Al-Aqsa Storm

Al-Aqsa Storm is an operation that has killed more than a thousand Israelis and injured nearly three thousand of them. The Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), according to the statistics of Israeli sources, has also captured about 150 Israeli citizens and soldiers. However, one of the remarkable points of the Al-Aqsa storm operation is the widespread surprise of the Israeli regime in the middle of this operation. This is a big victory for the Palestinian Resistance Movement, especially considering the dominance and continuous aerial surveillance of the Gaza Strip by Israel's intelligence and espionage agencies, as well as the presence of this regime's spies in the mentioned region.

Al-Aqsa Storm Operation

Palestine and especially Gaza City is going through sensitive days and nights. In these few days, the Zionists suffered blows that have no doubt never been seen in the history of the fake regime. Because Hamas, with a historic and unprecedented attack, caused the entire security equations of the Zionist regime and the regime leaders' understanding of the concept of "security", "control" and "deterrence" to be turned upside down. Now that the Zionists have touched the terror, death, war, and insecurity from the depths of their being, it is appropriate to ask them: Can you imagine you have imposed what is unbearable for you in 24 hours, on Palestinian people over a very long time? In this article, we discuss how important the psychological and security aspects of the Al-Aqsa storm are, from the point of view of Israelis and their understanding of security and insecurity.

The Backgrounds of Al-Aqsa Storm

• The first background: The current cabinet of the Zionist regime has been the most radical and extremist cabinet during the existence of this regime. It claims that it will finalize the fate of many cases that the previous cabinets were unable to finalize regarding the conflict with the Palestinians. This cabinet has followed programs of Judaization and deportation of Palestinians and military aggression in all its forms and the most extreme racist strategies against Palestinians;
• The second background: the continuation of the siege of Gaza as the longest and largest prison in history and the attempt to create an equation of peace for the economy and the non-recognition of the Hamas movement;
• The third background: the sharp increase in the number of Palestinian detainees and prisoners and the application of racist laws and their renewed repression by the Jewish extremist minister "Itmar Ben Goyer" as far as the number of administrative detainees, which is the worst type of illegal imprisonment, has reached more than 1,200;
• The fourth background: the news about the progress of negotiations, mediated by the United States, to normalize relations between Saudi Arabia and the Zionist regime and to completely ignore the aspiration of the Palestinian people.
• The fifth background: Obtaining information that showed that the Israeli army sought to carry out a large-scale attack against the Gaza Strip after the end of the Eid ceremony in the occupied territories.

Important Achievements of the Palestinian Resistance Movement in Al-Aqsa Storm Operation

Hamas' attack on Israel was like escaping from prison and had many achievements, including:

• Creating a revolution for those disappointed in Gaza and those disappointed by the victory of Hamas in Palestine;
• Giving a clear answer to Israel's extremist cabinet headed by Netanyahu;
• The failure of the project of naturalization and normalization of relations with Israel by Saudi Arabia and...;
• The response to the continuous Israeli attacks on Al-Aqsa Mosque and the massacre of Palestinians in the West Bank in the shadow of the silence of the Arab and Western countries;
• Causing irreparable damage to the economy and an irreparable blow to the Zionist regime;
• Collapsing the theory of deterrence and invincibility of Israel;
• Causing a very big failure for the entire security and intelligence flow of Israel;
• Introducing Hamas as the legitimate and national voice of the Palestinians;
• Increasing the credibility of Hamas and attracting the support of supporters of Palestine;
• Exposing the treacherous policies of the Palestinian Authority headed by Mahmoud Abbas;
• Showing Israel's growing oppression of Palestinians and exposing its racial cleansing plan;
• Causing failure of the policies of the United States and other major world powers;
• Disrupting America's plan of the deal of the century and the "Abraham" agreement (agreements between the Arabs and the Zionist regime);
• Preparing the pressure of Muslim nations on Arab countries related to Israel, such as Egypt, Jordan, etc.;
• Laying the groundwork for prisoner exchange (getting a trump card for prisoner exchange)
• Taking revenge for the violence against Palestinian civilians by the Zionists;
• Disturbing the alleged peace of America.
• US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said last week that the Middle East has reached a reassuring level of peace and stability.
• Charles Freeman, the former assistant minister of defense and the former US ambassador to Saudi Arabia, has

acknowledged some of these cases.

Irreparable Blow

On the 18th of Mehr, in response to the events of the 15th Mehr of occupied Palestine, the Leader of the Revolution of Iran said: "In this issue of the 15th Mehr, the usurper Zionist regime suffered an irreparable defeat, both militarily and in terms of information. Everyone mentioned the failure, my emphasis is on "irreparable". I say that this devastating earthquake has managed to destroy some of the main structures of this usurper regime's governance, and rebuilding those structures is not possible so easily. It is unlikely that the usurper Zionist regime will be able to restore those structures despite all the hype it is doing and all the support it receives from the Westerners in the world today.

I would like to say that since Saturday, the 15th of Mehr, the Zionist regime is no longer the previous Zionist regime, and the blow it received cannot be compensated for so easily." Experience has shown that it is not easy to analyze the mental geometry of the leader of the revolution during events. An example is the 33-day war. He promised victory at a moment when Hezbollah's victory over the Zionist regime's war machine was unimaginable. A promise that even Sardar Soleimani, as the Iranian commander present in Hezbollah's battle with the Zionist army, could not imagine!

Psychological Security Shock

One of the most important dimensions and aspects of the recent attack by Hamas on the Zionists is the provision of a new historical and psychological opportunity to understand the facts related to the lives of Palestinians. For several decades, the Zionist regime's army has brought great disasters on the Palestinian people which is now easier to be understood after the epochal operation of the Al-Aqsa storm.

The Palestinians have not tortured the Zionists and have not closed the gate of food and goods to them. They have only fought in a war that has been completely unequal in terms of financial and military facilities, and the main weapons of the fighters in this epochal battle have been will and faith. But Israel has used all kinds of tools and crimes not only against the armed fighters, but also against the Palestinian people, and has managed a war in which there are no moral and human limits. However, the Zionists themselves not only did not understand this difficult situation of the Palestinian people; but also they occupied their lands with ease and continued to build houses on other people's land. Palestinians, for several decades, have faced displacement, poverty, embargo, hunger, oppression, violence, murder and torture. But the Zionists have accumulated wealth and have always supported the crimes of the army and Mossad. But now the situation is not the same as the past for the Zionists.

Now the Zionists can also understand what the attack means and what a great tragedy it is to lose family members. Now they also can understand how much hardships and suffering are faced by defenseless people under difficult conditions. This is what psychologists refer to as identification. It means that there is an opportunity and possibility for us to be in a difficult situation and from the depths of our soul and understanding, reach a new evaluation of the situation of those who have already gone through the same event. For example, someone who sends help to an earthquake victim from hundreds of kilometers away may understand the dire situation of the earthquake victim, but he is sitting in a strong house with a roof over his head. He has not faced hunger, cold, heat and uncertainty. But when he suffers from an earthquake, he will understand what a difficult situation his fellow man has gone through in the past.

Of course, all this is in a situation where the Zionists, unlike the Palestinians, cannot understand what a difficult ordeal the occupation of the homeland by "another" is. What the Zionists understood in these few days was a deep sense of "insecurity". The same feeling that have a long life for the oppressed people of Palestine and they have always felt it because of the show of power and the crimes of the Zionist army.

Although these days the people of Israel have understood the insecurity and fear to the bone; now the Zionist regime uses the old tactic of sanctions to intimidate and frighten the Palestinians. Gaza has long been known as the world's largest open-roof prison, and the blockade and embargo of water, electricity, and food against its people is not an event that is strange and unexpected for the oppressed Palestinian citizens.

Investigating the Causes of Israel's Intelligence Failure in This Operation

While the Israeli military has increased its counterattacks on the Gaza Strip, the question is how the Islamist group Hamas was able to use bulldozers, paragliders, and motorcycles to carry out the largest attack in 50 years against one of the most powerful military and security forces in the Middle East. This operation was exactly the worst-case scenario that Israel's intelligence and military officials were supposed to worry about and plan to prevent it.

On Saturday, October 7, 2023, at around 6:30 am local time, Hamas fired more than 3,000 rockets and sent 1,000 fighters across the Gaza border into Israeli settlements. Despite the scale and scope of the attack, reports state that Israeli security officials claimed to have had no specific warning that Hamas was preparing a sophisticated attack that would require coordinated ground, air, and sea attacks. Many political and military analysts have criticized Israel for its intelligence failure to anticipate the attack, but the success of Hamas's surprise attack was also an operational weakness.

Information limitations

The attack by Hamas is not the first one that a government disastrously fails to predict and identify. Japan launched a deadly surprise attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. It destroyed the Pacific Fleet, and subsequently, Franklin Roosevelt declared war, which eventually led to the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency. Also, the CIA and other US intelligence agencies missed 23 opportunities to disrupt the 9/11 al-Qaeda attack that killed nearly 3,000 people. Israel itself was caught off guard almost 50 years ago, when Egyptian and Syrian forces attacked it during the Jewish holiday, igniting the Yom Kippur War.

Of course, it's possible that Hamas was more lucky than skilled and did nothing significant to hide its intentions or capabilities. For example, research into 9/11 showed that al-Qaeda terrorists did not need fictitious counterintelligence schemes or even fake names to succeed. They just needed the CIA and the FBI to do business as usual. As the Cold War ended and the terrorist threat increased in the 1990s, intelligence agencies failed to adapt their structure, motivations, and culture to identify and defeat a new enemy. As a result, the CIA and FBI missed nearly two dozen opportunities to infiltrate and possibly stop 9/11. One of the main reasons for the failure was that before 9/11, there was no formal training, clear process, or priority for warning other intelligence agencies about dangerous terrorists who might travel to the United States.

Currently, most analysts don't know exactly why the Israelis failed to detect the attack of Hamas, and it could take months for the Israelis to answer that question. Historically, Israel has been perhaps one of the best actors in the world at infiltrating its adversary organizations, which are admittedly difficult to penetrate. Israel has designed a defense plan that relies on intercepting missile attacks, border crossings, and early warning. But this defensive plan can do some of the work. Another key part is understanding the enemy's way of thinking and acting, and perhaps that's where the Israelis suffer a more significant weakness.

The Iron Wall, the 64-kilometer security wall that separates Gaza from Israel, was completed in 2021 for $1.1 billion. This wall includes a 609 cm high sensor-equipped fence, hundreds of cameras, and automatic machine guns that fire when the sensors go off. However, the wall was not effective against the surprise attack of Hamas. Hamas was able to cross the wall at several points around Gaza and continue its attacks without initial resistance. Israel's border surveillance system relies almost entirely on remotely operated cameras, sensors, and machine guns. The Israeli commanders were too confident in the impregnability of this system. They thought that a combination of remote surveillance and weaponry, high-ground barriers, and an underground wall to prevent Hamas from digging tunnels into Israel would make mass infiltration unlikely and reduce the need to deploy significant numbers of troops along the border. With this system in place, the army began reducing the number of troops there and moving them to other areas of concern, including the West Bank. Breaking this barrier was easier than what Israeli officials expected.

Likewise, Israel built its own Iron Dome, an air defense system to protect Israelis from rocket attacks from Gaza. the dome, which was completed in 2011, cost $1.5 billion for US and Israeli governments. Before the surprise attack by Hamas, this defense system was between 90 and 97 percent successful. Iron Dome worked well when the fighters fired relatively few rockets, but it was less effective against the October 7 attack by Hamas. When Hamas fired 3,000 rockets at Israel in just 20 minutes, the system was not able to respond to a significant degree. According to the Modern Warfare Institute's analysis, this amount was too many for Iron Dome to function optimally.

Before Hamas attacked Israel at dawn on Saturday, the Israeli intelligence agency detected increased activity in some of the Gazan militant networks that it monitors. According to two senior Israeli security officials, agents realized something unusual was happening and sent an alert to Israeli soldiers guarding the Gaza border. But this warning was not heeded, either because the soldiers did not receive it or because the soldiers did not read it.

Soon after, Hamas sent drones to knock out some of the IDF's cell phone stations and surveillance towers along the border to prevent officers from monitoring with video cameras. The drones also destroyed remote-controlled machine guns that Israel had installed on its border fortifications, eliminating a key tool for countering a ground attack. This made it easier for Hamas attackers to approach and blow up sections of the border fence, allowing the attackers to slip through gaps with ease in several places. Infiltrating more than 20 settlements and bases of the Israeli army in that attack was the worst violation of Israel's defense in the past 50 years and seriously challenged the sense of security of this government. For hours, one of the strongest armies in the Middle East was left weak and powerless to deal with hostile forces, leaving villages defenseless for most of the day and fighters spread across more than 70 square kilometers of Jewish state territory.

Why Did Israel Fail?

In the coming days and weeks, special investigations will examine what went wrong in Israel and what lessons the Jewish state needs to learn. To do so, analysts must determine whether it was the intelligence agencies that failed, or whether intelligence officers hid Hamas' plans only to ignore policymakers. They must find out whether Israeli intelligence agencies have understood that Hamas' capabilities are changing or not. And they must determine the potential impact of Israel's domestic political crisis on enemy perceptions and actions. They will also need to assess whether Israeli intelligence officials have over-relied on technology or not and finally, they must understand what Hamas has done right. According to intelligence experts, the success of this attack, based on the initial assessment, is rooted in the security failure of the intelligence community and the Israeli army, which includes the following: Failure of the intelligence officers to monitor key communication channels used by the attackers; Over-reliance on border surveillance equipment that was easily thwarted by the attackers, allowing them to attack military bases and inflict casualties; The gathering of some commanders in a border base that was attacked in the initial stage of the invasion and prevented communication with the rest of the armed forces; The willingness to accept the false and staged statements of Gaza's military leaders, made in private channels of communication, and the Palestinians knew they were being monitored by Israel; Therefore, the Israeli forces thought that they were not preparing for the battle. Hamas stayed out of two wars last year, allowing Palestinian Islamic Jihad, a smaller armed group in Gaza, to face Israel on its own. Hamas also ended a period of unrest along the Gaza border in a deal brokered by Qatar, giving the impression that it is not seeking an escalation. On the other hand, when Israeli intelligence officials briefed senior security chiefs about the most immediate threats to the defense, they focused on the dangers posed by Lebanese militias along Israel's northern border and greatly underestimated the challenges posed by Hamas.

The question facing Israel is whether this intelligence disaster was primarily a failure to warn or a failure to act. The number one mission of intelligence organizations is to prevent strategic surprise. But for intelligence success, warnings and information gathering are not enough; ultimately policymakers must act. The events that happen in an intelligence agency's own country can also change the perceptions and behavior of the enemy. Israeli intelligence agencies may not have known that the unprecedented domestic political crisis was perceived by its enemies, including Hamas, and that this crisis may have contributed to the success of the Hamas attack. Thus, this internal turmoil has weakened Israel's deterrence power not only by affecting enemy perceptions but also by eroding Israel's intelligence capabilities and military preparedness.

It seems that the attack of Hamas was neither very sophisticated and innovative nor completely simple and primitive. The type of operation required careful planning, coordination, timing, and training, and basically, this type of attack was something the Israelis could have expected and should have anticipated, even if it didn't happen on the scale it did. It was the failure and operational weakness amid a wide range of logistical and intelligence failures by Israel's security services that paved the way for Hamas to invade southern Israel. These consequences are a serious blow to Israel's security and also damage its reputation in the region as a reliable military partner. Israel was a strategic asset for some countries in the region in terms of security, and now it is obvious that Israel also has serious weaknesses.

Israel's security services do not dispute the extent of their initial failure, But they say that only after the end of the war can it be seriously and carefully examined. Sun Tzu, the ancient Chinese military theorist, emphasizes the importance of knowing the enemy and says in a phrase from the book Art of War: "If you know the enemy and know yourself, you don't need to fear the outcome of a hundred battles'. Perhaps the problem with the Israelis and many modern intelligence agencies is that instead of knowing the goals of their adversaries subjectively and having a deeper understanding of how they think and function, they have become overly dependent on operational and tactical intelligence. This understanding may not prevent the next surprise attack, but it can help prepare each actor's military and security capabilities. Finally, it should be noted that when intelligence agencies focus their analysis on foreign adversaries' understandings, the quality of domestic politics and its problems may embolden adversary actors and alter their risk-reward calculations.

Herzliya Reichsmann University Conference

On the 20th of Shahrivar, at the conference of Herzliya Reichman University, "David Barnia", the head of the Zionist intelligence agency (Mossad), seriously threatened Iran and said that it was time for Iran to pay differently. What Barnia meant by this ransom was the operation in Iran to assassinate senior officials; Operation in the heart of Tehran! Zion's eyes were staring at Tehran. Unaware of the fact that the resistance forces encircled Gaza, under the eyes of the three intelligence agencies of the Zionist regime (Aman, Shabak, and Mossad), were planning a major earthquake in the 75-year-old history of the Zionist occupation.

A Message to the World

Al-Aqsa storm operation has clear messages for the world: First, the Palestinians can easily threaten the security of the Zionist regime. Second, according to Riyad Mansour, the Palestinian ambassador to the United Nations, everything is clear now. Riyad Mansour quoted Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese as saying: "Continuing to suppress a population with complete immunity will lead to disaster, and this is what is happening." The international system and especially the Western countries, for several decades, remained silent against Israel's crimes and granted complete immunity to the Zionists. Also, they ignored the oppression Palestinians have faced. But now they can see that the Palestinian fighters, in an epochal moment, have embarked on a daring operation to save themselves from that oppression and great crimes. An operation that has attracted the attention of the whole world and especially the attention of military and security experts.

The head of the political bureau of the Hamas movement said that the people of Gaza have a deep attachment to their land and will not leave Gaza or go anywhere else.

Ismail Haniyeh, the head of Hamas's political office

The Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement made history with the Al-Aqsa storm operation, and this operation will be the beginning of the fall of usurpers from our land. Haniyeh further said: The usurping Zionists have resorted to killing the oppressed and innocent people of Palestine to compensate for the defeat and disgrace they have faced through the Ezzeddin Qassam battalions. Ismail Haniyeh said: "The cowardly army of the Zionist regime does not have the strength to compete with our brave and courageous soldiers, that's why they start killing." He added: With the comprehensive support of America and the West, despite the actions of the despotic enemy, we will resume the strategy of independence and return. The people of Gaza are deeply attached to their land and will not leave Gaza. It should be noted that Israel has demanded the withdrawal of more than one million Palestinians from northern Gaza.

Rashid al-Ghannooshi

Rashid al-Ghannoushi, the former speaker of the Tunisian House of Representatives and head of the Tunisian Ennahda movement, wrote in a letter from prison that was posted by his daughter Samia al-Ghannoushi on X account: "The Al-Aqsa storm operation, which was launched by the Palestinian resistance on October 7, is the gift of the people of Gaza to the Islamic Ummah.". In the second message from the prison, he added: "This prison is the power of renewal, motivation, mobilization, awakening, and the motto of the nation's heroism." The Al-Aqsa storm represents the renewal of civilization and the revival of the Islamic nation. In his message, Al-Ghannooshi said: Palestine, along with Al-Aqsa Mosque, is the central issue of the Ummah, and Al-Aqsa Mosque is the center of Islamic sovereignty and the pride of the Ummah. Al-Aqsa Mosque is the beating heart of the Islamic world, and the presence of any disturbing creature in the heart of the Islamic world is a warning of great danger, and this requires the mobilization of the nation to deal with this existential threat. By stating that the freedom of Palestine is not a burden on the shoulders of the Islamic world, but rather a lever for the unity of the Muslim Ummah, and this is more than a burden on him, Al-Ghannooshi tells his career: the issue of the freedom of Palestine must remain at the center of the movements of the Islamic world. He continued: Palestine is a verse of the book and a chapter of the Quran, whoever carries it, carries the book, and whoever leaves it, has left the book. Al-Ghannoushi called the Al-Aqsa storm operation a blessing and said: "Today, the Al-Aqsa storm is the gift of the people of Gaza to the Islamic Ummah, and it is a rejuvenating, motivating, and awakening power." The goal of the liberation of Palestine elevates the youth and politicizes them, and draws the new generation from small concerns to the big issues of the Islamic nation and humanity. Al-Ghannooshi likened the process of the "Al-Aqsa Flood" to "Noah's Flood" which will flood the whole world and rebuild it again so that the world of humanity can prosper and be saved from everything rotten. At the end of his message, Al-Ghannooshi said: This renewal of Islam is the renewal of humanity and the promise of a new world: a world of freedom, justice, brotherhood, and equality. It should be noted that Al-Ghannoushi has been in prison since his arrest on April 17 last year by the security forces after a raid on his home until the court ordered his imprisonment for provocative comments against the security of Tunisia.

The Consequences of the Al-Aqsa Storm on Israel

Economic Aspects

So far, many analyses have been done and written about the military and political aspects of this operation, but not much attention has been paid to its economic aspects. However, this operation is ongoing and we have to wait for the behavior of the parties to the war and other countries. But we can make this claim with a very high probability that regardless of whether the winner of the war is Israel or Hamas, this war has a main loser, which is Israel's economy. The reasons for this loss are summarized in several factors that will be mentioned below.

The first and most important feature of Al-Aqsa Storm is questioning the Ibrahim Pact and more importantly Arab-Med Corridor. Arab-Med Corridor aimed at the interconnected development of the Emirates, Oman, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel. It could bring a new geo-economic order to China and the North-South Corridor. What made the Arab-Med Corridor more important than the Ibrahim Pact was that Israel could be completely integrated and stabilized in the regional order through this corridor. The connection of this corridor to the Neom region of Saudi Arabia and its proximity to the Niran Strait would give Israel access to the Persian Gulf and geopolitical superiority over Palestine. In addition, this issue, while weakening the geo-economics of Iran, Egypt, Russia, and China, automatically could push the Palestinian issue to the sidelines. Regarding this analysis, perhaps the speculations about the Kremlin's assistance to Hamas can be understandable. Therefore, the most important impact of the Al-Aqsa Storm was questioning the geo-economic order which resulted in the inevitable acceptance of Israel. The relationship between Al-Aqsa Storm and the Arab-Med Corridor is like the relationship between the 33-Day War and the new Middle East plan.

The three fundamental features of Israel's economy since the mid-1990s are based on the knowledge-based sector, accounting for more than 50% of service exports and 35% of government tax collection. The export of goods and services in 2022 was about 166 billion dollars. This characteristic of Israel's economy makes it a part of the Arab-Med Corridor, which became the most common excuse for cooperation and normalization of relations between the countries of the region and Israel. Despite this, Al-Aqsa Storm will act as a very strong catalyst for capital and human capital flight from Israel, which was started earlier with the reforms of the judicial system. Before this operation, investments especially foreign investments have decreased by 90% and 68% of knowledge-based companies have intended to leave occupied Palestine or withdraw their funds. At least 80% of these countries have been registered abroad since the beginning of 2022. So, just like the weakness of human resources against the Al-Aqsa storm, the migration of specialized forces will be a fundamental threat to Israel's economy. The day after this operation, the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange experienced a sharp fall in the banking, insurance, and real estate sectors. In addition, the depreciation of the shekel against the dollar prompted the Central Bank of Israel to intervene in the market for the first time in three decades by injecting $30 billion. Although the central bank relying on $200 billion reserves, increasing interest rates, and conducting swap transactions can partially control the effects of this depreciation, the weakening of the credit rating in the S&P rating agency will be the biggest problem of the regime. The gradual decrease in the credit rating, which started with the reform of the judicial system, led to a decrease in foreign investment, an increase in foreign debt, and a decrease in the balance of the government's treasury. Until now, Israel's foreign debt to its GDP was estimated at 60%, which will undoubtedly increase. Economic recession is the future of Israel's economy in the short and long term, which is also accompanied by inflation. According to the estimate of the Central Bank of Israel, every 1 percent decrease in the value of the shekel means an increase of 0.1 to 0.2 percent in inflation, and as a result, a decrease in the level of income, people's purchasing power, and finally stagnation.

It is expected that after the end of this operation, there will be a massive flight of capital and the elite, which can lead to economic stagnation in the long term. War expenses such as the expenses of the military, the payment of salaries, and the damages of the war, are estimated to cost around 20 billion dollars so far. If the Netanyahu government does not amend the budget by reducing the costs imposed by the Torah Jewish Union or the Haredi and Ger Hasidic congregations, undoubtedly it will lead to inflation, especially inflation in the housing sector. What is remarkable is that the cost that Israel had planned for the implementation of the peace train project to create a nationwide network to connect to Jordan was 26 billion. At the same time, the lack of funding for this project was criticized. In addition, the south of Israel, which was the beginning point of this project suffers from a budget deficit in its medical system. Therefore, no matter who is the loser of this war, Al-Aqsa Storm has weakened Israel's economy in the long term by showing off the weakness of the Zionist regime in providing security while dismantling the normalization project, especially between Saudi Arabia and Israel, and most importantly, questioning Arab-Med Project.

Human Security

The spokesman of the Israeli army said during a press conference on the morning of Tuesday, October 17: "Currently, about half a million Israelis are displaced inside the country." According to the report of "Russia Ilyum" news channel, he noted that all residential complexes located around the Gaza Strip have been evacuated and more than 20 neighborhoods in the north of occupied Palestine are now empty.