View source for The Islamic Conference: Retrospect and Prospect

The title is an article by Hamid H. Kizilbash published in “Arab Studies Quarterly”, Vol. 4, No. 1/2, and “The Islamic Alternative”, (Spring 1982), pp. 138-156. The following is the article.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/41857622
Hamid H. Kizilbash is Associate Professor of Political Science at Lake Forest College, Lake Forest, Ill.

=Introduction=
Among the many actors on the international scene today, the Organization of the Islamic Conference is a relative newcomer;' but with a membership that includes a great majority of the OPEC countries and with a focus on one of the most vital strategic regions of the world, it may achieve greater influence in world affairs than many organizations that have been in business longer. Already, in keeping with the trend toward greater reliance on bloc politics in the United Nations, this newcomer is using its resources and diplomatic leverage to influence the direction of events and policies at the national and international level. Since the Organization of the Islamic Conference (hereinafter referred to as O IC] has not yet received much attention, it seems both timely and appropriate for a seminar on "The Islamic Alternative" to look at this international manifestation of the more widely observed phenomenon of Islamic assertion at the national level.

Muslim States of Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Middle East have been
active in world affairs through such forums as the conference of the nonaligned, the OAU, the group of77, the Arab League, as well as the United Nat ions. That they should have felt the need for another organization, based on the common factor of Islam, is a development that merits some attention. What are the objectives which the Muslim States hope the OIC will help them achieve? What are the issues that unite the members of the OIC given their many political, regional, and other differences? What role do the member states visualize for the organization in international politics?

These questions will be explored in the light of the record of the OIC.'The first section deals with a brief history of the organization, its charter and the institutional framework. This section seemed particularly necessary since so little has been written about the organization. The second section examines the major issues taken up by the OIC. A final section looks at the prospects for an organization of Islamic States in world politics today.

=History=

The OIC is an organization of forty-two Islamic States with its headquarters in Jeddah.5 It was formed as a result of the September 1969 summit of Islamic heads of state in Rabat, Morocco.

The Rabat meeting, attended by twenty-three States, was hurriedly called
at the initiative of King Feisal of Saudi Arabia and King Hasan of Morocco to protest the incident of arson at Mesjid-al-Aqsa (August 21, 1969) and the military occupation of Jerusalem by lsrael.6 Although discussion was largely restricted to the protection of the sacred shrines of Islam in Jerusalem, the Rabat summit succeeded in launching the OIC by calling for: (l) a follow-up meeting of foreign ministers to discuss the common action taken by Muslim States regarding the situation in the Middle East, and(2)the establishment of a permanent secretariat to coordinate the activities of Muslim States at the international level. 7

The first Conference of Foreign Ministers was held in Jeddah in March
1970, and while no formal charter of the organization was approved until the third conference in March 1972,8 it became clear that many Islamic States were interested in working together at the international level for certain common objectives. The 1970 meeting approved a proposal for an annual Conference of Foreign Ministers, a secretariat to be located at Jeddah (until Jerusalem could be liberated), and a secretary-general to be from Malaysia.° Twelve Conferences of Foreign Ministers have been held since 1970; the last met in Baghdad in June 1981.

The OIC entered a new phase of its life after the second Summit of Kings and Heads of State in February 1974. This meeting was held soon after the 1973 Ramadan War in the Middle East. Two important changes had taken place: President Nasser's towering personality was no longer there and oil had emerged as a political weapon. Not only did this phase see an expansion in the membership of the OIC with the PLO receiving full status as a member-state, but economic cooperation among Islamic States was pursued on a much larger scale. Even the Islamic identity of the organization was asserted with greater vigor and resolve. As one delegate to the second summit put it:

... we have before us a unique opportunity not only to forge this Islamic Conference into a collective political force that is to be directed in support of a just solution to a burning problem. Much more than that, we are being given the opportunity to work at the resurgence of Islam and oflslamic brotherhood and solidarity as an effective moral force for peace in the Middle East and in the world at large."

Subsequent meetings of the Conference of Foreign Ministers have had a greatly expanded agenda and have found it necessary to set up specialized committees and new agencies to deal with the workload.

With the signing of the Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel in July 1978, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, the OIC entered a third and more complex phase of its existence. Aside from the regular session, two extraordinary sessions of the foreign ministers' conference were held in 1980, and a Third Summit of Kings and Heads of State was held in Mecca in January 1981. Egypt and Afghanistan's memberships in the organization have been suspended and Libya appears to be having some difficulties with the Saudi Arabian approach to world politics.11 Before proceeding to examine the issues around which much of this conference activity is taking place, it might be useful to summarize briefly the charter and institutional framework of the OIC.


=Charter of the O/C=
The charter of the OIC, approved by the third Conference of Foreign Ministers in March 1972, has fourteen articles. They contain the usual provisions associated with such instruments, i.e., objectives and principles, rules of membership and withdrawal, procedures of amendment, and so on. The distinguishing and unique features of the OIC charter are, of course, the provisions inspired by Islam, including the basic limitation of membership to Muslim States. 12

Three categories of references to Islam can be found in the language of the charter. The first category makes the common faith a "factor for rapprochement and solidarity between Islamic people" and reminds member-states of the role of "Islamic spiritual, ethical, social, and economic values" in promoting world peace and development. The second category relates to more specific objectives to be pursued by Muslim nations, such as: (I) safeguarding the holy places of the Islamic faith, (2) supporting the people of Palestine in their struggle to regain their rights and liberate their land, and (3) strengthening the struggle of all Muslim peoples for dignity, independence, and national rights.13 The third category of Islam-inspired provisions makes Jerusalem (after liberation) the headquarters of the organization and urges the secretariat to consolidate relations with other Islamic organizations of an international character.'

The framers of the charter were careful to recognize the position of Muslim States as part of the larger Third World community and the United Nations organization. The charter affirms the commitment of the OIC to the U.N. charter as well as the Bandung principles of equality of States, the right of self• determination, noninterference in domestic affairs, and respect for the territorial integrity of States. ts Solidarity with the Third World is further highlighted by the promise of struggle against racial segregation, discrimination, and colonialism.

=Organizational Structure=
The O IC is still in the process of transition from its original embryonic state to something much larger and more complex. The simple consultative machinery of the early years continues, but underneath it, a multifaceted network of departments, standing committees, and independent agencies is being evolved to promote and monitor the economic, political, legal, social, and cultural development of the Islamic world [see Appendix 2].
The charter of the OIC mentions three principal organs and a standing committee. These are: (I) the Conference of Kings and Heads of State and Government (CKHS), (2) the Conference of Foreign Ministers (CFM), and (3) the General Secretariat.Obviously, the intent was to have a simple two-tiered process of consultation to be facilitated and coordinated by a secretariat and the secretary-general and not the elaborate institutional framework of commissions, councils, and assembly associated with inter• national organizations such as the United Nations, the European Com• munity, or even the League of Arab States. In fact, the organizational structure of the OIC appears closer to that of the Organization of African Unity with its annual assembly of heads of state and its Council of Ministers. The member-states of the OIC seem to have approached the task of international institution-building with considerable caution and the most liberal interpretation of the charter does not suggest any radical surrender of sovereign prerogatives to the new organization. The framers of the OIC charter appear to have opted for a modest first step toward consultation rather than an uncertain leap toward a supranational entity of Islamic nations.

The organization's supreme authority is vested in the CKHS (also known
as the Islamic Summit) which was originally to be called in session whenever the interests of Muslim States warranted it,! and which, since the 1981 summit, has now been scheduled to meet every three years."° Only three summits have been held since 1969, the first at Rabat (1969), the second in Lahore (1974), and the third in Mecca(l981). Although the CKHS is the most powerful organ of the OIC, it has tended to rely heavily on the preparatory work done by the CFM and the General Secretariat and tends to delegate much of the policymaking as well as the implementation to them. It has become customary for the Islamic Summit to produce a declaration outlining the concerns of the OIC and formulating a program of unity and action. The Rabat Declaration, the Declaration of Lahore, and the Mecca Declaration each charted a course that the OIC followed in specific activities through the CFM and the Secretariat.Aside from the practical advantage of a periodic gathering of Muslim heads of state, the CKHS also has a symbolic value. This is highlighted at each summit by the customary gathering of all kings, presidents, and prime ministers to pray together, demonstrating the unity of the Muslim world.
The CFM is the pivotal organ of the OIC. Consisting of an annual meeting
of foreign ministers of Islamic States, the CFM is responsible for implementing general policy, reviewing the progress of resolutions adopted, admitting new members, approving the budget of the Secretariat, fixing the date and venue of its own meetings and those of the CKHS, and appointing the officers of the organization. It has met twelve times so far. It can take decisions by a two-thirds majority but prefers to work by consensus. Aside from its regular sessions, the CFM can and has met for three extraordinary sessions, and it has become the practice of the foreign ministers of Islamic States to meet in New York during the course of the U .N. General Assembly sessions. After the usual inaugural by the head of state of the host country and the annual report of the secretary-general, the CFM has, since
1974, developed a practice of splitting up into four commissions to cover the increasingly crowded agenda for a three-day session.22 The actual work is done in these commissions and then submitted in the form of draft resolutions for approval by the plenary session. The number of resolutions passed at each CFM session and the number of topics covered has expanded greatly.3

The General Secretariat of the OIC was set up, in the words of its first
secretary-general, "to provide an organ for coordinating the various activities for cooperation among Muslim countries."2 The Secretariat now has four assistant secretaries-general and a growing staff of international civil servants.2' In keeping with the provisions of the OIC charter, the Secretariat is expected to maintain impartiality in its work, and enjoy a legal capacity as well as diplomatic immunity in member countries.26 The Secretariat is presently headed by its fourth secretary-general, Habib Chatti of Tunisia.27

The main task of the Secretariat is to follow up the resolutions of the CKHS and the CFM, to supply working papers and information to member-states, and to prepare for meetings of the conference. In fact, the role of the Secretariat has not been that passive, the secretaries-general have time and again taken initiatives in setting up new programs such as the universities for Niger and Uganda or even a new name of the organization.28 The Secretariat appears to have faced some budgetary problems and manpower shortages which continue to be a concern in the organization.

Aside from these three principal organs of the OIC, there are a number of
advisory and independent agencies reflecting the growing importance attached to economic cooperation and solidarity among Islamic countries.3° The length and scope of the present study does not permit in-depth attention to these agencies. They include the Islamic Commission for Economic, Cultural, and Social Affairs, the Islamic Solidarity Fund, and the Islamic Development Bank, and such agencies are a most important aspect of the growing organization of the Islamic Conference.

=Major Issues Discussed=
The OIC bas concerned itself with a fairly broad range of political, economic, and cultural issues. A review of the agenda items and the resolutions passed suggests four categories of issues: (I) threats to the territorial integrity and security of Muslim States from outside the Muslim world; (2) the struggle of Muslim minorities; (3) issues relating to racism, colonialism, and imperialism including movements for liberation; and (4) economic and cultural issues. A fifth category of issues arising out of differences between Muslim countries could be added, but the number of such issues to come before the Conference have been few and there seems to be an unwritten policy to avoid getting involved in such issues unless both sides request it.31 Unity against the common enemy of all Muslim States, whether it be Zionism, imperialism, colonialism, or economic backwardness, has been emphasized, while the causes of disunity have been played down.
The attempt in this section will be to provide an overall picture of the kinds of issues with which the OIC has been concerned in order to get a better understanding of the organization, rather than undertaking an exhaustive discussion of the issue itself.

=Security of Muslim States=
The issue around which the OIC was organized and which has been on the agenda of every meeting since 1969 is the liberation of Jerusalem and Palestine and the security of Arab territories against Zionist expansionism.3

In the category of security, the OIC has also taken up the issues of protecting Muslim States against nuclear threat and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.

Threat to the sacred shrines of Islam in occupied Jerusalem, liberation of the Palestinian homeland, and containment of Zionist expansionism have been treated as different aspects of the same issue. Since the 1974 Summit, the PLO has enjoyed full membership rights in the organization, and the entire Islamic community has committed its political, material, and moral support to the Palestinian people. The OIC has passed resolutions calling for the return of Jerusalem to its status before June 1967, the creation of an independent State of Palestine, and denouncing the Camp David Accords. The Declaration of the 1981 Islamic Summit calls for Jihad in the following words.:

We therefore pledge to wage Jihad with all the means at our disposal for the liberation of Al-Quds and the occupied territories. We shall make this liberation struggle the prime Islamic cause of this generation until God willing Al-Quds AI-Sharif and all the occupied Palestinian and Arab territories are restored to their legitimate owners.33

A catalogue of other OIC actions to deal with this issue could include: declaring August 2l as Al-Aqsa Day and 1980 as the Year of Jerusalem; creation of the Al-Quds Committee and the Jerusalem Fund; a special Palestine stamp to be issued by all member-states for raising funds; creation of the post of assistant secretary-general for Palestinian and Al-Quds Al• Sharif affairs; and coordination of diplomatic efforts to bring about the expulsion of Israel from the United Nations. Unity on the Palestine issue has been complete as far as basic objectives are concerned but differences have arisen over tactics from time to time. The latest development involves Egypt's unilateral peace with Israel; Egypt's membership was suspended. Although the organization has brought new resources and a larger forum to deal with the Middle East issue, no immediate breakthrough has been achieved, and the OIC seems prepared for a protracted struggle in this regard.

Beginning with the Fifth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers in 1974, the issue of strengthening the security of Islamic States against nuclear threat has been a regular item on the agenda. The OIC has called for a solemn undertaking from nuclear weapon States not to use or threaten to use such weapons against non-nuclear States, and since 1979 has thrown its weight behind the proposal for an international convention on this subject and the establishment of nuclear weapon free zones in Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia.34

The OIC met in an extraordinary session in January 1980 to consider the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The issue was presented as an instance of military intervention and interference in the internal affairs of States and as a Soviet attempt to prevent the Muslim people of Afghanistan from exercising their right to determine their own political future. The OIC resolution reaffirmed "the determination of the Islamic States to pursue a nonaligned policy in respect of superpower conflict and to protect Muslim people from the adverse effects of the cold war between these States. "JS The Soviet Union was condemned for its military aggression against the Afghan people and asked to immediately and unconditionally withdraw its troops. The OIC meeting also suspended Afghanistan's membership in the organization and called upon member-states to consider staying away from the Moscow Olympics.°
At the same session that dealt with the Afghanistan situation, the OIC also
expressed concern for the threat or use of force by the United States against
I ran and called for the withdrawal of foreign troops from the Horn of Africa.

=Muslim Minorities=

This is an issue that has involved concern for the welfare of Muslim minorities in all parts of the world; the Philippines, Cyprus, and Ethiopia have received particular attention.
The situation of Muslims in the Philippines has been on the agenda since the third CFM in 1972 and the Moro National LiberationFront(MNLF) has attended the meetings of the OIC as an observer. The Philippine Government has been condemned for its military repression of Muslims in the southern provinces and has been urged to grant them autonomy. A four-nation committee was appointed by the CFM to help negotiate a peace between the MNLF and the Philippine Government, and during its tenth session the CFM proposed bringing the issue before an international forum.37
The cause of the Turkish Muslim community in Cyprus was brought before the seventh CFM in 1976 and the Eritrean problem has been on its agenda since 1973. In each case the organization has endorsed the Muslim cause and attempted to use the offices of the OIC to support their struggle. A number of resolutions have also been passed calling upon all States with Muslim minorities to guarantee their political and religious rights, and on the basis of a study prepared on Muslim minorities by the OIC Secretariat, a new Department of Muslim Communities in Non-member States has been created.38

=Racism/ Colonialism/ Imperialism=
The OIC has shown considerable interest in this category of issues both by reference to the Islamic message of brotherhood and equality and the colonial experience of Islamic States. In 1976 the seventh CFM further added to this category by declaring Zionism to be another form of racism.In the words of the 1976 resolution:

...the ruling racist regime in Occupied Palestine as well as the two ruling racist regimes in Zimbabwe and South Africa stem from a common origin, constitute an integral entity of the same racist structure, and arc organically linked in their policies which aim at humiliating man and depriving him of all dignity.

Many of the resolutions passed by the OIC condemn South Africa, Southern
Rhodesia, and Israel for their policies of racism and apartheid.
Aside from Israel, the main targets of anti-colonial activity have been Portugal, Spain, France, and South Africa. Specific resolutions of condemnation were passed, for example, against:

1.	Portugal by reference to Guinea and Senegal (CFM, 1972); Mozambique, Angola, Cape Verde, Sao Tome and Principe Islands (CFM,1974);

2.	Spain by reference to Spanish Sahara (CFM, 1974);

3.	France by reference to Somaliland, Comoros, Mayotte, and Seychelles
(CFM 1974, 1977, and 1978);

4.	South Africa by reference to Namibia (CFM, 1976).

The OIC has recognized the importance of other forums, such as the Organization of African Unity or the Conference of the Non-aligned, on these issues and acted in coordination with them. Part of its stand against colonialism has involved support of liberation movements, particularly in Africa.9

Although evidence of the anti-imperialist stand of the OIC can be found in many discussions and resolutions, the extraordinary session of January 1980 illustrates it best. There the Islamic States expressed their resolve to combat foreign intervention "whether from States traditionally known for their imperialist policies or other States following in their footsteps."4 The OIC expressed grave concern at the efforts of certain great powers to exert pressure on Islamic States, particularly the attempt to establish military bases on their territory. Condemning pressures of all kinds, the CFM drew the attention of the community "to the current attempt by certain Western powers to exploit the new situation created by Soviet armed intervention in Afghanistan for reintroducing imperialist intervention in the Islamic world, particularly the region near Afghanistan."

=Economic and Cultural Issues=
In this category the OIC has taken up issues relating to the "new international economic order and food security, trade, and economic cooperation" among Islamic States, the problems of Muslim States that are landlocked, and the protection and promotion of Islamic culture and civilization.

Concerning the North-South debate, the 1974 CFM endorsed the Declaration and Action Programme for the Establishment of a New International Economic Order passed by the Sixth Extraordinary Session of the United Nations General Assembly." The second Islamic Summit of 1974 called upon all developing nations to unite their efforts to establish more equitable and balanced relations and urged member-states "to work toward their liberation and that of other countries of the Third World from the inequities governing international relations aimed at perpetuating the exploitation of the resources of these countries to the benefit of the developed countries."46

Proposals for greater cooperation between developing countries were also voiced at the 1974 Summit, as the prime minister of Pakistan stated:

With the recent dramatic improvement in the terms of trade of the oil• producing countries, which will lead to a rapid increase in their financial resources, an unprecedented shift will occur in the global monetary and financial balance of power. The Third World can now participate in the economic and financial councils of the world on an equal footing with the developed countries and will be able to acquire a due measure of influence and control in international financial and economic institutions. Indeed, for the first time, the Third World is potentially in a position to use its own resources for financing its development through cooperative effort.'

Since then the OIC has moved more and more toward emphasizing economic cooperation among Islamic States. The 1977 CFM approved the Draft General Agreement on Economic, Technical and Commercial Cooperation which encourages member-states to undertake joint economic projects, research, training, and exchange of experts and trade liberalization. This aspect of the work of the OIC has seen the greatest expansion and seems to be receiving the most attention. Economic aid for development of the "least developed Islamic countries," as well as assistance for Muslim refugees in Djibouti, Somalia, Chad, Uganda, Kampuchea or help for the drought-stricken countries in the Sahel are just a few examples of the expanding economic aid program of the OIC. The emphasis on economic activities is also evidenced in the work of agencies like the Islamic Development Bank and the Islamic Solidarity Fund. Similarly, the Islamic Centre for the Development of Trade and the Islamic Chambers of Commerce, Industry, and Commodity Exchanges have been set up to expand economic trade between Islamic countries. The problems of the six landlocked countries have been referred to the Islamic Commission for Economic, Social, and Cultural Affairs by the 1977 CFM so that measures can be initiated to ameliorate the economic difficulties of these countries.

In the cultural field, the OIC has been concerned with the preservation of Islamic civilization and the improvement of the quality of life of Muslim people throughout the world. Centers of Islamic learning, culture, and art have been set up in many parts of the Muslim world and the Islamic News Agency as well as the Broadcasting Organization provide information from an Islamic perspective. The CFM has passed resolutions to counter propaganda against Islam and even to hold "Islamic Games."
An extremely important area of activity not covered by the classification of issues used in this section, is the coordination of policies and actions to be followed by Islamic States in other international forums. The CFM has been used by member-states to agree on candidates for international offices, to define positions to be taken at international conferences, and to work out strategy for cooperation with other regional and Third World organizations.

=The Oic and International Politics=
We have established that there is a new intergovernmental organization set up by Islamic States and that its members are dealing with a variety of political, economic, and cultural problems. This section turns to the impor• tant question: What chances does the organization have of achieving its objectives in the international arena today?

Cosgrove and Twitchett in a study of the United Nations and the European
Community have suggested three tests for evaluating the capacity of an international organization to act on the international scene: (1) degree of autonomous decisionmaking power of the central institutions of the organization; (2) extent of significant and continuing functions performed by the organization which have an impact on interstate relations; and (3) significance attached to the organization in the formation of foreign policies of States, particularly by the members. 48 Judged by this criteria, the OIC, at this time, is clearly not as effective an organization as it could be, although its central institutions enjoy considerable autonomy and its decisions are acquiring greater influence in the interstate relations and the foreign policy of member-states. This set of criteria assumes that all international organiza• tions seek the same level of cohesion and supranational authority. The record of the OIC seems to suggest that it may not be seeking, at present, the kind of community that Europe has achieved.

Islamic States are spread out over a broad geographic area, the political systems range from monarchies to various shades of republics, and economic development in the Islamic community is very uneven. More importantly, most of the Islamic States are just beginning to emerge from a period of colonial exploitation and Western dominance that eroded the Islamic identity and ensured economic dependence. Imperialism has been quick to divide and rule the various Islamic peoples and exploit the weaknesses of various ruling groups. Such a community of States needs an international organization with different methods and procedures from those that others have created, and the OIC seems to be, at least partially, aware of the kind of community it must serve.

The future of the OIC will also be determined by factors in international
politics that are outside the control of the Islamic community. A physical assault on the vital oil resources of the Middle East. reduced U.S. support of the Zionist movement, intensification of Soviet-American confrontation any of these could seriously impede or enhance the ability of the OIC to exercise greater influence in international politics.

The domestic politics of Islamic countries have a critical link with the future performance of the OIC. Unstable political regimes that are unable to mobilize the people and solve the economic problems to the extent that their resources permit cannot pursue independent and effective foreign policies. It would also be unrealistic to expect that regimes with widely differing domestic policies and economic systems can develop the mutual confidence and trust that effective united action at the international level requires.

The role of Islam in providing the necessary unifying force to improve the prospects for the OIC also needs to be understood more clearly. There is a tendency, particularly in Western circles, to see Islamic resurgence as one monolithic movement to return to fundamentalism marked by the use of severe punishments for crime. In fact, the resurgence of Islam means different things in Libya, Iran, or Pakistan. At the level of personal beliefs and faith in the teachings of the Holy Qur'an and the Prophet, Islam unites the one billion Muslims of the world, but until Islamic institutions are designed and developed which are common to the polity and the economy of the different States, the basic common belief can, at most, only provide a starting point. Developing common Islamic institutions is a process that the O IC has helped to launch and will facilitate, but it is not a reality that can emerge overnight. If the economic power of the oil-rich Islamic countries can help them achieve greater freedom of action and break the dependence on the former colonial powers, it can also contribute to a movement to develop and consolidate economic and political institutions which will become common to most of the Islamic world.

International politics today is characterized by the emergence of a multipolar global community and an increasing confrontation between the North and the South. In one sense, the OIC is a product of both these trends. Just as the European Community and the Peoples Republic of China have become powerful independent forces after the end of the bipolar era, so also a unity of Islamic States has the potential to become another center of power in world affairs. The States of the Islamic world share the kind of population base, resources, and technology which are essential for great power status. In the North-South confrontation, Islamic States recognize their place in the South, and by strengthening their economic position vis-~-vis the North, they can influence the balance in favor of the South. In other words, the OIC is capable of playing an important role in shaping the international politics of the future. 
Unfortunately, it continues to be subject to all the trials and tribulations of the factional politics that has kept the Islamic States weak in the past. The organization's chances of being taken seriously by others, of
achieving its objectives, and of emerging as a new force in world affairs remain very much an open question and tied to the problem of unity. If the following statement in the Mecca Declaration of 1981 is any indication of the attitude of member-states, they are obviously satisfied, hopeful, and committed to the future of the organization:

Recalling with satisfaction the establishment of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and noting with pleasure the progressive development of this organization, as well as its growing status in international fora as a symbol of the unity of Muslims and a framework of understanding and rapprochement among them, and noting also the establishment of other institutions emanating from the organization, and the continuation ofjoint efforts in this direction, we commit ourselves to support and develop our organization, and to provide it with appropriate skills and adequate resources, so that it may discharge the noble tasks assigned to it, and further to support the Islamic Solidarity Fund and Al-Quds Fund as well as other organs and projects of the organization to ensure their success."

=Footnotes=
The footnotes are available in the website of the article.

=Bibliagraphy=
The bibliography is available in the website of the article.

=Notes=