policymakers have been able to normalize relations with communist China because China is not expansionist. So too could policy be normalized with fundamentalist governments. The United States can afford to accommodate fundamentalism, and it should. The attempt to contain it will almost certainly fail, and there is no better way to guarantee continued tension between political Islam and the West. | ||
== | ==NOTES== |