View source for Islamizing the Conflict (Book chapter)

The title is the fifth chapter of the book “Jerusalem and Its Role in Islamic Solidarity” by Yitzhak Reiter published by Palgrave Macmillan in 2008. The following is the chapter.<ref>https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=bZbFAAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=%22Islamic+solidarity%22&ots=Gdb_y6fmkV&sig=KmqQNtIs1YwhI6yI7IPKEissOFo</ref>

=Introduction=

The conflict over the Jerusalem holy sites is a useful tool in the struggle for Palestinian national awareness. The first to make relatively successful use of this issue was the leader of the Palestinian national movement during the Mandate period-Hajj Amin al-Husseini, the "Grand Mufti" and president of the Supreme Muslim Council from 1922 to 1937. The Palestinian Arabs' political weakness after the British Mandate's establishment in Palestine caused them to look to the greater Arab and Muslim world as a natural source of support. In their efforts to enlist the support of Muslim countries and populations, the Palestinian leadership employed religious symbols, primarily in the call to save Islamic holy sites from foreign control (Jewish and British/Christian). The Jewish activity during this period played into the Arabs' hands. During the 1920s, efforts were made to broaden Jewish rights at the Western Wall, the site that in the consciousness of many Jews represented an authentic remnant of the Temple compound, at a time when the Temple Mount/ Haram site was under exclusive Muslim control. The Muslims acted to prevent such an expansion of rights, out of fear that by bringing articles of furniture to the site the Jews would be seeking to establish their sovereignty over it. At the same time, the Muslims worked to enhance the importance of al-Haram al-Sharif. In 1928, the Supreme Muslim Council, headed by Hajj Amin al-Husseini, completed a restoration project at the al-Aqsa compound, financed by donations from the Muslim world. The Zionist challenge, or "Zionist provocations," as Husseini called them, served as his impetus for the enlistment of political support and for the raising of funds from Muslim communities outside of Palestine. What the Jews refer to as the "192 Riots," in which more than 113 Jews were massacred in Hebron, Safed, and other places, are called by the Arabs "the 1929 Revolt," a first expression of opposition to British occupation and to Zionist immigration.

A commission of inquiry was appointed by the British government in May 1930 to investigate what became known as "the Western Wall incidents" and the conflicting Jewish and Muslim claims regarding the Wall. This commission submitted its report in December of the same year. The report stated not only that the Western Wall is a remnant of the ancient Herodian Jewish Temple but also that the Muslims see its southern part (not the then praying pavement or the present-day plaza) as associated with the Prophet Muhammad's Night Journey. The Jewish side claimed that al-Haram al-Sharif's guide of 1914 does not mention the Western Wall as a holy place for Muslims. It concluded that the Western Wall itself is under full Muslim ownership and the praying pavement is a Muslim Waqf. However, it decided that the Jews had a proprietary right to pray at the site according to arrangements dating from the Ottoman era' (ab antique practice), but they were not permitted to bring chairs or benches, to build a mechitza (dividing wall between men and women) or to blow the Shofar. Thus, the British ruled that the status quo should prevail.

The fact that the struggle for rights at the Western Wall formed the background to these events aided the Palestinian leadership in depicting its political struggle as a religious one and in playing on Muslim religious feeling. Husseini did not, perhaps, manage to persuade all Palestinian Arabs by means of his religious campaign, as there was significant opposition to his efforts, but his main success appears to have been among Muslim communities outside of Palestine. Husseini's activity generated a certain degree of pressure upon the British, who feared the effects of religious agitation on Muslim populations in India and in Middle Eastern areas under their control and influence. 2 Hajj Amin al-Husseini proceeded to turn al-Haram al-Sharif into a burial pantheon of important Muslim figures. He succeeded in convening the Islamic Congress in Jerusalem in 1931 and in bringing about the decision to establish a university in Jerusalem, to be called the al-Aqsa University (a decision that was never implemented).3

Amin al-Husseini also made use of the sacred status of Jerusalem and Palestine, with al-Aqsa at its center. In 1935, he issued a religious ruling (fatwa) according to which all of Palestine is holy to Islam: Having been Islam's first direction of prayer (qibla), al-Aqsa is the third-holiest site in Islam, the place to which the Prophet traveled in his Journey (al-isra') and from which he ascended to heaven (mi'raj). Moreover, he argued, the land of Palestine is saturated with the blood of Muslim warriors from the period of the Islamic conquests and is the burial site of many prophets, saints, and fallen warriors; every inch of the land is thus considered as the repository of their remains and of their religious faith.4 Descriptions of the Holy Land are taken from the fada'il literature in praise of Jerusalem and al-Sham.5 Along with this ruling the Mufti issued an additional fatwa that called upon Palestine's Muslim landowners to dedicate their property as waqf due to the land's special status, and thereby to prevent its sale or at least to enable the Supreme Muslim Council to supervise real estate transactions of those properties that had received waqf status. 6 This campaign was unsuccessful.7

Yasser Arafat, the foremost Palestinian leader of the second half of the twentieth century, also employed religious symbols for political purposes. In his speeches, Arafat would incorporate Qur'anic verses, usually ones in which the Children of Israel are depicted as having betrayed God and been, consequently, punished.8 Arafat's hinted interpretation was that the ancient Jews' punishment was that of being prohibited from entering the Holy Land. In some of his speeches, Arafat likened the Muslim recapture of Jerusalem to its seventh-century Muslim conquest.9

One of the most popular clerics in the Muslim world today, who writes prolifically on the Jerusalem issue and the need for jihad in order to liberate Palestine, is the previously mentioned Sheikh (Dr.) Yusuf al-Qaradawi." Qaradawi is very much upfront about the fact that his entire textual oeuvre, from legal rulings to sermons, statements to the press and lectures, constitutes an ongoing battle in a religious propaganda war whose motives are political in nature. In his book Jerusalem Is the Problem of Every Muslim, he defines the Palestine situation as one of religious war in which each Muslim is bound by the duty of jihad in its highest form, adding: "If those who have stolen our land use religious justifications to fight us, then we must return fire using the same methods. If they fight us with the Torah, then we must fight them with the Qur'an; if [they use] the Talmud, then [we must use] the hadith collections of Bukhari and Muslim; if Shabbat, then Friday; if they say the Temple, then we must say al-Aqsa." Qaradawi also adds recommendations for political activity: renewal of the Intifada (this section of the book was written, apparently, prior to September 2000), opposition to normalization with Israel, renewal of the Arab boycott of those who engage in commerce with Israel, declaration of the conflict as an Islamic war; the establishment of a world Islamic body to be charged with liberating Jerusalem, and the establishment of an al-Quds fund to which all Muslims would contribute for Jerusalem's liberation.11 

The influence of Qaradawi's sermons is readily discernible in Arab academic and journalistic writing. The following will serve as an example: a Jordanian lecturer in the Applied Science Private University's Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences (Amman), Dr. Muhammad 'Awad Salih al-Hazayma also contends that the conflict is, in essence, a religious one, and that Islam has a clear goal: "Removing the Jerusalem issue from the narrow national context and placing it in a broad Islamic context will enable support to be garnered from the Islamic countries and minorities around the world, just as the Jewish state has used the connection between the Torah and the New Testament in order to sway Western Christian opinion." Al-Hazayma, who apparently belongs to the Islamist stream in Jordan, bases himself on the views of Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi in his call for a strategy of employing Islam in the polemical battle. He cites a tradition according to which Abu Bakr, the First Caliph, told military leader Khalid ibn al-Walid to "[f]light your enemy using the same means with which he fights you-fight sword with sword and spear with spear." Al-Hazayma writes:

And we add, faith with faith. If our enemy uses religion to fight us, and if they enlist YW-the Jewish God-we will enlist and employ the name of Allah, and if he sends us his soldiers in the name of Judaism, then we will send them our soldiers in the name of Islam, as did Qutuz in the Battle of Ain Jalut [in which the Mongols were defeated by the Mamluks in 1260], and if they come to us with the Torah, then we will counter them with the Quran, and if they go forth under the banner of Moses, then we will go forth under the banner of Moses and Jesus and Muhammad together, and if they mention the prophesy of Isaiah, then we will mention the hadith of Muslim and Bukhari, and if they wage war upon us in the name of the Temple, then we will wage war on behalf of al-Aqsa, and if our enemies tell their soldiers "You are the chosen people," then we will tell our soldiers "You are the best people.12

The following are three additional examples illustrating radical Muslims' political objective in the conflict over Jerusalem. The first of these is taken from the words of Egyptian political author Dr. Ra'fat Sayed Ahmad. Ahmad says that Jerusalem was chosen to symbolize the struggle over Palestine because the religious context "requires its liberation from its long captivity." The second example appears in a 1999 book entitled Our Cultural Presence in Jerusalem by Dr. Ahmad FahimJabr, a Palestinian lecturer at al-Quds University. The author defines the book's aim thus: "[t]o raise awareness of the blessed city and its religious status among Muslims...to arouse the reader's interest in Jerusalem and lead him to participate in this arena, and to accentuate the importance of control over Palestine in general and Jerusalem in particular and to view it as part of defending the way of Allah."14 The last example is the book by Abd al-Tawab Mustafa, written in order to counter the Zionists' claims to a historical right to Palestine and Jerusalem, anchored (in his words, "supposedly") in the Torah, and in order to promote the idea of Islamizing the conflict. The Islamic dimension, he writes, is not meant to replace Arab nationalism or Palestinian territorial nationalism with an exclusively religious ideology, but rather to complement the former. According to him, by imparting an Islamic dimension to the conflict every Arab and every Palestinian gains the right to world Muslim assistance.15 Another prominent Islamic intellectual, Dr. Muhammad 'Amara of Egypt has written that the conflict is religious in nature, despite the fact that Muslim opposition is directed toward Zionism as a national movement, rather than at Judaism as a faith.16

It is clearly in the Palestinians' and the Arabs' interest to highlight the conflict's religious dimension. From this point of view, the well-publicized visit by Ariel Sharon (and several Likud Knesset members) to the Temple Mount on September 28, 2000 provided the Palestinians with the most effective ammunition that they could have wished for in their campaign for world Muslim public opinion. In a November 2002 interview, the Palestinian minister of waqf and religious affairs Sheikh Yusuf Salama explained why the uprising had been named the al-Asa Intifada: "Because it symbolizes the national faith regarding Palestine, to which the Prophet traveled in his Journey." In other words, it is worthwhile to attach religious symbols to the political struggle. In this interview, Salama enumerated the successes that this approach had attained, attributing to the Intifada such achievements as defending the holy places, unifying the Palestinian people, and making the Palestinian problem the foremost issue in the Arab world and on the all-Muslim agenda. According to him, it had also served to mobilize the Arab leadership and the Arab street, "as we saw in the Beirut summit, where a consensus was reached on the founding of a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital"17 (meaning the March 2002 Arab Peace Initiative). Even if Salama exaggerated the existing level of pan-Islamic solidarity, it is nevertheless true that al-Aqsa as a religious symbol added ideological and emotional fuel to the Palestinian struggle. In the preface to a book on the history of al-Aqsa that was published on his initiative, Salama writes that "[t]he book aims to familiarize Muslims with the al-Aqsa Mosque, so that we may pray together in al-Aqsa after its liberation from the occupiers and after the founding of an independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital and under the leadership of Yasser Arafat."8

The scope of the political-religious indoctrination that is taking place via print publications can also be seen in a book on Jerusalem that was issued in 1995 by the Organization of the Islamic Conference's (OIC) Islamic Scientific, Educational and Cultural Organization (ISESCO). The following appears in the book's preface: "This publication is undertaken for the sake of both keeping alive the issue of Al-Quds in the sphere of world concerns and keeping up the attachment of Muslims worldwide to this city. This initiative should help to disprove the false claims of both the Zionist movement and the State of Israel; on the other hand, it should cancel the effect of the fallacious propaganda that seeks to deny Muslims their natural rights to this holy city." It is also stated that "Muslims throughout the world ... wish to make any sacrifice that will free this holy city from the yoke of the conquering occupant."


=5.1 The Role of the Jewish Party to the Conflict, and the "Mirror Syndrome"=

Does Jerusalem's elevation represent an Arab-Muslim initiative, or is it a reaction to parallel activity on the Jewish-Israeli side of the conflict? Is the phenomenon in question a reflection of the "mirror syndrome"2" Muslim writers do, in fact, present their activity as a response to Israeli policy, rather than as steps taken on their own initiative.' There can be no doubt that Muslims are not the only players in the field of religiously inspired political activity, and that the Jewish party to the conflict is active in this area on several planes: the first plane is that of ideology. As was mentioned above, Zionism as a national movement bears an inherent religious message that poses a challenge to Arabs and Muslims. The idea that Zion is Jerusalem and that Jews must return to Zion-and that exiles must ingather in the Holy Land-is based on historical justifications taken from sacred writings (God's promise to Abraham) and has been granted legitimacy by the Christian world that accepts the Old Testament-to widespread Muslim displeasure. The second plane is that of the struggle for the Holy Land and for the holy sites. Despite the Israeli government's secular nature, Muslims regard the post-1967 nationalist-messianic wave and the Jewish settler movement in the Palestinian territories as religiously motivated phenomena that reflect Israeli mainstream positions. They object to the aggressive Jewish control exerted over places that, they claim, are holy to Muslims as well, such as Rachel's Tomb, the Cave of the Patriarchs in Hebron, the Western Wall plaza, and other sites, and to the activities of radical Jewish Temple movements. At the third plane, we see that since the Oslo process there has been a significant rise in Israeli-Jewish awareness (even among Jews who are not religiously observant) of the Temple Mount as a vital symbol of national and cultural identity. According to a poll conducted in February 2005, only 9 percent of the Jewish public is willing to allow sovereignty over the Temple Mount to pass entirely into Palestinian hands, while 51 percent insist on exclusive Israeli control of the site, and 36 percent are prepared for joint-Palestinian-Israeli control. Ariel Sharon's demonstrative Temple Mount visit in September 2000 as well as the attempts of right-wing Knesset members to visit the site just prior to the implementation of the Disengagement Plan from the Gaza Strip are two examples that illustrate the Temple Mount's upgrading as a national Jewish site. Jewish Temple Mount-related activity sends a message to the Arab-Muslim religious and political echelons that they are being confronted with a religious challenge no less potent than the political rivalry, and they react within the twilight zone that lies between religion and politics.

Major milestones are identifiable in the process by which the Jerusalem issue came to penetrate world Arab and Muslim awareness as a unifying symbol in the struggle against Israel. The process evolved along with the Arab-Muslim experience of Jewish "challenge" with regard to the Temple Mount.' The match struck by Michael Dennis Rohan, a mentally unstable Australian Christian who set fire to the al-Aqsa Mosque in August 1969 (including the Nur al-Din minbar preacher's pulpit-associated with Saladin) served to reignite the idea of employing al-Aqsa for the purpose of liberating Palestine from Israeli occupation. The setting on fire to the al-Aqsa Mosque while the site was under Israeli control constituted the first sign of danger from an Arab-Muslim perspective. This act of arson incited the Muslim world and was a motivating event for those seeking to make al-Aqsa a bone of contention in their struggle against Israel. Two days after the incident, the UN Security Council convened at the urging of Arab countries and issued a resolution that expressed deep concern over the profanation of al-Haram al-Sharif.24 The Muslim claim was that the fire was set deliberately and Israel was held responsible. An official publication of the Palestinian Authority (PA), published in 2002 and written by the head of the Ministry of Waqf and Religious Affairs' history department, Muhammad Ghawsha (pronounced Ghoshe), alleges that the Mosque fire was set by an "Israeli criminal named Michael William Rohan" (the name of the Australian Christian who committed the act was Michael Dennis Rohan). Ghawsha accuses Israel of attempting to prevent efforts to extinguish the fire, contending that "[t]he fire was finally put out by Palestinian volunteers from Jerusalem and the surrounding villages," but not before first having to battle Israelis in order to do so:

When they arrived they found that the Mosque's gates had been locked by the occupation soldiers while the Mosque was being consumed by flames, but the enraged mob succeeded in breaking through. But at this point they found that the fire hoses were not working and only then, after much delay, did the Jerusalem Municipality fire trucks arrive. The Muslims called for fire trucks from Hebron, Bethlehem, Jenin, Ramallah, al-Bira and Tul-Karem. The Jerusalem fire chief tried to keep them from entering, but the Hebron fire chief prevented this and 30,000 Palestinians volunteered and helped to extinguish the fire." Even today, the Arab League Web site states that "Israel burned Al-AqsaMosque.'7

According to Israeli columnist Uzi Benziman, the East Jerusalem (Palestinian operated) fire station's commander and staff were the first to reach the site and, upon discovering the extent of the blaze, called the main fire station in West Jerusalem; within a short time 16 fire trucks arrived at the site. The Muslims who gathered at the site accused the Israeli firefighters of bringing gasoline instead of water to fuel the fire.28 The Israeli government was deeply concerned by the incident-an incident that damaged Israel's image and cast doubt upon the legitimacy of its sovereignty over Jerusalem.

Thus, the fire started by an Australian tourist is perceived in the Arab world as a fully intentional Israeli act. One publication states that Rohan was aided by an Israeli terrorist group. It is also claimed that the Israeli Jewish public widely supports the idea that the al-Aqsa Mosque should be demolished.
After the 1969 arson incident, Egyptian president Gamal Abd al-Nasser called for a war of purification against Israel, while King Faisal of Saudi Arabia and other Arab political leaders called upon all Muslims to mobilize for jihad to liberate Jerusalem." The event also served as an impetus to King Faisal's founding of the OIC (Munazhzhamat al-Mu'tamar al-Islami), an intergovernmental grouping of 57 Muslim states.' In the wake of the Mosque fire, King Hussein appointed the Royal Jordanian Commission for Jerusalem Affairs, headed by his brother, former Crown Prince Hasan.

The Muslim and Palestinian message that has been disseminated since the arson incident is that so long as Israel controls the Haram/ Temple Mount, al-Aqsa is in danger. The date of the fire (August 21) is commemorated via various events-some held by Arab states and some initiated by Islamic or nationalist political organizations. Thus, on the thirty-third anniversary of the arson, the Jordanian professional associations organized, in cooperation with the Islamic Action Front (a political party opposed to the government), a parade under the auspices of Amman governor Abd al-Karim Malahmah (a member of the ruling regime). During this event, performances were staged of battles to conquer Jerusalem from the Byzantines and the Crusaders, and Palestinian folk dances were presented to a background Palestinian folk music.32 The (state-run) Jordan News Agency issued a press release in honor of the event, in which it enumerated the Jews' "hostile" acts in Jerusalem and the "massacres" carried out by Israel "at the Mosque, while mentioning King Hussein's contribution to al-Aqsa's restoration and the fact that King Abdallah II had ordered the installation of a minbar resembling the Saladin minbar that was burned in the fire.

A year later, on August 20, 2003, the Islamic institute that runs the Jordan-based www.elquds.net Web site held a press conference at the Beirut Press Club, to commemorate the thirty-fourth anniversary of the al-Aqsa Mosque fire and to announce a campaign to get 100 million Muslims to sign an "affirmation of our right to Jerusalem." The head of the institute professed the belief that Israel and the Jews were behind the arson incident. He connected Jerusalem with the Palestinian question and urged assistance to the Palestinians in their struggle, as well as opposition to normalization with Israel, opposition to the United States (because of its support for Israel), and promotion of an economic boycott of the United States aimed at damaging its economy.'

Other major incidents involving Israel have also served to reinforce the message that "al-Aqsa is in danger." The shooting attack staged on the Temple Mount in 1982 by Allan Goodman, a recent American immigrant to Israel who had been conscripted into the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and used his weapon to shoot at Muslims, provided an additional opportunity for this message to be disseminated. A visit to the Temple Mount by the Knesset Internal Affairs Committee in January
1986 also triggered Muslim demonstrations and violent encounters between Muslims and the security forces, resulting in harsh reactions from the Arab world. In the wake of the Internal Affairs Committee visit, the Israeli qadis warned against any attempt to deviate from the status quo, and a delegation of Arab Knesset members visited the site in order to show solidarity with the Muslim Council. During this period Rabbi Mordechai Eliyahu, Israel's chief rabbi, issued a ruling in favor of building a synagogue on the Temple Mount. The Muslims viewed this with alarm as an official Israeli initiative, and their reactions intensified accordingly."

The Palestinian uprising (the first Intifada), which erupted in December 1987, placed the sacred compound at a central locus of the national conflict. The Palestinian Muslims used the relative immunity of the site where large crowds gathered after the Friday service and the large open esplanade that Israeli forces usually do not enter as a venue of political demonstrations and unrest. The mufti of Jerusalem's deputy, Sheikh Muhammad-Sa'id al-Jamal stated in reaction to the demonstration that al-Haram al-Sharif is an inseparable part of the land of Palestine and that it, therefore, was only natural that the Intifada should take place in the mosques as well.

Further challenges were instigated by Israeli elements, such as the digging of the Western Wall Tunnel. In July 1988, when the tunnel was prepared to absorb tourists and in order to extend its capacity the Israeli government decided to open an exit in the northern part into the Arab Christian quarter, a large-scale violent Muslim reaction prevented the government from executing its plan at that time. It was opened only in 1996 (see below).

The first Intifada heightened world Muslim awareness of Jerusalem and of Palestine in general. The Temple Mount was used during the first Intifada as one of the symbols of the struggle, and Israeli Arabs also began to become involved in what was going on around them. Various clerics and factions competed for control of the Temple Mount and increased their propaganda efforts. Leaflet 21 of the Unified National Command, entitled "The Blessed al-Aqsa Mosque," called for preventing the desecration of Islamic holy sites in Jerusalem. The leaflet declared an al-Aqsa Day (August 7), on which, according to its authors, "[o]ur strike forces will deal heavy blows to the enemy forces and to the settler herds." The Intifada's United National Command representing Palestinian armed factions called upon the OIC, the Arab countries, the Vatican, and the UN for assistance, requesting their urgent intervention in order to put an end to the desecration of the Muslim and Christian holy places."

The stormiest event in the history of Palestinian-Israeli violence at the compound took place in October 1990, which the Muslims refer to as the "al-Aqsa Massacre". This occurred when the radical Jewish Temple Mount Faithful movement publicized some provocative plans, including a cornerstone-laying ceremony for the Third Temple near the Dung Gate and the erection of a Sukkah (a hut commemorating the Jew's wandering in the dessert after the Exodus from Egypt) next to the Mughrabi Gate. In the Muslim version of the events, the Temple Mount Faithful's cornerstone-laying ceremony for the Third Temple was taken seriously by many Muslims, who, therefore, organized for preemptive action. A month prior to the incident, the al-Aqsa preacher Sheikh Fathalla Silwadi called upon Muslims to come and defend the Mosque with their bodies.39

The police prohibited the planned ceremony from taking place near the sacred compound but permitted it to take place at the nearby Silwan area. In reaction, Muslims showered rocks from al-Haram al-Sharif courtyard onto worshippers at the Western Wall. The police forces that were summoned to the Haram in order to disperse the demonstrators and stop the rock-throwing opened fire and killed 17 Muslims. Another 53 Muslims and 30 Jews (police and worshipers) were injured." In the event's aftermath, the Waqf presented an exhibition of photos and other artifacts of the affair at the Islamic Museum next to the al-Aqsa Mosque. Following the events, the UN Security Council unanimously passed a resolution condemning the acts of violence committed by the Israeli security forces resulting in loss of human life and injury to many Muslims on the Temple Mount and decided to send a mission of the UN secretary general to the region to investigate the incident. The United States also supported this decision,41 but Israel did not consent to receive the delegation. One of the outcomes of the October 1990 events was the beginning of a campaign launched by the Head of the Islamic Movement in Israel-Sheikh Ra' id Salah, claiming that Israel intends to bring about the destruction of the al-Aqsa Mosque.

The Palestinians documented the 1990 affair in two books, both entitled The al-Aqsa Massacre.42 One of these, an initiative of a PLO-affiliated entity, includes on its title page a letter from PLO chairman Yasser Arafat to "the steadfast inhabitants of Palestine." Quoting Quranic verse 17:7 about the destruction of the Second Temple (by the Romans), he promises that the Palestinian flag will fly over the mosques and churches of Jerusalem.43 

Baruch Goldstein's 1994 shooting attack and massacre of 29 Muslim worshippers in the Cave of the Patriarchs/The Ibrahimi Mosque in Hebron also contributed to tensions surrounding the issue of the holy sites and constituted an additional phase in the process described above. Two years later, in September 1996, the opening of the Western Wall Tunnel generated a mini-Intifada in the Palestinian territories and represented another important stage in the dissemination of the "al-Aqsa is in danger" message. In the clashes between protesters and the police three Muslims were killed and 31 people were injured, including 11 policemen.44 The riots quickly spread to East Jerusalem and the territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The events took on the character of a popular uprising, which was supported by members of the PA's police who even opened fire on Israelis. Scores of Palestinians and 15 Israelis were killed in the riots. Incidentally, radical Islamic factions called the Palestinian activities in reaction to the opening of the Western Wall Tunnel the "al-Aqsa Intifada"45-the name that four years later was to be given to the second Intifada.

At the time it was claimed that the Israeli excavations constituted a physical threat to al-Aqsa.46 In the wake of this incident the Islamic Movement in Israel organized the first convention (mahrajan) under the banner "al-Aqsa is in Danger." Finally, the demonstrative visit by Ariel Sharon and Likud Knesset members to the Temple Mount in September 2000 led to the second Intifada's appellation of "al-Aqsa."

Israel's post-1967 archeological excavations and the digging of the Western Wall Tunnel were perceived and portrayed by Muslims as acts intended to undermine the al-Aqsa compound's foundations, so that, when the earthquake prophesied in Jewish apocalyptic and eschatological tradition occurred, the Mosque would collapse and the Jews would be able to rebuild their Temple. This contention is set forth in an unsigned ruling published on the Web site of former Saudi grand mufti Abd al-'Aziz Ibn Baz in response to a question referred to him by one Dr. Muhammad Ahmad al-Kurdi. In his reply, the mufti quotes the Israeli minister of religious affairs in 1967 as allegedly having told Knesset members interested in building the Temple that the time for that was yet to come, since it was necessary to wait for the earthquake that would cause the Mosque to collapse and enable the Temple to be constructed in its place.47

Official Israeli policy on this subject, embodied in two important decisions by state entities-first, the Chief Rabbinate's decision according to which Jews are forbidden by Jewish law to enter the Temple Mount, and second, the government's decision to leave the Temple Mount's administration in the hands of the Muslim Waqfhas received almost no recognition in the contemporary Muslim world. In contrast, the activities of often marginal Jewish extremist groups, some of them tiny, aimed at renewing Temple worship have been publicized by the Palestinians as though they reflect the official Israeli position. However, some of the Israeli official and nonofficial policy in the Old City leads me to conclude that the Muslims' fear, although greatly exaggerated, is not completely without foundation.

I will mention here two recent developments. The first is the Israeli government's authorization given to the extreme right association El-Ad (acronym of "to the city of David") to conduct archaeological excavations (supervised by the government's Antiquities Authority) in the Old City. The El-Ad activity is aimed to bolster the Jewish character of the Old City via modern tourist development that emphasizes the Jewish history and almost ignores the Arab and pre-Hebrew periods. The second, is the Israeli unilateral construction work during 2007 to replace the ramp leading from the Western Wall plaza to the Mughrabi Gate with a modern metal bridge while intending to conduct year-long excavations in the old ramp (which includes Muslim artifacts) and underneath in the Western Wall plaza. Israel's unilateral action was based, apparently, on two assumptions: first, the ramp is outside al-Haram al-Sharif in the Western Wall area that has been completely under Israeli control since 1967; and second, that Muslims would reject any plan connected to the Mughrabi Gate because they oppose Israel's control of this gate as the access ofJews and other visitors (particularly tourists) to the compound. Although there may be some justification in the Israeli position, one should not be surprised if work in such a sensitive place (which is also inside a UNESCO-declared world heritage venue) conducted in such a unilateral form would not result in strong protest from the Muslim side. Nevertheless, the abovementioned Israeli actions in no way relate to the Muslim campaign that centers on the claim that Israel strives to destroy al-Aqsa and to build the Third Temple in its place. The claim that Israeli officialdom is persistently working toward al-Aqsa's destruction is utterly baseless and is merely used by Islamist activists for political mobilization.

In order to prove their theory, Palestinian officials claim that the many excavations conducted by Israel, both archeological digs outside of the Temple Mount and excavations carried out for tourism or religious-national purposes were intended for the sole purpose of undermining al-Aqsa's foundations so that it would collapse, reveal the Temple's deeply buried remains, and enable renewed Jewish worship at the site. These accusations included the Western Wall Tunnel that was dug along the Temple Mount's western wall and other excavations conducted in the past (some of them branching out from the Western Wall Tunnel). Thus, in August 2002, Palestinian mufti Sheikh Ikrima Sabri claimed that Israel was preventing the al-Aqsa renovations committee from visiting the external excavations site in order to determine whether digging was taking place underneath the Mosque; he mentioned on this occasion that he had already warned that such excavations were impairing the ancient structures' foundations.48 The collapse of the retaining wall supporting the walkway to the Mughrabi Gate in February 2004 was also portrayed by Muslims as having resulted from Israeli underground excavations aimed, according to them, at causing the Mosque to collapse so that the Temple could be built in its stead.

Those involved in disseminating the claim that al-Aqsa is in danger do not actually need to present concrete evidence of their contention. The mere fact that al-Aqsa is under Israeli control constitutes a danger in and of itself, as the head of the Islamic Movement in Israel testified before the Or Commission that was appointed to investigate the October 2000 events in the Arab sector.49 Al-Aqsa has been declared by Islamic, Palestinian, and other entities to be in Israeli captivity and thus, according to the radical factions, every Muslim is enjoined to sacrifice his life for its liberation. Moreover, any act, whether performed by a Jewish nationalist group or on behalf of the Israeli state authorities, that the Palestinian leadership interprets as an attempt to erode Palestinian authority and status on the Temple Mount is presented as additional proof of the danger to which al-Aqsa is exposed.

The examples of Arab-Muslim reactions to Israeli activities are innumerable. Thus, when asked in a television interview about the danger to al-Aqsa, Sheikh Ikrima Sabri characterized it as highly imminent, making mention of a January 2001 attempt to set fire to one of the Temple Mount gates (Bab al-Ghawanima), and additionally referring to the danger posed by the excavations beneath al-Aqsa and to Jewish extremists' demand for permission to pray on the Temple Mount. Sabri stated that no precedent of Jewish worship at al-Aqsa should be allowed, since enabling even one Jew to pray there would create a new reality at the site." Another example is connected with the Western Wall Tunnel excavations. In an article published by Muhammad al-Halayqa on the Web site of the Islamic Movement in Israel's southern branch, the author (baselessly) claims that, in addition to the Western Wall Tunnel whose opening was publicized, three additional secret tunnels have been dug beneath the site, one in the direction of the Mosque, one in the direction of the Dome of the Rock, and the third from west to east. "The danger posed by the tunnels is not merely that of al-Aqsa's potential collapse, but also the fact that the Jews are continuing to excavate in order to find their temple." The list of examples of this nature includes the police-mandated halt to renovations on the Temple Mount during the last few years, the existence of a police point on the Temple Mount, the presence of Israeli police at the entrances to the Temple Mount, the periodic restrictions (due to reasons of security and public order) regarding worshipper age at the Temple Mount and the prevention of worshippers from outside Jerusalem from entering the site, the parades organized by Jewish Temple Mount faithful followers, visits by Israeli politicians to the Temple Mount, the activity of the (Israeli) Committee for the Prevention of the Destruction of Antiquities on the Temple Mount, and in 2003 also the Israeli authorities' efforts to renew tourism at the Temple Mount (and the exercising of Jews' right of access to the site) after nearly three years' cessation.

In short, actions and statements of the Israeli-Jewish party to the conflict unquestionably fuel Islamic activity regarding Jerusalem. Israeli actions perceived as injurious to Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem and its environs are used by the Palestinians and others to strengthen world Muslim awareness of the need to "liberate" Jerusalem. However, it would be a mistake to interpret this phenomenon of the last generation as one of reaction only. The Israeli challenges do indeed draw responses, but the campaign to upgrade Jerusalem was initiated as a means of enlisting support within the strategic depth of the Arab world and the greater Muslim world; there is no symmetry or equivalence between the Israeli challenges and Islamic activity. Arab-Muslim entities are conducting a political campaign in which religion serves as a highly efficient medium for public education and for mobilizing political support, while the Israeli challenges that arise during the course of this campaign simply keep the torch of al-Quds burning in Islamic awareness. There are two reasons why the Muslim party to the conflict makes immeasurably greater use of religion as a weapon than the other party: because Muslim society by nature is less secular and because the Arab and Muslim world is the weaker, defeated party, it makes maximal use of all resources available to it.

However, despite the above mentioned official discourse of conflict, ongoing unofficial meetings have been held regularly since 1967 between the Waqf's leaders and representatives of the Israeli police and the Jerusalem municipality. These gradually created a modus vivendi between the Israeli government and the Waqf officials, as well as the Jordanian government.52 In practice, the Israeli government essentially abandoned the enforcement of its law wherever the Temple Mount/ al-Haram al-Sharif was concerned. The site's administrators were moderate Palestinian figures appointed by Jordan, and they generally adhered to all the tacit understandings that were reached with Israel's representatives.
The post-1967 modus vivendi was based on the following points: The Waqf administers the site, controls the gates, dictates the rules of behavior, employs Muslim guards (today there are 210 guards, 70 in each of the three shifts) responsible for the ongoing maintenance and physical upkeep, charges entrance fees from non-Muslim visitors to the Dome of the Rock and the al-Aqsa Mosque structure. However, the Waqf is not allowed to raise flags within the compound. Significant renovations and constructions were, until September 1996, unofficially coordinated with the Israeli Antiquities Authority.

Israel, on the other hand, controls the Mahkama building (al-Madrasa al-Tankiziyya), which serves to house a border-police unit to overlook the compound and to intervene in cases of violation of public order. It also holds the keys to the Mughrabi Gate and controls the entrance of visitors via this gate. Israeli police guard the site against the outer circle and entrances and maintain public order inside the compound. However, some of the powers Israel claims to hold according to its post-1967 law are restricted by the fear of large-scale Muslim violence. The major unresolved issues are the active prayer of Jews within the compound and the supervision of diggings and construction. Some regulations are being coordinated between Waqf and Israeli authorities, such as the opening hours for visitors and the visit of high-ranking foreign state officials.

The modus vivendi according to the above regulations prevailed until September 1996, when Muslim riots erupted following Israel's action of opening the northern exit of the Western Wall Tunnel. Previous incidents of the 1980s had ended peacefully. One such case happened in August 1981, when the Western Wall Rabbi-Yehuda Getz-discovered, during the digging works of the Wall's Tunnel, a burrow (known by archaeologists as Cistern 31) leading east toward the underneath of the Dome of the Rock, where it is believed that the Jewish Temple stood. Waqf employees detected the workers and quick police action blocked the burrow with permanent concrete. This prevented widespread clashes. In January 1986, the extreme Jewish Ateret Cohanim group unearthed a new part of the Western Wall, which was used by the group for prayer. 

=5.2 "Al-Aqsa Is in Danger"-A Strategy of Political Empowerment=
 
In reaction to the opening of the Western Wall Tunnel's northern exit and the violent incidents that took place between Palestinians and Israelis against this background in September 1996, the Islamic Movement in Israel's northern branch, headed by Sheikh Ra'id Salah, began to organize mass rallies under the slogan "al-Aqsa is in Danger." This slogan transmitted to the Muslim public the message that Israel is seeking, in a deliberate and systematic way, to destroy the al-Aqsa Mosque in order to build the Third Temple in its place. The Islamic Movement in Israel's campaign was already underway before 1996. As noted above, in the early 1990s, Sheikh Ra'id Salah began interpreting Israeli statements and actions as being intended to bring about Muslim al-Aqsa's destruction. Jewish Temple Mount movement activity and statements made by Israeli officials regarding the Temple Mount fueled accusations, whilst various incidents that occurred were blown out of proportion in order to prove the theory that the al-Aqsa site is in imminent danger. Nimrod Luz's research on the shaping of IsraeliArab discourse on al-Haram al-Sharif indicates how extensively these messages influence even nonobservant Muslims and Christians. Secular Knesset member Ahmad Tibi, for example, believes that al-Aqsa is in danger "as long as it is under foreign occupation." The construction activities at the site's underground level orchestrated by Sheikh Ra'id Salah during the 1990s-the building of the Marwani prayer hall in the area known as Solomon's Stables, and the creation of an additional prayer hall in the lower section of the al-Aqsa Mosque structure-were portrayed as having thwarted Jewish intentions to build a synagogue in the site's lower area.

Palestinian officials frequently cite the precedents of the Cave of the Patriarchs and Rachel's Tomb as proof that Jews must not be permitted to set foot upon the Haram/Temple Mount. In their view, the consent extended after 1967 to Moshe Dayan by Sheikh Muhammad Ali al-Jabari, then mayor of Hebron,' regarding Jewish entry to the Cave of the Patriarchs served to whet the Jews' appetite, so that in the end they did not content themselves with this limited authorization but rather took over a significant portion of the site and the prayer times. Rachel's Tomb, which according to them is the tomb of a Muslim saint (Bilal ibn Rabah-the muezzin of the Prophet Muhammad), was expropriated by the Jews after they had received the keys to it from the Muslims. These issues were raised in August 2000 by Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), then a senior PA official and now PA president." The Palestinian minister of waqf and religious affairs wrote the following in 2002: "The Palestinians, the Arabs and the Muslims will not permit a repetition of what happened at the Ibrahimi Mosque in Hebron, and they will defend al-Aqsa using every means at their disposal.5 He added that "al-Aqsa is currently being subjected to excavations beneath its foundations and to plotting by the Israeli authorities, so that they may build what is referred to as the alleged Temple in its place."57

The position of the Islamic Movement in Israel's northern branch is set forth in a book on Jerusalem containing a signed preface by Sheikh Ra'id Salah who since 2005 is titled in the Arab media "The Sheikh of al-Aqsa; Salah writes that all of the sites holy to Islam are in danger (Jerusalem, in particular) and thus al-Aqsa as well. Yusuf al-Husayni, the book's author, wrote that his study was intended to "expose the true face of the inhuman policy of destroying Islamic holy sites." In the publisher's preface, written by Dr. Abd al-Rahman Abbad of Jerusalem, he defines Ariel Sharon's demonstrative Haram/Temple Mount visit in September 2000 as a Judaizing act since, according to Abbad, Sharon had declared that he was "making a pilgrimage to the Temple," thereby seeking to nullify the Islamic connection to al-Aqsa and to convert it into an awareness of Jewish connection to the site "by means of guns and terrorism.58 The 57-member OIC claims in an official document that the efforts to undermine Muslim activity at al-Aqsa are still going on. The document portrays Jerusalem as a city stolen and constantly endangered by Israel. It is stated there that "[t] he excavations underneath the al-Aqsa Mosque are being conducted under the pretext of searching for Solomon's Temple." "It was Israel that orchestrated the al-Aqsa Mosque fire in 1969 [according to the document's authors, the arsonist-Rohan-was Jewish] and it is trying to replace the mosques with the Third Temple."59 It is also stated that "Muslims believe that the attempt to lay the cornerstone of the Third Temple [a Temple Mount Faithful demonstration ofOctober 1990] is an official act of the State of Israel." In order to drive home the danger's imminence, the authors cite a May 2001 news item from al-Sharq alAwsat-a London-based, Saudi Arabian-funded newspaper-according to which "Ariel Sharon is studying a plan drawn up by the radical right and the religious parties, and...Israel is seeking to build a synagogue on the Temple Mount that will serve as a foothold in anticipation of the establishment of 'Solomon's Temple' ... which means the destruction of the al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock."61 

The claim that al-Aqsa is in danger is also fueled (whether unintentionally or intentionally) by Muslim interpretations of Zionism as a religious ideology aimed at building the Third Temple, for which al-Aqsa's demolition would be necessary. I have already discussed Zionism's religious basis and Israel's political reality in the introduction. Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that initiatives aimed at building the Third Temple and destroying the mosques are associated with Israeli fringe groups only. The idea that an intention exists of replacing the mosques with a Jewish temple was presented by the Palestinian leadership to the Mandate-era commission of inquiry charged with investigating Jewish and Muslim rights at the Western Wall.62 During the last generation this claim has increasingly gained broad currency. Thus, for example, Abd al-'Aziz Mustafa peruses the 1920s-era Encyclopedia Britannica and Jewish Encyclopedia entries for Zionism and determines that the Return to Zion and the founding of the Jewish state in Palestine are based on an ideology centered around building Solomon's Temple and restoring the Davidic monarchy to power in Jerusalem. From here the author goes on to discuss the tangible danger to which, in his opinion, al-Aqsa is exposed, and he presents information on the various Jewish organizations that are involved in promoting the rebuilding of the Temple, as though they reflect mainstream Israeli views.64 According to the author, the intentions of demolishing al-Aqsa and building the Temple in its stead are quite serious, since the Jews are currently engaged "more in doing than in talking." In his opinion, the Temple Mount groups enjoy great power and success both in Israel and abroad, and thus the danger that they represent must be taken with the utmost seriousness.65

Another author, Abd al-Tawab Mustafa, notes that the Jews mention the destruction of the Temple on all ceremonial occasions, and that this reflects the seriousness of their intention of rebuilding it; moreover, he writes, the Jews regard the State of Israel itself as the "Third Temple" [meaning the third kingdom].66 Another example may be found in the encyclopedia of questions and answers on Jerusalem compiled by al-Qasim. According to al-Qasim, the Jews believe "that the Messiah will appear in this land, and from this stems their need to gather together in Palestine" and "to build the alleged temple as quickly as possible; the Jews are thus using all despicable means to realize their intentions in this regard." Al-Qasim states that the Zionist Christians are of the same mind and work to advance the process by encouraging Jews to immigrate to Palestine.67 Israel, according to him, "is seeking to implement their plan to expel all of the Palestinian and Muslim inhabitants, to destroy the al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock, to rebuild the 'alleged' temple in its place, and to [re]-establish the Davidic and Solomonic kingdom in anticipation of the coming of the Messiah."68

The current fear campaign under the banner "al-Aqsa is in Danger" is enjoying greater success than did Hajj Amin al-Husseini's activity during the British Mandate period. It must be emphasized that the religious symbols of al-Aqsa and Jerusalem and the concomitant propaganda do not stand alone. They are part of a broader political agenda in whose service myths are formulated and the media mobilized. Muslim audiences absorb the "al-Aqsa is in Danger" message along with the abundance of other images and information that exist regarding Israel and its activity vis-~-vis the Palestinians in the territories, and the campaign has made significant inroads into Muslim public awareness. Here are several examples: Dr. Maan Abu Nuwar, an Oxford based Jordanian historian and former senior police officer (known for his Arab-nationalist views), has written in an op-ed stating that the Jews are seeking to destroy the blessed al-Aqsa Mosque and to build Solomon's Temple on its ruins.69 Jordanian journalist Yasir al-Zaatara wrote that, despite the fact that there was no televised broadcast of the Islamic Movement's "al-Aqsa is in Danger" festival (in 2002), it nevertheless echoed across the entire Arab and Islamic world. According to him, "Sheikh Ra'id Salah is the foremost Palestinian symbol of the inhabitants of the territories occupied since 1948, despite the lack of media coverage" (the article was written prior to Salah's trial). The same al-Dustour newspaper issue included an article by publicist 'Ali al-Safadi."" In an another opinion piece that appeared in a Jordanian newspaper, a regular columnist for the state-run al-Dustour newspaper asks, "Is Israel's intention of building the Third Temple a mere empty threat, and are Interior Minister Tsachi Hanegbi's pronouncements regarding the possibility of opening the Temple Mount to Jewish worship only intended to provoke the Arab world, or do they represent serious intentions?" Basing himself on an article on the Temple Institute (which works to advance this goal) that appeared in the local Israeli paper Kol Ha'ir, the author states that these threats should be taken seriously.71 

Another writer, Abd al-'Aziz Mustafa, explains in his book that the problem of Jerusalem is the Muslim world's highest priority. Mustafa defines the al-Aqsa Mosque's centrality to the conflict as being "due to the plot that is being woven against it and this lends the issue its Islamic dimension." The author is concerned about young Muslims' ignorance regarding al-Aqsa and his book is, therefore, aimed at motivating Muslims "to act to save the holy Mosque before the Jews and the Christians destroy it. Against the background of the opening of the Western Wall Tunnel's northern exit, Syria's grand mufti at the time, Sheikh Ahmad Kuftaro, issued a statement of identification with the Palestinians' violent displays of opposition to Israel, adding that Israel was using the search for Solomon's Temple as an excuse to harm the foundations on which the al-Aqsa Mosque stands.73 Kuftaro added that Israel wants to swallow up Arab and Muslim land and is not interested in peace. Moreover, according to Kuftaro, Israel was violating all of the agreements and he, therefore, called upon Arabs and Muslims "to unite and perform the religious duty of defending land and life and the holy places against the enemy, including making use of the trade embargo weapon against countries that provide assistance to Israel."74

One may form an idea of the prevalence and influence of the "al-Aqsa is in Danger" messages from the fact that the Islamic Movement in Israel sponsored an annual pan-Islamic competition for essays to be published on its Web site, under the slogan "Bayt-al-Maqdis fi Khatar" (Jerusalem is in Danger). In 2001, for example, the competition drew 20,000 essays written by Muslims in twenty different countries.75 The Movement also mobilizes children and youth in an educational awareness-raising campaign to collect donations for the defense ofal-Aqsa. Thus, on August 25, 2002, the Islamic Movement organized an "al-Aqsa Children's Fund" convention at the al-Aqsa site. According to the event's organizers, 12,000 children were bused to the site together with their parents in vehicles provided for free by Arab transportation companies. In an announcement on behalf of the movement, the organizers thanked the media organs that had covered the event and condemned the Arab satellite stations that had failed to do so. The movement expected to collect 3 million shekels ($660,000) via this campaign, to be used for renovations at the al-Aqsa compound.76

The development of Jewish myths is also a source of concern to Islamic officialdom. Thus, engineer Raif Nijm, a former Jordanian minister who currently serves as deputy chairman of the RoyalJordanian Committee on Restoration of the al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock, stated, in a May 2003 lecture at Amman's Shouman Club entitled "The Siege of Jerusalem," that Israel had dug an underground house of worship next to the Western Wall Tunnel that provided a venue for the screening of a film presenting what he referred to as "a falsified history of Jerusalem." Nijm was apparently referring to the short film shown to visitors to the Davidson Center next to the southern Temple Mount excavations. According to publications of the center, which is located near the Dung Gate, the film "depicts a Jew's journey during the three Pilgrimage Festivals, as he ascends to Jerusalem in order to perform the commandment of pilgrimage to the Temple Mount. The film includes portions of the computerized virtual model of the Temple Mount, in which the paths leading to it are also presented. This simulation enables viewers to travel 2,000 years back in time and to become immersed in the city's day-to-day activities of that period."

=5.3 Jerusalem Belongs to the Entire Muslim Nation=

Yasser Arafat's consent to the Oslo process, with its postponement of deliberations over the most contentious issues, including that of Jerusalem, was accompanied by a firm commitment on his part to ensuring that the eastern, Palestinian-inhabited part of the city, including the Old City and the al-Aqsa compound, would ultimately be under Palestinian sovereignty. In my estimation, control over Jerusalem's Islamic holy sites will be a significant political and economic asset to the future Palestinian state. It will garner for the Palestinians a place of importance in pan-Arab and pan-Islamic forums, and it will also be able to serve as a valuable impetus for development investment (centered on the tourism and the Muslim and Christian pilgrimage industries). By contrast, an arrangement that may be interpreted as a relinquishment of the Islamic shrines will damage the image of the PA, and its leadership, in the eyes of Arab and Muslim world.

Arafat's speech at a Johannesburg mosque on May 17, 1994, provides an opportunity to analyze his position. In this speech Arafat attempted to defend his willingness to sign the Oslo Accords while also continuing to fan the sparks of the struggle and to maintain his freedom fighter image in case the agreement should collapse and he should be forced to return to the arena of armed struggle. During that speech, Arafat stated:

The Jihad will continue and Jerusalem is not for the Palestinian People. It is for all the Muslim Umma [nation], all the Muslim Umma. You are responsible for Palestine and for Jerusalem before me...[ ... ] you have to understand, our main battle is not to get how much we can achieve from them here or there. Our main battle is Jerusalem ... [ ... ] I can't, and I have to speak frankly, I can't do it [the struggle for Jerusalem] alone, without the support of the Islamic Umma, I can't do it alone. And not to say like the Jews, "Go thou, and thy Lord, and fight ye two" [Qur'an 5:27]. "Go and your God to fight alone." No, you have to come and to fight and to start a Jihad to liberate Jerusalem, your first shrine ... [ ... ] They will try to demolish and to change the demographic[s] of Jerusalem. It is very important, unless we have to be (inaudible) cautious and to put it in our priorities and nothing were to be priority than Jerusalem. To put it in our first priority, not only as Palestinians, not only as Arabs, but as Muslims and as Christians too.

The speech expresses the importance to the Palestinians of the struggle, presented here as jihad, for East Jerusalem. From the time of the Oslo Accords, Arafat conducted a propaganda campaign in which he portrayed the al-Aqsa and Jerusalem issue not as an exclusively Palestinian affair, but rather as one that belongs to the entire Muslim world. Transferring responsibility to the Muslim world means that the political leaderships of the Arab countries and the Muslim communities as such have to take moral responsibility for the "dangers" of a Judaicized Jerusalem and for harm to al-Aqsa. After the failure of the second Camp David summit Arafat said: "Before the conflict ends, the most important thing is to solve the problem of Jerusalem. This is not a task for the Palestinian people only, but rather for all Arabs: Muslims and Christians.79 This message has been reiterated by other religious and political figures.

Several months after the al-Aqsa Intifada broke out, Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the most popular mufti in the Muslim world today, said in a television interview that "Now the danger to al-Aqsa is greater than it was previously, now the danger exists of losing Jerusalem altogether. All Muslims around the world must therefore rise up and defend it, because it is not the exclusive property of the Palestinians but rather of the Islamic nation, just as Mecca does not belong to Saudi Arabia but rather to the entire Muslim world."" The message's practical significance was expressed by Yusuf Salama, Palestinian minister of waqf and religious affairs, in a November 2002 interview. Salama said that Yasser Arafat made no decision at the second Camp David summit regarding Jerusalem prior to consulting with Sheikh Za'id Aal Nahiyan (Abu Dhabi), Crown Prince Abdallah of Saudi Arabia, and President Husni Mubarak of Egypt, because he is convinced that the Palestinian problem is not that of the Palestinians alone but rather of all Arabs and Muslims.81 In 2002, Salama's ministry published a book on the history of the al-Aqsa Mosque, dedicated to "those who have vowed not to rest until their eyes shall see liberated Jerusalem; to those who have sacrificed their lives for Palestine, Jerusalem and al-Aqsa; to the leader of the Palestinian people who loved Jerusalem; and to those who never cease to assert that [t]here shall be no compromise on even one centimeter of holy Jerusalem'; and to the originator of the saying 'There is not one among us who belittles the importance of even one centimeter of honored Jerusalem.' "82

A vivid illustration of the relationship between Jerusalem and the Muslim world may be seen in a poster that was distributed by the PA at the beginning of the al-Aqsa Intifada, in which a Palestinian child mocks an armed Israeli soldier against the background of the al-Aqsa Mosque. The poster's slogan: "Defending the al-Aqsa Mosque-the duty of 1,300,000,000 Muslims."83 The poster was distributed at the pan-Arab book fair in Cairo that year; a large Muslim population in Egypt and other Arab and Muslim countries was exposed to it.

Based on the statements of Arab and Muslim leaders, clerics, intellectuals, and publicists, Arafat's message has been readily received by the Arab and Islamic world. The political significance of this lies in a concomitant constraint on Palestinian flexibility: Palestinian leaders will have to obtain the consent of the leaders of key Muslim states such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Morocco to any agreement that may be conceived relating to the sovereignty over Jerusalem and the holy sites.

=5.4 Jihad=

The conflict's Islamization actually began during the pan-Arab nationalist era, and Gamal Abd al-Nasser also made use of it in his day, although his ideology was secular. In the wake of the August 1969 al-Aqsa Mosque fire, Egyptian president Nasser composed a letter to soldiers in the Egyptian army, in which he expressed himself thus:

I have thought a great deal about the despicable crime against our faith's most sacred site, against our history and against our culture...and I have reached the conclusion that Arab force is the only way ... In the next battle you will no longer be the army of your nation only, but rather the army of Allah...the defenders of faiths and homes and God's holy books. This will not be a war of liberation only, but rather a war of purification (marakat tathir) ... We cast our eyes now upon the al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem, which is currently beset by the forces of evil...Our armies shall return to the al-Aqsa Mosque plaza, and Jerusalem shall be restored to its pre-colonialist state.

From Hassan Ma'mun-the head of al-Azhar-Nasser received in response a telegram that stated that "the enemy of Allah will not depart from the land of peace except through jihad, so that Jerusalem may once again be Islamic as God has willed."

Nasser and Ma'mun viewed jihad as the duty of Muslim rulers to send their armies to fight a holy war. However, the al-Azhar Institute's Research Committee, which published Nasser's and Mamun's statements, has interpreted jihad differently in this context: It is not only a public duty, but also the personal duty (fard 'ayn) of every Muslim to fight for Jerusalem's liberation: "Now jihad has become the personal duty of anyone who is able to fulfill it. Every part of the world [all Muslim communities] must send a group to participate in jihad, and whoever cannot take part physically should send money or weapons. The current situation is a stain on the brow of all Muslims," the pamphlet states.°

This message also appeared in a song by Umm Kulthum of Egypt, the Arab world's most popular singer. The song is entitled The Three Holy Cities, and its third verse is as follows:

From the place from which Muhammad ascended to the heavens during the night, from Jerusalem the pure and unsullied, I hear...a cry for help. I know that the enemies have burned the holiest place and trampled upon it in their arrogance. I hear the sad stones lamenting in the dark of night: Woe unto Jerusalem, caught in the aggressor's grasp, oh no! The sun shall not rise upon the hateful occupier. The land shall return to its praiseworthy and powerful owner. The al-Aqsa Mosque shall be restored to its Masters and shall fill His believers with pride. The sun shall rise again over our homeland, more loyal than ever to Allah.86

In contrast to the other messages mentioned above, the duty of jihad to liberate Jerusalem as a personal religious obligation (fard 'ayn) is endorsed primarily by Islamic religious or nationalist extremists, and there is no way of determining its influence on the public at large.

Before the first Intifada broke out, a pan-Islamic body that deals with Muslim legal rulings (al-Majma' al-Fiqhi al-Islami) convened in Mecca and ruled that Jerusalem's liberation is every Muslim's personal duty. 

The convention honored the Palestinian people for its participation in jihad, citing religious rulings that underscore the obligation of jihad and reject the possibility of a peace treaty with Israel and noting that the Qur'an is mightier than international law.87 The view of jihad as a personal obligation began to gain currency among Muslim clerics from the time of the first Intifada's outbreak in December 1987. Thus, Sheikh Abd al-Latif Mushtahri, former director of homiletics at al-Azhar, enumerated, in a book that he published in 1988, what he described as "the series of Zionist crimes that began in ancient times and have continued throughout history, including the al-Aqsa fire,"crimes to which, according to Mushtahri, the time has come to put an end via jihad. "This is a life or death issue for which all Muslims must mobilize," he wrote."

Beginning with the first Intifada, and with increased urgency since the second, the state of Jerusalem under Israeli occupation has been presented as the problem of all Muslims and as a stain upon the brow of all Muslims until such time as the city shall be liberated. The most prominent of the Islamic ideologues who propound this view is Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi. The title of his book, Jerusalem Is the Problem of Every Muslim, illustrates this approach. Here clerics differ over the issue of whether the entire Muslim nation's duty regarding Jerusalem also gives it the right to sovereignty over the city; of particular interest is the question of whether the negotiators have the religious authority to reach an agreement with Israel regarding Jerusalem's permanent status. There are those who feel that no compromise over Jerusalem may be authorized and thus that the Muslim nation has the sovereign authority to torpedo any such compromise, and there are those who distinguish between the duty of jihad and the city's sovereignty after its liberation. Abu Aliya of Saudi Arabia writes, for example, that, due to Jerusalem's special sanctity, it is every Muslim's personal duty to defend and fortify it, thus making it the task of the entire Muslim world. The Zionist danger, according to him, is a danger to all Muslims, since it is a form of colonialism that poses a general threat. "The entire Muslim world is therefore now urgently enjoined to liberate Jerusalem and Palestine from the Zionist Jews who aggressively seek to suppress the rights of the Arab and Muslim world." Jerusalem is waiting for the Arabs and the Muslims to liberate her from occupation, writes Abu Aliya, adding a rhetorical question: "And who will hasten to her aid after Saladin?" He concludes that the Muslim world's duty vis-~-vis Jerusalem is that of preparing itself for a prolonged jihad in order to restore Jerusalem and Palestine to its inhabitants [the Muslim Palestinians]. The entire Islamic world resolutely affirms its right to the sacred places upon which Muslim blood has been spilled and is adamant about the Holy Land's Islamic character. Nevertheless, the burden must be borne first and foremost by the Arab and Muslim Palestinian people, who, because the Mosque is located on their territory, are charged with leading the struggle."

Jihad in the context of the call to liberate East Jerusalem from Israeli control has also become a central motif employed by radical Islamists who define the struggle against the Jews as a religious war. Thus, Abd al-'Aziz Mustafa writes that the jihad against the Jews is a Shari 'a obligation and that the next war against them will be a religious war. Mustafa quotes a well-known hadith (cited in the canonical collections) according to which a time will come when the Jews will be hiding behind every tree and rock and the Muslims will be called upon to kill them." Another author, Abd al-Tawab Mustafa, writes that, from the day on which Palestine's Arab inhabitants welcomed their conquering Muslim brothers, Palestine became Arab and Muslim, and that since then its defense has been the duty of all Muslims. He adds that the fact that thousands of shahids (martyrs) have died in the city's defense and conquest testifies to the special place that Jerusalem holds in Muslim hearts and minds, and to the consequent duty of Muslims to ensure its safety. Mustafa points to differing approaches between independent clerics and the heads of al-Azhar. According to him, while a defeatist attitude in relation to Israel was displayed by the governments of Egypt and other Arab countries (and by the heads of the al-Azhar Institute, who are subordinate to Egypt's president), those clerics who do not occupy formal positions at al-Azhar rule correctly regarding the duty of jihad to liberate Jerusalem.91

Jerusalem, like all of Palestine, is frequently defined as "the Land of the Holy Jihad." Shaqaldi, for example, writes that this is the holiest land on the face of the earth. Due to its status as the cradle of the prophets, it is the center of the world to which everyone has come and touched his head, and all of the important events have taken place in this land. It is, therefore, the Land of Jihad and the field of battle for the shuhada (who sacrifice themselves for it) and a graveyard for the enemies who coveted and occupied it. Moreover, Jerusalem's destiny is that of Palestine as well-the enemy's "land of defeat" (ard al-hasm), the place where the Romans, the Tatars, and the Crusaders were ultimately subdued.92

Shaqaldi writes that the Haram (al-Sharif) in Jerusalem differs from the two sacred mosques in Mecca and al-Madina (haramayn), in that it has traditionally been defined as the third mosque after the two that preceded it (thalith al-haramayn), that is, it is not a permanent haram (highest sanctuary) until Judgment Day, but rather a haram that has been exalted by means of holy jihad. It is not protected like the haramayn against which no hand may be raised, but it is rather a haram that the Muslims have always defended via jihad.93

Dr. Adnan Ali Rida al-Nahawi, an author identified with the Palestinian-Islamist stream, published a book in 1993 in which he wrote that the land of Palestine is a land of ribat (defense) and jihad and that the very issuing of religious rulings on the subject-the efforts to seek fatwas forbidding sulh (peace) with the Jews and enjoining jihad against them in order to liberate Palestine-is itself proof of the Muslim world's weakness, since a fatwa is an interpretation and not the sacred text itself; whereas, according to al-Nahawi, the problem of Palestine actually appears in the Quran and the sunna, and these texts should be disseminated.94 On the back cover of al-Nahawi's book is a list of the Islamic heroes of ribat and jihad, starting with Abu Ubayda ibn al-Jarrah, one of the sahaba or companions of the Prophet Muhammad, through Caliph Umar ibn al-Khattab and ending with Saladin.

The call to jihad also appears in the texts and speeches of Islamic movements in various locations. Thus, the Muslim Brotherhood organized a demonstration in Zarqa, Jordan, in November 2002, in which the movement's secretary general in Zarqa, Dhib Anis, called for jihad to liberate Jerusalem from the Jewish enemy.95 Another recent example is the "al-Quds Culture Fair" that opened on July 5, 2005, adjacent to Saladin's Castle in the Jordanian town of Ajloun, under the sponsorship of Dr. Ishaq al-Parhan of the Islamic Movement and with the participation of thousands. In his welcoming address, the fair's director, Saud Abu Mahfudh, drew parallels between Jerusalem's liberation from the Crusaders by Saladin and current events."

=5.5 The Current Saladin Myth=

Farhan's words of analogy between the Crusaders and Israeli Jews leads us to highlight another future-oriented myth. It takes a past event and seeks to transport it into the future: when Muslims compare Jerusalem's present with its Crusader past they equate the city's return to Muslim rule to its liberation by Saladin.

Jerusalem's capture by Israel in June 1967 was perceived by many Muslims, and not just by Islamic radicals, as compared to its capture by the Crusaders at the end of the eleventh century. They make an analogy between the June 1967 trauma and that of July 1099, as well as between the need to liberate Jerusalem from Israeli occupation and the city's liberation at the hands of Saladin. Moreover, the coincidental timing of Saladin's entry into Jerusalem on 27 Rajah-the date on which the Prophet Muhammad's Night Journey to al-Aqsa (al-isra') is traditionally commemorated-is interpreted by Muslims as a sign from heaven. Ziad Abu-'Amr, a scholar at Birzeit University (and recently a Palestinian politician), also claims that the Israeli occupation reminds Arabs and Muslims of their weakness and of the need to rise up and liberate Jerusalem from Jewish hegemony.97 The sense of inferiority and weakness appears to serve as a motivating factor in the development of the contemporary Saladin myth.

The call to Muslims' jihad, including Jerusalem's liberation, currently emanates from the Islamist circles and from Islamic groups that oppose the prevailing regimes in various Arab countries regimes that have engaged in peace talks with Israel (Egypt, Jordan, and the Arab-Saudi peace initiative). It is clear to the Arab regimes that jihad is an empty slogan. The Arab countries concentrate their efforts on promoting their own particular interests at the expense of pan-Arab cooperation and, besides, the present balance of power, both in the Middle East region and globally, does not favor the Arabs. The Islamist and anti-Israel elements in the Muslim world tend to cope with the sense of Arab and Muslim inferiority vis-~-vis Israel and the West by cultivating the Saladin myth. Saladin has thus become a contemporary Islamic hero, one employed by political-Islamic revival movements to further their ends, with Arab state officialdom getting caught up in the rhetoric.98 Jerusalem's envisioned reconquest by Saladin fuels their belief that the wheel of history is turning and that Islam will ultimately emerge victorious and liberate Jerusalem. For this reason the current Muslim campaign for Jerusalem includes an element of yearning for a second Saladin, a new Muslim hero who will liberate the Holy City from its non-Muslim occupiers. As Sheikh Yusuf Salama, former Palestinian minister for waqf and religious affairs, put it in 2002: "Jerusalem was the unifying factor for Muslims during the Crusader period, and it is what will unify Arabs and Muslims today, with Allah's help." Barzaq, who wrote a book on al-Aqsa, expresses this hope in the following words: "It is difficult to write in the time that we miss al-Quds and we are aspiring for [a new] Umar or Saladin who would return to us our al-Quds and our dignity."100 

At the end of the twentieth century, the Muslim world commemorated the eight-hundredth anniversary of Saladin's capture of Jerusalem. A conference in honor ofJerusalem was held in 1987 by the Association of Arab Historians in Baghdad to mark the event. The conference ended with a joint statement regarding "the need to liberate Jerusalem from the Zionist defilement, as Saladin liberated it from the Crusader defilement." Within this context, the Palestinians and the Jordanians make use of the burning of the minbar, associated with Saladin, during the 1969 al-Aqsa Mosque fire. The Jerusalem Waqf preserved remnants of the minbar for restoration;:! Hashemite Jordan, under King Abdallah II, funded the restoration and after the completion of the work, it was placed back in the mosque in 2007.

In 1990, the OIC'sJerusalem Committee declared the first al-Quds Day on October 2-the day in 1187 on which Saladin defeated the Crusaders in the Battle of the Horns of Hittin, thereby paving the way to his victory in Jerusalem. On the second such al-Quds Day, held in November 1991, three spokesmen mentioned Saladin. Khalid al-Karaki, the then Jordanian minister of culture and higher education, who sponsored the event, referred to the Zionists as "the new Franks who came from the West flying the banner of religion, and Jerusalem fell to them." Palestine, according to him, is "Arab Islamic land that cannot be relinquished, and even if a particular leader gives up parts of it for tactical or strategic reasons, this is not binding for the Arab-Muslim nation whose duty it is to liberate all of the Palestinian national territories." Al-Karaki connected Palestine's liberation with Saladin, whose situation was, according to him, no better than that of the Arabs today when he set out on his mission to liberate Jerusalem. Al-Karaki raises this belief to the level of ideology, which he refers to as Salahdiniyya (Saladinism), a model to be studied and emulated. According to the Jordanian conference participants' narrative, Saladin was a Muslim jihadist for Jerusalem's liberation, one in the chain that began with Caliph Umar I and continued via Saladin and on to Abd AI-Qadir Al-Husseini, one of the leaders of the irregular fighting force against the Jewish Yishuv during the Mandate period, Hashemite Sharif al-Husayn ibn 'Ali (the leader of the 1916 Arab revolt), and his son King Abdullah I of Jordan who captured (East) Jerusalem in 1948.103

Evidence of the degree to which the myth has been internalized may be found in the words of an East Jerusalem resident, Jamila Natur, quoted in a children's activity-book. Jamila Natur, a Jerusalemite who was born before 1948 and lived as a girl in the San Simone neighborhood, says:

“The Crusaders, as we know, came from Europe, conquered the land and tried to establish the Christian Kingdom of Jerusalem here. The end is common knowledge: they did not succeed in adapting to the regional conditions, their kingdom fell apart and disappeared and the remaining occupiers returned to Europe. For us there can be no doubt that history is repeating itself with amazing accuracy. The Jews have also come mainly from Europe, they are also unable to adapt to the region and the climate, and the fate of the Zionist state will be similar to that of the Crusader kingdom. What we are still lacking is a contemporary Saladin, a great Arab leader capable of uniting the ranks and expelling the invader."

The Saladin myth thus signifies a kind of historical cyclicality that is expected to restore Jerusalem to Islamic sovereignty. The figure of Saladin has come to feature prominently in contemporary Islamic discourse, particularly in publications about Jerusalem, including books dedicated to Saladin's conquest of the city.


=5.6 The Attempt to Forge a Muslim-Christian Alliance=

The Arab and Muslim world's Jerusalem discourse is an overwhelmingly Islamic one, in which Christian Arabs are excluded from the Palestinian and Arab-nationalist objectives in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Moreover, some of the al-Aqsa campaign's messages (the apocalyptic traditions, for example) also include anti-Christian elements. The Palestinian leadership is, therefore, seeking ways to bring about a rapprochement with the Christian community. Another reason behind these overtures is, of course, Jerusalem's sanctity and the importance of its holy sites to the Christian world, which make the Western powers and Western religious and international institutions important factors in the issue of Jerusalem's future. The PA and official clerics have been making efforts to create a myth of joint Christian-Muslim interest in Jerusalem. For this reason the Palestinian political and general Islamic discourse features many expressions of Christian-Muslim partnership or fraternity regarding the question of the Jerusalem holy sites." The Palestinians usually put forth the claim that maintenance of the status quo at Jerusalem's Christian sites and church institutions is also their responsibility. In order to balance the Islamic discourse that alienates Christians, the Palestinians and the Islamists themselves employ two different lexicons-a religious-Islamic one and an Arab-nationalist one-depending on the audience in question. Thus, for example, Palestinian mufti Sheikh Ikrima Sabri has referred to the Christian factor as contributing to the Palestinians' strategic depth, stating in an interview with the Egyptian al-Musawwar shortly before the second Camp David talks that Jerusalem provides the Arabs-Muslims and Christians with strategic depth."Yasser Arafat also said on many occasions that he represents the Christians too. In many of his statements, he mentioned that he represents the Arabs, including both Muslims and Christians.

The central message is thus that the Jerusalem and Palestine issue is also the Christian Arab community's affair, as illustrated by the following examples: Ahmad Kuftaro, Syria's former grand mufti, said in a lecture at al-Azhar University on "Christian-Muslim solidarity in Jerusalem" that the Christians have supported their Arab-Muslim brothers in the defense of the holy places and of Arab national interests in general. Muslims, for their part, have historically treated Christians with respect, according to them special "protected" (dhimi) status, defending them and exempting them from military service. In his lecture, Kuftaro presented various historical examples of Christian-Muslim cooperation, some over holy site issues, and, citing a relevant Qur'anic verse, added that the Christians are closer to Islam than to the Jews whom he characterized as closer to paganism; Muslims, according to Kuftaro, are thus enjoined to display more hostility toward Jews than toward Christians." This verse is widely cited in Arabic anti-Semitic publications.

In regard to Clinton's proposals regarding the Temple Mount, Arafat is quoted by Palestinian cabinet member Saeb Arekat as having said: "What do the Jews want underneath the Temple Mount? And the Armenians who took refuge in Palestine are dearer to me than any other group. I negotiate in the name of the Arabs, the Muslims and the Christians."I Arafat is additionally quoted by one of his advisors, Akram Haniyya, as having told Clinton, "I serve as the permanent Deputy Chairman of the Islamic Summit, and I protect the rights of Christians."I Rejecting Israel's demand for sovereignty over the holy sites, Arafat stated in an interview with the Japan Broadcasting Corporation (NHK) that both Christian and Muslim Arabs found the demand unacceptable. "However, I offered them [the Jews] freedom of prayer at the Western Wall. They are praying there, and I offered that they would be able to continue with their prayers, because I respect Judaism ... they will have an open corridor to reach the Western Wall and they have to respect our worship as Muslims and as Christians.1

The IDF siege of the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem in April 2002, in which about 40 Palestinian armed men took over the church, one of the most important in Christianity, with approximately 80 church staff and civilians trapped for the duration, gave the Palestinians and Islamists a golden opportunity to add a Christian dimension to the jihadist approach by presenting the event as a war to defend the Christian holy site. It is interesting to reflect on how the desecration of one of Christianity's holiest sites by Palestinian terrorists was transformed into the more respectable act of "Muslim defense of the Christian holy site from desecration at the hands of the Jewish military forces." A ruling was published on the al-Azhar Web site, issued jointly by several al-Azhar muftis, according to which one who dies in the defense of the Church of the Nativity is a shahid; the opportunity was also taken to rule that charity (the Islamic obligation of zakat, in which charity is collected during the month of Ramadan and distributed to needy Muslims) on behalf of the Christians of Palestine is permissible according to Muslim law. Sheikh Muhammad al-Jazzar, a member of al-Azhar's Fatwa Committee, explained the ruling thus:

The residents of Palestine today are warriors in a holy war, and because the suffering endured by the Palestinian people is shared jointly by Muslims and Christians, zakat funds (of the entire world Muslim population) must therefore be donated to both Muslims and Christians, since they are defending Muslim land. The Church of the Nativity is a holy place that must be defended and a Muslim state in which this Church operates has an obligation to protect it, and thus anyone who has fallen in the defense of the Church of the Nativity becomes shahid in the highest degree, he will be resurrected together with all of the prophets and righteous ones.112

This ruling received the support of al-Azhar secretary general Mahmud Ashur, who added that Islam commands Muslims to respect "the People of the Book" and their holy places, as Muslim history tells of the respect accorded to the Najran Christians by the Prophet Muhammad, who allowed them to pray in the mosque where Muslims prayed.'' Joining him in support of this fatwa was Sheikh al-Sayyid Wafa', secretary general of al-Azhar's research institute, adding that the ulema conference that had recently been held at al-Azhar had authorized this legal-religious approach and had gone even further by calling upon all Muslims to donate their zakat money that year to the inhabitants of Palestine-both Muslims and Christians. The fatwa thus reflects, according to al-Sayyid Wafa', the position of al-Azhar's Islamic scholars. Another mufti, Sheikh Abd al-'Azim al-Hamayli, a former member of al-Azhar's Fatwa Committee, even ruled that in this instance the zakat donation may be made earlier than usual (that is, rather than waiting for the month of Ramadan), such as the Palestinians' suffering. The mufti based his ruling on the tradition that Caliph Umar ibn al-Khattab had ordered that zakat money be given to an old Jew whom he had encountered in al-Madina, saying: "It would not be right to abandon him in his old age." Hamayli added that the Church of the Nativity incident amounted to an attack [by the Jews] and to the imprisonment of all those present in the church, including monks and priests. A slightly different opinion was expressed by Dr. Muhammad Ri'fat Uthman, formerly dean of al-Azhar's faculty of Shari'a, who stated that those who were in the Church of the Nativity were exposed to criminal gunfire, and that the Palestinians had returned fire and suffered casualties. This act was considered to be one of defense of human life, whether the lives defended were those of Muslims who had sought refuge in the church or those of the Christian priests who were serving there. It is a Muslim's duty to protect a Christian if his life is in danger or his property or honor threatened, even if the aggressor is a Muslim. Uthman's ruling differs from the above ruling in that the slain Muslim, in this case, is not a shahid of the first degree (one considered to be a shahid in this world as well, so that it is not necessary to wash his corpse, wrap him in a burial shroud, or pray for his soul), but rather a shahid only in the world to come.

These conciliatory efforts, interesting though they may be, have apparently failed to impress the Christians living in the Palestinian territories; since the rise of radical Islam, they have come to feel increasingly threatened. The rise of Islamist groups such as Hamas in the West bank spurred Christian emigration.116 Moreover, Bethlehem Christians became a minority in the city!" It was reported that Christians of Ramallah, Bethlehem, BeitJala, and Beit Sahour felt threatened during the first Intifada and more so since the outbreak of the second Intifada that was inspired by the Islamic brand of al-Aqsa.

The Muslim students' struggle to establish a mosque on the Catholic Church-affiliated Bethlehem University campus and the Islamic Movement in Israel's campaign to build the Shihab al-Din Mosque in close proximity to the Basilica of the Annunciation in Nazareth are two examples that serve to illustrate Christian fears. Moreover, in the Church of the Nativity incident described above, the Christian clergy present a different narrative of the church takeover, one that implies (without stating it openly) harsh criticism of the Palestinian gunmen who sowed chaos in the church and placed it in the eye of the storm. Following the agreement between Israel and the PA for the expulsion from the West Bank of the Palestinian gunmen who had taken shelter in the church, the Bethlehem Christians expressed their relief: "Finally the Christians can breathe freely," said Helen, 50, a Christian mother of four. "We are so delighted that these criminals who have intimidated us for such a long time are now going away.8

In conclusion, Jerusalem and the al-Aqsa Mosque are two religious identity symbols employed by the Arab-Muslim party in the conflict over Palestine within a strategy of Islamizing the conflict and giving it a shape of a "clash of civilizations" (in the Huntingtonian term) or, more precisely, a clash between religions. The Islamic strategy was constructed to cope with the challenges put by the Israeli-Jewish party to the conflict, which creates many confrontational incidents in and around the Temple Mount/al-Aqsa compound. Indeed, the campaign entitled "al-Aqsa is in Danger" was first employed publicly by Islamist groups following the events of October 1990 mentioned above. The 17 Palestinians who died as a result of these events led to the term "The al-Aqsa Massacre." A videocassette entitled Bayan min Ma'azin al-Quds (A Call from the Minarets of Jerusalem)-prepared by "The World Forum for Muslim Youth-The Committee for Palestine Youth" and disseminated by a Saudi Arabian company (Mu'assasat Qurtuba lilIntaj al-Fanni)-which I purchased in Sydney, Australia, documented what it called "the movie that tells the ongoing attempts to destroy the blessed al-Aqsa Mosque and to erect on its ruins the alleged Temple."

This chapter shows that the campaign of Islamizing the conflict via the issue of Jerusalem has proved effective, judging by the many examples of media coverage, opinion articles, and other manifestations published in the Arab/Muslim world. The messages are that Jerusalem belongs to the entire Muslim nation. The fact that it is controlled by the Jews is seen as a mark of guilt on every individual Muslim as well as on every Arab and Muslim state, each called upon to launch jihad to liberate Jerusalem. The aspiration for a second Saladin to emerge to rescue the holy city has been widely disseminated and inculcated in the Muslim world. Islamist groups have propagated these messages, but they have also been welcomed by masses across the Muslim world.

The next chapter identifies the many religious-political actors who were involved in the operations and actions to implement the Islamization strategy, and their achievements.

=References=

References are available on the book link of Google Scholar.

=Notes=