Sectarian identity and national identity in the Middle East

The title is an article by Fanar Haddad published in journal “Nations and Nationalism”, 2020; 26:123-137. The following is the article.

Abstract

This article looks at modern sectarian (here referring to Sunni/Shi'a) identities and their interaction with nationalism in the Middle East. In doing so I make three interrelated claims: 1) the term 'sectarianism' is distortive and analytically counterproductive. A better understanding of modern sectarian identity requires us to jettison the term. 2) Once discarded, our focus can then shift to sectarian identity: how it is constructed, perceived, utilized and so forth. A holistic understanding of sectarian identity must recognize the multiple fields upon which it is constructed and contested. The model adopted here frames sectarian identity as simultaneously operating on four fields: doctrinal, subnational, transnational and, crucially for our purposes, the national dimension. 3) Thirdly, this article challenges the assumptions regarding national and sectarian identities in the modern Middle East. Contrary to conventional wisdom, modern sectarian identities are deeply embedded in the prism of the nation-state and are inextricably linked to nationalism and national identity. The article will rely primarily on the example of modern Iraq but, as will be seen, the Iraqi example is significantly echoed in the cases of Bahrain, Syria and Lebanon.

Keywords: Nationalism, Middle East, sectarian identity, Sunni, Shi'a, Iraq

Introduction

Since at least 2003, the question of sub-state identities in the Middle East (and particularly in the Mashriq) has been disproportionately associated with the Sunni-Shi'a divide under the problematic label of "sectarianism." The elasticity and rudderless usage of the term has led to the reification of a number of misplaced normative assumptions. Chief amongst these relate to the presumed relation between sectarian identity and national identity. Most often this positions the two as mutually exclusive concepts: The rise of an ill-defined sectarianism supposedly signifies a weakness or absence of nationalism, and hence, a normatively "good," "modern," and territorialized national identity is framed as the antidote to a normatively "bad," "pre-modern," and transnational sectarian identity. This article seeks to offer a corrective to these assumptions and in so doing makes three interrelated claims:

1. The way the term sectarianism is used has profoundly impeded our ability to correctly contextualize the role and relevance of sectarian identity in the modern Middle East. As such, rather than continuing with the circuitous debates as to what sectarianism is, a more fruitful approach would be to abandon the term and shift the focus to sectarian identity and its workings: How does it gain/lose relevance? How is it imagined and experienced in different contexts? And, most relevant to our purposes, how does it interact with national identity?

2. Viewing sectarian identity as any one thing (a religious identity or a social identity or a political construct, etc.) is inherently flawed in that it insists on framing intrinsically multilayered phenomena (sectarian identity and sectarian relations) in monochrome terms. This defies far more complex realities and recreates the unhelpfully rigid categories and binaries that have dominated the literature (Valbjorn, 2018). The complexity and ambiguity of sectarian identity mandate a multilayered framework that acknowledges the fact that these identities operate simultaneously on multiple, interconnected and mutually dialogical fields: doctrinal, subnational, national, and transnational (Haddad, 2020, Chapters 3 and 4).

3. With the term sectarianism safely discarded and with the adoption of a suitably multilayered conceptual framework for sectarian identity, the article comes to its central point, namely, the relationship and interaction between sectarian identity and national identity. Far too often the two are framed as polar opposites. This rests on unfounded normative assumptions regarding the content of nationalism and on problematic reductions of sectarian identity to its religious/doctrinal component. It also presumes convergence bordering on synonymy between secularism and nationalism. The fact is that sectarian competition in the age of the nation-state is as much a function of competing national truths and contested claims to the nation-state as it is a function of competing religious truths and exclusivist claims to overarching religious categories ("true Islam," for example). Rather than secessionist movements or fantasies of sectarian homogeneity, the more common pattern is for modern sectarian competition to take place within, and in the name of, the nation-state.

To illustrate the interrelation between sectarian identity and national identity, I rely on ethnosymbolist approaches to the study of nationalism and on sociological contributions to identity theory as in the works of Brubaker, Freedland, Yuval-Davis, and others. More broadly, it is hoped that this article will provide a corrective to common framings of sectarian identity as a sui generis concept with unique powers of causation and explanation. Doing so requires us to jettison ambiguous and negatively emotive terms like sectarianism and to turn our attention to the workings of sectarian identity as a multilayered concept operating on four fields: doctrinal, subnational, transnational, and (the focus of this article) the national dimension. The article will rely primarily on the example of modern Iraq but, as will be seen, the Iraqi example is significantly echoed in the cases of Bahrain, Syria, and Lebanon. What these countries have in common is, first, their high levels of sectarian heterogeneity and, second, they are ostensibly civic states where religious/sectarian identity is not an official criterion for political inclusion. As such, the ideal that is consistently looked to, but seldom achieved, is a sect-neutral pluralistic state based on concepts of citizenship. This has a profound impact on how sectarian relations and sectarian plurality are framed. The counterexamples would be Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Israel where there is little pretence to state neutrality regarding sectarian/religious identity.

From "Sectarianism" to Sectarian Identity

The many facets and manifestations of sectarian identity and sectarian relations are simply too numerous and too complex to be subsumed under one politically charged, value-laden, elastic, and irredeemably negative term such as sectarianism. Even a cursory survey of the literature-let alone mass media and public commentary-reveals a bewildering array of ways in which the concept is understood. In the vast majority of cases, the phrase is left undefined: In a recent survey of over 120 studies on sectarianism, I found that close to 70% made no attempt to define the term (Haddad, 2017b). This is particularly problematic given how the phrase's elasticity and presumed negativity have sharpened its utility as a political tool with which to delegitimize political opposition and stigmatize difference and nonconformity-as evidenced in how mass-protests in Bahrain and Syria in 2011 were effectively vilified by detractors with the nebulous charge of sectarianism (Wimmen, 2014; Al-Rasheed, 2017). Likewise, sect-specific rituals and otherwise legitimate expressions of sectarian identity have been stigmatized by association with an undefined sectarianism. As such, and considering the policy-relevance and social salience of the term sectarianism in the contemporary Middle East, defining or abandoning it is a matter of practical consequence.

While there are several broad approaches to how the term is understood, it suffices here to briefly examine the most popular of these, namely, that which focuses on the intersection of sectarian identity and politics.3 A good example of this defines sectarianism as"... the deployment of religious heritage as a primary marker of modern political identity." (Makdisi, 2000, p. 7). One of the merits of this approach is that it highlights the fact that much of what is referred to as sectarianism is indeed a function of modern politics rather than ancient religions thereby preempting primordialization and "medievalization" of the subject (Makdisi, 2017, p. 25). Nevertheless, this approach can only partially unpack the many meanings of sectarianism. For one thing, political behaviour can be sect-centric (and hence regarded as evidence of "sectarianism") absent the formal political reification of sectarian identities. This is vividly illustrated in the case of both the Syrian and Iraqi Ba'th regimes where political identity was not overtly linked to religious identity nor were conceptions of religious orthodoxy especially relevant to questions of political inclusion. Nevertheless, both regimes are associated with an undefined sectarianism but less because they have asserted a particular sectarian identity and more because they sustained a set of power relations that revolved around a nexus of tribal, regional, and party networks that only partially overlapped with sectarian identity (Van Dam, 1979; Hinnebusch, 2015, pp. 114-115; Batatu, 1978, pp. 1078-1093). Other weaknesses in this approach include its inherent top-down view of sectarian dynamics and its exclusion of belief/doctrine as a potential driver of sectarian relations/antagonisms.

In practice, the phrase sectarianism is hazy enough to act as an all-purpose explainer thereby hampering sound analysis by the suspension of cause and effect. This is reminiscent of how the concept of race has been problematized by critical race theorists, something that scholars would do well to emulate when it comes to "sectarianism": like "pure race," "sectarianism" is a product of thought and language, "[h]aving no material existence, they cannot have material causation," (Fields & Fields, 2014, pp. 22-23). Be it race or sectarianism, these concepts are presumed to objectively exist and are falsely taken as an analytical starting point with a cascading trail of distortions; hence, the prevalent mystification of sectarian identity whereby it is accorded far more causality than is necessary. For example, commentary on Iraq and Lebanon often credits ethno-sectarian identities with causality when trying to understand the corruption and dysfunction that so characterize the two political systems. In the process, this overlooks the far more central role of structural drivers such as the absence of robust institutions and weak rule of law. After all, self-styled secular or sect-blind parties are equally capable of, and susceptible to, corruption in such environments. Likewise, the apportionment of political offices does not have to follow the logic of sect or ethnicity and would operate in near-identical ways were it based on the logic of region, tribe, or party-political affiliation as opposed to sect. More relevant to our purposes, the incoherence and negativity of the term sectarianism has led to a widespread mischaracterization of the relation between sectarian identity and national identity with the former being framed as the Manichean opposite of national identity rather than as a potential function of it.

The Many Dimensions of Sectarian Identity

Rather than something that identifiably exists, the term sectarianism is, in practice, shorthand for a variety of symbols, behaviours, actions, attitudes, and other phenomena related to sectarian identity. As such, what is actually being discussed in the rapidly expanding literature on sectarianism is in fact sectarian identity and its many facets and dimensions. Hence, identity is where we should locate our conceptual starting point. How is sectarian identity constructed? What drives its salience? And, for our purposes, how does it relate to and interact with nationalism? Following the example of Yuval-Davis (2006), identity is here framed in relation to notions of belonging. Identity denotes the ever-evolving and never-ending process of subject formation as it relates to an individual's sense of belonging to, and shifting relationship with, a set of collectives (the content, relevance, and meanings of which are subject to context-dependent change). The dynamic nature of identity is well captured by Lawler's description of it as something that is "achieved" through social relations rather than statically held by individuals (Lawler, 2014, p. 2). This inherent fluidity of belonging means that identity is best imagined as a mode of cognition. As one study put it (Brubaker et al., 2004, p. 47), collective identities are " ... not things in the world but ways of seeing the world. They are ways of understanding and identifying oneself, making sense of one's problems and predicaments, identifying one's interests and orienting one's action." Identities, sectarian, or otherwise are reproduced through processes of social and political practice both from above and from below: by individual reliance on identity categories in order to create meaning and make sense of the world and by political actors and social and political institutions seeking to reproduce the group and order society by persuading members to deepen their belief in, and attachment to, groupspecific narratives, symbols, boundaries, and fellow members. It is through these practices that the prerequisite personal and social meanings of identity are generated and reproduced. Whether through performativity, narrative, or dialogical practice, constructing meaning is essential to turning something into an element of identity. As one study put it: "... having a British passport does not automatically give someone a British identity ..." (Vignoles, Schwartz, & Luyckx, 2011, p. 2).

With this basic starting point, we can frame sectarian identity as belonging (not necessarily voluntary or active) to a collective that is marked by sectarian (here meaning major, institutionalized, intra-religious) cleavages: Hanbali, Zaidi, Protestant, Catholic-for our purposes, specifically Sunni and Shi'a. For the concept of sectarian identity to have the requisite conceptual clarity and analytical utility, we must recognize the different meanings and frames through which sectarian identity is perceived and experienced. In this, we would be following the example set by earlier identity theory in its wariness of rigid definitions-indeed in Lawler's view it is impossible to arrive at a singular definition of identity (Lawler, 2014, pp. 8-9). As such, it is necessary to consider how sectarian identities are experienced and perceived in practice away from monochrome frames and impractical binaries. For example, sectarian identity as an a-national signifier of religious truths is very different to sectarian identity as a form of intra-national group solidarity or as a frame for competing claims to state resources. Likewise, at the level of the nation-state, sectarian identity and sectarian relations amongst compatriots are imagined, perceived, and experienced differently from one national setting to another. The fact that these are, in one sense, transnational identities amounts to little in terms of commonalities in sectarian relations within different national settings (consider Protestant-Catholic relations in Northern Ireland with their counterparts in Brazil or Sunni-Shi'a relations in Iraq with those in Qatar).

The key point here is not to argue for the precedence or relevance of one frame-such as the intersection of sectarian categories with class structures (Joseph, 1983; Rahimah, 2016)--to the exclusion of others-like the utilization of sectarian identity in regional Middle Eastern geopolitics (Salloukh, 2017; Gause, 2014). Rather, analytical precision is better attained by viewing sectarian identity as a composite, multilayered identity thereby moving beyond narrow approaches that view the subject through a single prism. This follows the lead of earlier studies of identity (Abdelal, Herrera, Johnston, & McDermott, 2006; Brubaker & Cooper, 2000; Yuval-Davis, 1999) that found the concept problematic absent a multilayered framework. Likewise, our conception of sectarian identity and sectarian relations is best served by a similarly segmented approach. In practice, modern sectarian identity is imagined, formulated, mobilized, expressed, felt, and experienced simultaneously on four interdependent, mutually informing and reinforcing fields or dimensions (Haddad, 2020, Chapters 3 and 4): Doctrinal: On the level of doctrine and religious truths. In other words, as a global or a-national identity organized around, and marked by, a set of religious truths.

Subnational: As a frame through which to mediate social and power relations within a given national setting. National: At the level of the nation-state and as a prism through which national identity is mediated. Transnational: As a prism for international relations, inter/transnational solidarities and geostrategic competition. Sectarian identity is formed and reproduced by the constant interplay between these four dimensions. As such, the parameters of sectarian identity and sectarian relations will differ depending on which of these dimensions is more relevant to a given context. For example, the religious truths that mark sectarian competition at the doctrinal level are often absent in sectarian competition at the subnational level where tribal, regional, and class dynamics are more likely to animate sectarian relations (Hinnebusch, 2018). A recurring example of this is the perception (never entirely accurate) that one sectarian group has greater access to, and control over, channels of patronage (Alawis in Syria, Sunnis in Bahrain, and so forth). Another recurring theme is the discriminatory association of a particular sect with lower socio-economic categories of class (Shaery-Eisenlohr, 2011, pp. 44-45; AI-Wardi, 1965, pp. 135-136; Salamandra, 2013, p. 305; Owen Jones, 2018, p. 95). Likewise, any driver that we identify when thinking about sectarian competition generally (fear, greed, prestige, and so forth) will operate differently along these different fields in that the stakes will vary from one dimension to another. It is important to note that, rather than separate concepts, these four dimensions are in constant dialogue-for example, the national dimension impacts on sectarian identity at the doctrinal dimension in the form of personal status laws and national curricula. As such, these four dimensions should not be viewed in a hierarchical way nor is it possible to establish a fixed causal relationship between them. Rather than onion-like with differently sized layers encasing a core or a heart, this approach frames sectarian identity as the sum of these four constituent parts.

With the term sectarianism discarded and sectarian identity thus conceptualized, we can develop a more targeted approach to the study of sectarian dynamics by shifting our theoretical focus in accordance with our dimensional focus: International relations theory can help us decipher the transnational dimension of sectarian identity, critical race theory is useful when thinking about sectarian identity at the subnational level, and religious traditions are needed when considering the doctrinal dimension and so forth. For our purposes, an examination of the relationship between sectarian identity and national identity is best located in the study of nationalism. With a multilayered framework, we can pursue this without denying or underplaying the other dimensions of sectarian identity. This allows us to better contextualize modern sectarian identity and to dispense with the common fallacy that posits it as the negation of national identity and vice versa.

Sectarian Identity in the Era of the Nation-State

One of the most common and most misplaced assumptions holds sectarian identity as the polar opposite of, or mutually exclusive to, national identity. This line of thinking frames a normatively positive nationalism as the antidote to the ills of "sectarianism" based on the faulty assumption that national identity necessarily unites where sectarian identity inevitably divides. This reflects a narrow reading of national and sectarian identities that uncritically assumes a synergy between the former and secularism and between the latter and religious dogma. Yet religious truths, as already seen in the multidimensional framework presented above, are only one aspect of sectarian identity, and it is an aspect that seldom drives modern sect-coded political contestation. More to the point, there is nothing to suggest that sectarian identities are an inherently centrifugal driver in national politics. On the contrary, sect-centric actors in pluralistic contexts often internalize the discourse of citizenship and nationalism thereby creating considerable overlap between perceived national and subnational group-interest (Henley, 2017; Sayej, 2018). This highlights one of the chief characteristics of modern sectarian identity, namely, its interaction with, and refraction through, the nationstate, national identity, and nationalism. Most commonly, this is manifested in sect-centric visions regarding the form, meaning and content of a given national identity and the management of national resources-symbolic and material. In this way, "Sunni" and "Shi'a" become potential (though by no means inevitable) frames for national inclusion and exclusion and potential vehicles through which to claim ownership of the state and access to its resources. This is abundantly illustrated in the sect-coded conflicts of Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Bahrain, none of which were concerned with matters of religious orthodoxy or the pursuit of sectarian homogeneity.

Several observations regarding sectarian identity's relation to nationalism can be made at this point. First, again, the role of religion-as-doctrine (as opposed to religion-as-identity) is often marginal in national-level sect-coded political contestation in the era of the nation-state. Second, and by extension, far from being a negation of nationalism, the national dimension of sectarian identity allows sectarian competition to act as a function of nationalism. Rather than artificial nations breaking up into supposedly more resonant lines of identity, modern sect-coded conflict is more often the product of a contested, but nevertheless singular, nationalism. Unlike ethnic identities (Amazigh, Kurdish, Baloch, Arab), transnational sectarian solidarities have not developed into sect-coded secessionist/nationalist movements in the Middle East. This does not negate sectarian identity's transnational dimension or the existence of sect-specific transnational public spheres (Matthiesen, 2016), yet this does not equate to the erosion of national boundaries or the de-nationalization of national issues. Rather, it is an example of the cross pollination between the transnational and the national dimensions of sectarian identity. In that sense, a transnational public sphere connects different national settings without blurring the boundaries between them. A loose parallel would be Irish-American sympathy and support for Republican Irish militancy. The transnationalism of the relationship did not make Irish Republicans any less Irish nor did it make Irish-American sympathizers any less American. This recalls Shaery-Eisenlohr's (2011, p. 3) argument for a more synergetic conception of national and transnational solidarities: "... transnationalism always operates locally and ... transnational solidarities ... need to be studied in their national contexts ... transnational ties can help the production of nationalism and appeals to transnational solidarities are often rooted in nationalist agendas." Hence, we can speak of a Shi'a-centric or Sunni-centric Bahraini nationalism but not of an unhyphenated sectarian nationalism. This is why we have yet to see a serious sect-coded secessionist movement in the Middle East (with the far from straightforward and far from clearly secessionist exception of the Islamic State/ISIS). One of the few examples that may be of relevance here is the abortive attempt at creating an Alawi state in Mandate Syria. Largely a French effort, the plan struggled to gain significant Alawi support with most Alawi leaders adopting a Syrian nationalist position (Pierret, 2013, p. 101; Weiss, 2015, pp. 82-84). Even today this belief in the Syrian state persists despite the sharp divisions produced by the civil war. In a recent survey, 65% of respondents felt that a political system based on citizenship and equality before the law was the most appropriate form of governance to overcome "sectarianism"only 10% countenanced partition (The Day After, 2016, pp. 82-84).

Third, it follows that what is at stake in modern sectarian conflict in places like Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Bahrain is not the survival of the nation-state but the nature of its governing order: hierarchies of power, access to and distribution of political and economic resources, the identity of the nation-state, and the symbolic content of national identity. Through it all, the nation-state itself is not challenged; indeed, it is the prize of the contest. More than that, the nation-state provides the anchor, the legitimacy, and popular resonance for competing sect-coded claims. Again, with the exception of the likes of the Islamic State and transnational militants, domestic protagonists in sect-coded conflict almost always frame their stance with reference to the nation-state. This is well illustrated by the Iraqi, Lebanese, and Bahraini political classes: All are obliged to denounce "sectarianism", all must voice their commitment to the nation-state, and political messaging (even at times of civil war) has consistently framed sect-centric claims in national terms. Even a document as unabashedly sect-centric as The Declaration of the Shi'a of Iraq (Haddad, 2011, pp. 148-150) is one that is inescapably anchored in national claims. In that sense, sectarian identity's national dimension means that modern sectarian competition and sectarian conflict often happen for, within, and in the name of the nation-state.

Fourth, another recurring theme-and one that is again contradicted by the exceptional example of the Islamic State-is that though competing, sect-centric visions of the nation-state can drive political competition to the point of civil war, the concept and reality of sectarian plurality is almost never challenged. Demographic engineering may occur in particular locations for strategic reasons or as a function of wartime revenge, but national sectarian homogeneity is never the goal. Rather than a rejection of coexistence, sectarian conflict in contexts of high sectarian heterogeneity is more often about who gets to define the terms of coexistence and who gets what in the national framework (Shaery-Eisenlohr, 2011, p. 9). This is neatly illustrated in a survey that found that Sunnis in the Middle East are more likely to view Shi'as as non-Muslims in countries with few if any Shi'as. In fact, of the Middle Eastern countries that were surveyed, the most accepting of sectarian plurality were those that had gone through sect-coded civil wars-Lebanon and Iraq (Pew Research Center, 2012, Chapter 5).

Finally, an overlooked fact that relates to the above and that again highlights the often symbiotic rather than antagonistic relation between sectarian and national identities is that the former are, by definition, secondary identities that act as subsidiaries to larger ones (religion, nationality, ethnicity) and that have thus far been incapable of creating sect-based nationalist movements. Even a sectarian minority living in a sect-coded theocracy-Iranian Sunnis-have mobilized primarily along ethnic lines (Baloch, Kurdish, Arab) (Sabahi, 2013; Dudoignon, 2017, Chapter 6). The subordination of sectarian identities to the greater national and/or religious good can be traced to the 19th century and the rise of Islamic modernism in response to the challenges of western imperialism (Brunner, 2004, pp. 34-43; Enayat, 2005, Chapter 1). This placed a premium on Islamic unity that was later to be replicated in the prioritization of unity (ethnic and/or national) in confronting colonial interests. This has had a profound impact on the acceptability of sect-centricity as it has long been framed, sometimes cynically, as detrimental to the greater good of national unity (Osman, 2015, pp. 39-41; AI-Nifis, 2008, pp. 45-49; Matar, 2003, pp. 23-42). Indeed, it has created a persistent awkwardness in how sectarian identities are imagined by people in the region. This was perceptively noted by Henry Mack, British Ambassador to Iraq, who wrote in 1950,"... the struggle [between Sunnis and Shi'as] remains a partially hidden one, of which both sides are vaguely ashamed and which both would like to see resolved without an open political clash." (Kedourie, 1988, p. 253).

Sectarian Identity and Narratives of Nationalism

Ethnosymbolists are well placed to shed light on the relation between national and sectarian identities. Ethnosymbolism's tongue duree focus on myths, memories, traditions, and symbols in the formation and re-creation of nationalism is relevant not just to national identities but to their constituent subnational identities as well (Smith, 1986, Chapters 6 and 8; Smith, 1999: part 1). If competing groups share a single nation-state and lack secessionist ambitions or an alternate national consciousness, they will define their national identity according to myth-symbol complexes (Kaufman, 2001, Chapter 2) rooted both in what may be termed generic views of the nation-state that permeate group boundaries alongside group-specific inflections of the same nation-state. In this way, the nationalist myth-symbol complex can potentially be refracted through subsidiary sect-specific filters: a Shi'a-centric Lebanese nationalism or a Sunni-centric Iraqi nationalism each incorporating sect-specific symbols and narratives into how the nation-state is framed. In this way, ethnosymbolism in the Middle East must be mindful of competing reservoirs of symbolic and mythological capital that nevertheless have too much overlap for clear and total separation.6

To illustrate, an overarching Bahraini national identity does not preclude divergences between Sunni-specific and Shi'a-specific tropes and symbols of Bahraini nationalism-such as sect-specific divergence over what constitutes Bahrain's chosen traumas (Volkan, 1998, Chapter 3). For instance, the narrative of conquest surrounding the rise of the ruling family would be one such divergence in the Bahraini case as would the memory of the massdemonstrations of 2011 and their suppression (Strobl, 2018, Chapter 1; Gengler, 2015, Chapter 2). Similarly, perceptions towards the civil war diverge to a significant (though incomplete) extent amongst Syrians: One survey found discrepancies in Syrian opinion towards the demonstrations of 2011 with a near-consensus amongst Sunnis that they were a civilian democratic response to tyranny while several minority groups appeared more likely to echo the regime line and point to anti-Syrian conspiracies (The Day After, 2016, pp. 25-28).

Precisely because sectarian competition in places like Bahrain, Iraq, and Lebanon takes place within, and in the name of, an ostensibly sect-neutral nation-state, sect-specific myth-symbol complexes in such places will locate Sunnis/Shi'as within the nation-state. This further binds Sunnis and Shi'as of a particular country by enhancing the national dimension of their sectarian identity through the creation of added country-specific commonality and contestation. In this way, national hyphenation serves to territorialize sectarian relations, anchoring them in a set of issues specific to a particular nation-state; hence the limited utility of doctrinal rapprochement in addressing sectcoded political conflicts.' To illustrate, a Lebanese Shi'a debating sectarian issues with an Indonesian Sunni is likely to focus on religious truths because that is the primary site of commonality and hence of contestation between the two. Conversely, the same Lebanese Shi'a debating sectarian issues with a Lebanese Sunni will likely see the discussion shift towards national truths: demographics, national narratives, and generally speaking, entitlement and access to the national pie. In other words, the contestation in this case would be between Lebanese Shi'ism and Lebanese Sunnism.8 This dialectic interplay between commonality and contestation is hardly unique to the Middle East or to sectarian relations; coexistence and conflict are seldom absolutes, and long-term coexistence can be episodically punctured by instances of tension and possibly violence even amongst deeply interconnected communities (Blok, 1998, p. 37, Kolsto, 2007, p. 161).

The idea that there is a national dimension to how modern sectarian identities are imagined, practiced, and contested becomes fairly unremarkable if we discard the misplaced normative assumption that national identities are an inherently more benevolent and positive force than sectarian identities or that the two are completely separable. An older body of literature approached the relationship between national and religious identities in a manner precluding the unrealistic binaries that proliferate in recent treatments of sectarianism in the Middle East-such as the orientalist maximalist view and the equally unhelpful nationalist minimalist view (Makdisi, 2008, p. 560). For example, Brubaker (2012) rejects the dichotomization of nationalism and religion by challenging the assumption that the former is an inherently secular phenomenon. Instead, he proposes several ways of viewing religion and nationalism as separate but intertwined concepts. Along similar lines, Kinnvall (2004) has argued that identity constructs combining religion and nationalism are an especially common response to crises of ontological insecurity. Likewise, and as echoed by Smith (2003), Azar Gat (2013, p. 223) notes that, although religion on its own is rarely able to serve as the basis for nationhood, national and religious sources of identity have, more often than not, acted in complementary and mutually reinforcing ways. We see elements of this across the Middle East in the special place reserved for Islam in nominally secular polities (and of Judaism in Israel) thereby recalling Friedland and Moss's (2016, p. 434) observation that it is "... difficult to make a clean separation between religion and nationalism in history, whether nationalism is religionized or religion nationalized."

In an earlier study, Friedland (2001, p. 138) made an important point that is key to understanding the interaction between nationalism and religious/sectarian identity: "Nationalism offers a form of representation-the joining of state, territoriality, and culture. It has nothing to say about the content of representation, the identity of that collective subject, or its values." This insight highlights how all manner of identities, histories, mythologies, and so forth come to compete for position in the national narrative. In that sense, under certain circumstances and in certain contexts of heightened political relevance, sectarian identity may be asserted by sect-centric actors in an effort to have it furnish the props of nationalism thereby achieving a closer alignment between the symbols of state and the symbols of sect. In the process, a group's belief that they embody the nation-state and vice-versa, or a minority group's sense of themselves as an integral part of the nation-state, is validated and feelings of existential/ontological insecurity are allayed. Ultimately, how a group identity is perceived will be significantly shaped by its relation to, and place in, the nation-state. As argued by Horowitz (2000, p. 217) in his classic study of ethnic conflict, "... groups derive prestige and self-respect from the harmony between their norms and those which achieve dominance in society." However, given the already mentioned acceptance of the reality of sectarian plurality in countries of high sectarian heterogeneity, the congruence between symbols of sect and symbols of nationalism is never absolute; rather, when relevant, it is a question of relative advantage within a context of acknowledged plurality.

Viewing sectarian dynamics as a displacement of nationalism overlooks the multidimensionality of sectarian identity and baselessly suggests that nationalism has a fixed content that is necessarily positive and inclusive. Friedland's point regarding the undetermined content of nationalism allows us to view sectarian identity as one potential ingredient amongst many in the mix that can supply nationalism with its emotional, symbolic, and discursive content. The interaction between religious/sectarian and national identities is self-evident in places like India, Poland, Israel, Ireland, and any number of other contexts; likewise, contestation over the content of nationalism and competition (not necessarily violent or zero-sum) over the place of various identity groups within the national narrative is hardly remarkable-consider European debates regarding multiculturalism or America's "culture wars" between conservatives and progressives. In a similar vein, in Middle Eastern contexts of high sectarian heterogeneity, the essence of sectarian competition on the level of the nation-state is not about denying the nation-state or sectarian plurality within it but about centring a particular sectarian identity at the heart of the national narrative (Shaery-Eisenlohr, 2011: introduction; Gengler, 2015, Chapter 2; Haddad, 2017a).

Sectarian Conflict and Nationalism in Arab Iraq

The false juxtaposition of a supposedly secular, political, and territorialized nationalism/national identity against a religious, doctrinal, and transnational sectarianism/sectarian identity is a common theme in analysis (scholarly and popular) of Iraq, Syria, and other cases of sect-coded conflict. For example, one study (Dixon, 2017, p. 13) argues that, whatever the objective drivers of conflict, "... a nationalist politician may consider conflict to be the result of the failure to achieve nationhood ... and a sectarian [politician] the failure to establish the 'true religion'." This counterfactually negates any overlap between the two and restricts sectarian identity to its doctrinal dimension thereby ignoring the reality that matters of religious orthodoxy seldom drive modern sect-coded conflict, nor is this an isolated example; on the contrary, the dichotomization of an undefined sectarianism and nationalism and the presumed polarity between sectarian identity and national identity are something of a conventional wisdom. In another study, Azmi Bishara (2015, p. 7) explicitly and normatively frames nationalism (wataniyya) and pan-Arab ethnonationalism (qawmiyya) as integrative processes as opposed to sectarianism, which he describes as a "violation of national unity." In this way, nationalism (including pan-Arab ethnonationalism) is framed as an uncontested and uniting concept, whereas a loosely defined sectarianism is presented as inevitably leading to fragmentation. These assumptions reduce national and sectarian identities to caricatures that fail to capture their fluidity and their interaction.

Likewise, in introducing a special edition on sectarian identities in Iraq, the editor stresses the "... centrality of sectarian identities to Iraq's future because such identities undermine a key prerequisite for political stability and democratic governance in all nation states, namely the need for a strong sense of national identity ..." (Davis, 2010, pp. 229-230). This recalls the much-critiqued practice of displacing the concept of racism with that of race thereby obfuscating the difference between the authors and the objects of racism and, by extension, blurring the social and political practices that underline it (Fields, 2001). Similarly, by arguing that sectarian identities undermine national identity, the above quote suggests that causality lies with the identities, in and of themselves, thereby ignoring the role of state policy, economic distribution, relations of power, and the social and political practices that animate sectarian dynamics. In the case of Iraq, Kurdish separatism and alienation from Iraqi nationalism may have a long pedigree, but there is no Sunni/Shi'a equivalent. There was an abortive plan for a Shi'a federal region, but this federalist, not secessionist, project failed to gather momentum or popular support when it was first floated in 2005. A more serious attempt to redraw borders is the Basra autonomist (at times separatist) project (Visser 2005); however, this is clearly driven by regional rather than sectarian considerations (Visser, 2007). In short, whatever problems sectarian identity may cause for Iraq's political development, the negation of Iraqi nationalism is not one of them.

In the era of the nation-state, Arab Iraq's "sectarian issue" (unlike its "ethnic issue") was never about secession or the redrawing of borders. Rather, until 2003, it chiefly revolved around matters of Shi'a political representation, access to state resources and the extent and limits of Shi'a identity in the public sphere. In that sense, it was a stateShi'a rather than a Sunni-Shi'a issue--hence the emergence of a Shi'a-centric political culture with little in the form of a Sunni parallel until 2003. The political changes of that year empowered Shi'a-centric political actors and set the stage for a prolonged conflict pitting them against those trying to reverse, resist, or halt the impact of regime change (Haddad, 2017a). The ebbs and flows in sect-coded political contestation and the fluctuating political relevance of sectarian identities since 2003 highlight the inadequacy of on-or-off conceptions of "sectarianism" and monochrome definitions of sectarian identity. It also illustrates the redundancy of the national (ism)-versus-sectarian (ism) binary. For instance, it is generally accepted that in 2008-2010, there was a significant retreat in the political relevance of sectarian identity, especially when considered horizontally at a societal level. Amongst the many indicators of this was electoral behaviour: Whereas the electoral coalitions and voting patterns of Iraq's first set of elections in 2005 were overwhelmingly based on ethnic and sectarian identities with only a handful of broad sect-centric and ethnocentric coalitions dominating the field (Dodge, 2012, pp. 44-48), sectarian (Sunni and Shi'a) identities were markedly less relevant in the elections of 2009 and 2010 (International Crisis Group, 2010, pp. 2-12; Katzman, 2011, pp. 9-19, 25). The standard narrative regarding this shift mistakenly posits it as a case of ethno-religious loyalties receding in favour of nationalism thereby repeating the flawed dichotomization of sectarian and national identities and misreading both in the process. For example, in describing the shifting electoral landscape, a study in the Journal of Democracy in the election year of 2010 mistakenly looks to the nationalism-versus-sectarianism dichotomy in search of causality (Dawisha, 2010). Hence, incumbent Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is portrayed as breaking away from the grand Shi'a alliance of 2005," ... denigrating its sectarianism and running on a strict Iraqi nationalist platform" (Dawisha, 2010, p. 27). Yet the grand Shi'a alliance, and indeed all electoral coalitions in Arab Iraq, consistently employed the vocabulary of Iraqi nationalism-including the mandatory denunciations of sectarianism. Doing otherwise is political costly. As such, the fact that in 2010 the grand Shi'a electoral coalition declared its " ... own abhorrence of sectarianism and pledged itself to 'preserve the unity and honour of Iraq' ... " (Dawisha, 2010, p. 34) is not evidence of a shift to a nationalist line but an example of boilerplate mainstream Iraqi political rhetoric that is seldom deviated from even at the heights of sect-coded violence in 2006-2007. In the same article, Maliki's coalition is portrayed as adopting "... an Iraqi nationalist orientation which set it apart from other heavily Shi'a groupings." (Dawisha, 2010, p. 30).

Here, we see how the dichotomization of national and sectarian can end up stigmatizing sectarian identity. After all, why should a lack of diversity ("heavily Shi'a") be contrasted against nationalism? The divergence in question is between different visions of Iraqi nationalism rather than between national and antinational/non-national positions. As such, the shift in electoral behaviour is not one from sectarian to national, rather it is one of decreasing sect-centricity. Political mobilization on a less inclusive subnational platform (in this case sectcentricity) can be contrasted against a pan-national approach (or a more sect-neutral approach), but it does not necessarily equate with an anti/non-nationalist stance. Whether or not an electoral coalition is cross-sectarian says little about its nationalist credentials. The U.S. Republican party under Donald Trump's presidency is far less inclusive or diverse than their Democratic rivals, yet we would not think of describing them as less nationalist.

Not only is the polarity of sectarian and national identities inaccurate, it can obscure causality in political development. The reason that Arab Iraq was torn by sectarian identity after 2003 was not due to an absence of nationalism but due to the empowerment of sect-centric political actors and the rise in political uncertainty that created the conditions in which a zero-sum contestation of political power and of the meaning of Iraq, Iraqi identity, and Iraqi nationalism could take place. Crucial in that regard is the rise of existential fear in the form of a security dilemma between sect-coded camps. The easing of sectarian entrenchment in 2008-2010 reflects the easing of these dynamics rather than the rise of nationalism-which though contested was never in short supply. Likewise, the reemergence of civil war in 2013 and its decline around 2015 were the results of identifiable factors that cannot be understood through the false dichotomy of sectarianism and nationalism. Rather, surveying the past 15 years, the driver of sectarian conflict in Iraq was ultimately the international, regional, and domestic ramifications of the destruction of the Iraqi state and the political empowerment of Shi'a-centric actors. With the stabilization of the post-2003 order and with existential contestation of the state subsiding, sect-centricity dropped. As such, the recent shift from identity politics to issue politics (Jabar, 2018) does not reflect a shift to nationalism any more than the example of 2008-2010 does; rather, it signals the end, for now, of serious contestation of the balance of power between sect-centric actors and hence the loss of political sect-centricity's primary raison d'~tre.

Rather than a rejection of the nation-state or of sectarian plurality, the goal of Shi'a-centric political actors has been to ensure that Shi'as are reified as the senior partner, or the big brother, in Iraq's multicommunal framework. This political vision is perfectly encapsulated in an internal document that was circulated within the grand Shi'a political alliance of 2005 and that outlined a vision for Iraq in which Iraqi Shi'as would form the core of the Iraqi nationstate: "Iraq is the Shi'a ... And the Shi'a are Iraq." Describing the document, former minister Ali Allawi (2007, p. 438) writes that it envisaged an Iraq composed of"... a constellation of lesser sects and ethnicities revolving around a Shi'a sun." As such, this vision relegates rather than negates non-Shi'a Iraqis and redefines rather than abrogates Iraqi nationalism by unapologetically framing Iraqi Shi'as as Iraq's staatsvolk, nor was this an isolated case: Whether framed arrogantly as a sense of entitlement or paternalistically as a duty or burden, the idea that they are the major component and hence the big brother in Iraq enjoys considerable currency amongst Iraqi Shi'as. For example, commenting on the "historic settlement" that was mooted in late 2016 and that was to create a sustainable framework for "postIslamic State Iraq," Shi'a populist TV personality and MP Wajih Abbas stated that Shi'a political factions had a set of unofficial preconditions for any such settlement, one of which was that "the junior partner must recognize the Shi'a as the senior partner" (Interview, 2016). Likewise, when asked by a television host why Sunnis should accept Shi'as setting the terms of the "historic settlement," Shi'a politician Fadi al-Shimmari (Al-Sumeria, 2016) answered: "Shi'as are the largest component and they are the father to all the other components. That they [Shi'as] reach out to their partners ... this is their duty." In another example we find Iraqi political leader Muqtada al-Sadr writing: "It is known that the clear majority in Iraq are the Shi'a. This requires Shi'as to be the big brother [al-akh al-akbar] to all and it falls to them to ensure unity and to show kindness ... " (Al-Sadr, 2013, p. 58).

These examples show the essence of sect-centricity in Arab Iraq: competing sect-centric visions of the nationstate within a shared national and territorial framework. Even if we look to more militant examples of sect-centric actors, we still find that the vast majority of these anchor their politics and their violence in the prism of the nationstate. This is clearly evident in the anthems and poetry associated with the Sadrists and the Mahdi Army-one of the chief protagonists in the sectarian violence that engulfed Baghdad in 2006-2007 (Haddad, 2013). It is also evident in the messaging of non-Islamic State and non-Al-Qaeda Sunni armed groups. More recently, the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU)-an umbrella formation of mostly Shi'a armed groups that were mobilized to confront the Islamic State in 2014--have centred their messaging around a core narrative of Iraqi patriotism defined by a crossconfessional (but unambiguously Shi'a-led) fight against the Islamic State (Garrison, 2017). Alongside this paternalistic (and patronizing) narrative, there is a more offensive one that aggressively condescends to and shames the "junior partner" Sunnis. This has especially proliferated after 2014 and the military mobilization to wrest Sunni-majority areas from the Islamic State. This narrative revolves around incendiary accusations of cowardice and stained honour. For example, a poem recited by a PMU fighter attacks the men of the Sunni regions of Iraq accusing them of cowardice and low morals and of selling their daughters to foreign Islamic State fighters: "She got pregnant and gave birth to a bastard, have you no shame?" (YouTube, 2016). There are endless such examples, and both the condescending/shaming and the paternalistic/patronizing expressions of Iraqi Shi'a-centricity have proliferated since 2014. However, the point to note here is that regardless of how Shi'a-centric, offensive, divisive, bigoted, or crude such examples might be, they are nevertheless expressions of different conceptions of Iraqi nationalism rather than its negation.

Conclusion

The nation-state and the concept of representative government (not to be confused with democracy) created statecentred societies with a novel, bottom-up sense of ownership of, and entitlement to, the state. As argued by Eriksen (2017, pp. 774-745), "While [modern) states clearly seek to govern societies, they are at the same time claiming to represent society as a whole, acting on behalf of 'the people' ... the actions of the state are seen as identical to the actions of society." In this way, a national public sphere is created in which sectarian identities become one amongst many potential frames through which competing claims to the nation-state-material, symbolic and ideational-can be made. Once the premise of representative government is reified in the form of the nation-state, the question of how "the people" are to be represented and governed becomes an all-important one and a site of permanent contestation (White, 2011, p. 151). This contestation, particularly when sect-coded, is often misread as a negation of the nation-state. This ignores the layered nature of modern sectarian identities that includes a national dimension to sectarian relations. As with earlier studies of religion and nationalism, the purpose here is not to deny that the two are distinct phenomena but rather to debunk the notion that they are antagonistic, mutually exclusive opposites.

The national dimension of sectarian identity sees modern sectarian competition revolving around the construct of the nation-state, be in terms of contested access to national institutions, or the need to have influence on and a presence in the national narrative, or the need to be included in dominant conceptions of the staatsvolk. More often than not, these issues play out in far more subtle ways than the sledgehammer bluntness of the post-2003 era's sect-centricity. A more common manifestation of modern sectarian competition involves differential access to the state and state resources, for example, in housing, policing, or public services (Gengler, 2015, Chapter 5). This is often rooted in deeper sources of modern Sunni-Shi'a contestation relating to competing national narratives that variously include, exclude, privilege, and marginalize-even if only through omission-certain sectarian identities at the expense of others. Similarly, myths of national authenticity and ethnic purity can sometimes be used to elevate or demote people within the national framework (Matthiesen, 2015, pp. 30-32; Gengler, 2015, Chapter 2; Haddad, 2011, pp. 40-51). Ultimately, such examples are sect-coded contests for position in the national narrative. To paraphrase Toby Dodge (2018, p. 29): This competition is ultimately about a struggle to impose one dominant vision of what a country is and who its people are.

Endnotes

Endnotes are available on the website of the journal.