Savak

The Formation of SAVAK

After  the    1953 Iranian coup d'état, known in Iran as the 28 Mordad coup, was the overthrow of the Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh in favour of strengthening the monarchical rule of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi on 19 August 1953, orchestrated by the United Kingdom and the United States,that C.I.A played central rol, the Americans decided to maintain Iran as the main base in the region.  So firstly ,they establish the intelligence service in Army  and secondly by ten people of his advisers, led by Yatsevitch, Colonel CIA director at the US Embassy in Iran, intelligence and national security (SAVAK) established which its law was approved by the National Assembly in March 1957 without any serious opposition.

Thus SAVAK ,only with one page of law but with unlimited  power and authorities , headed by Teymur Bakhtiar as first  chief  established in 1957. By given  unlimited authorities to Savak,it  gradually predominated over all affairs of the country.

In all, at least one SAVAK officer stationed as a secretary and also  a trained officer in  each section of all ministries was appointed behalf of Savak. In addition, under the so-called social programs (such as the Literacy Corps (Sepāh-e dānesh), Health Corps, Savak was  collected  all information and activities  from all over the country .

On the other hand, in order to control the Iranian political activities in abroad, especially students and activists , the especial offices was  established in Europe and the West and by penetrating in  some political  organizations had tried to follow their   activities .With regard to this situation , Bakhtiar ,the first head of SAVAK, who had unlimited power and  affalited to one of the tribes (Bakhtiyari  tribe ) is supposed that he was seeking  for higher positions and seizing power .This issues  had caused that Mohamad Reza Shah  was feeling  dander behalf of him.

This subject  and other issues caused  that the king sought to establish the  control services   in order to monitor the actions  and treatment of organizations and high-ranking  authorities .Mohammad Reza Shah  was wanted to maintain his position  and prenent the similar  problems in the future .

SAVAK Structure

SAVAK consisted of three main parts: the directorate, general offices and SAVAK of Tehran and other cities. Also, SAVAK had representatives in other countries.

Presidency

In the diagram prepared in 1952, the area of the SAVAK presidency included the following parts:

• Office of the head of SAVAK
• SAVAK deputy office
• Special fund
• Advisers to the head of SAVAK
• Control
• Inspector General
• Secretariat of the National Security Council
• Agreements.
• General offices of SAVAK
• First department, administrative affairs
• The second general department, collecting foreign information
• The third general department, internal security
• Fourth General Department, Protection
• The fifth general department, technical
• 6th General Department, financial affairs
• 7th General Department, Foreign Intelligence Review
• 8th General Directorate, counter-espionage

• 9th General Directorate, research .

SAVAK controlled students and Iranians abroad, and for this purpose, it cooperated with the police of other countries.Also, SAVAK had complete control over the behavior of the government, parliaments and parties and reported their actions to the king.

SAVAK had complete control over the performance of various parties and groups, both religious and non-religious, and severely suppressed any protests and actions against the king .

SAVAK's activity was not limited to security issues; Rather, he gradually interfered in all the affairs of the country and in fact, our power was superior to the power of the government.

Savak Security

The security of Savak was the responsibility of the fourth department under the directorship of Brigadier General Kangarlu. The fourth department was divided into three sections on the basis of its three-fold security responsibilities:

·       Personnel security

·       Site security

·       Document security

It also had a fourth section which dealt with guards. The heads of the provincial Savak department for security guards were also under the command of the fourth department.

Personnel security: This in no way meant that the fourth department would protect Savak personnel against physical attacks from opposition groups. Rather, personnel security meant that the past life of the personnel, prior to their employment in Savak, was investigated along with those they were acquainted with according to methods approved by the personnel department. The staff selection procedure was such that Savak could not be penetrated by enemy agents or opposition elements. However, the department for personnel security had to check any suspicious moves and give Savak employees complete briefings on their responsibilities and no precautionary measures that must be taken. The briefings were aimed at training the personnel. For example, suppose an agent of the targeted agencies or one of the secret opposition groups planned to get information from Savak. He would first of all approach an employee of Savak and establish friendly links with him and gradually he would acquire the necessary information from him. In this way, the employee would become an unwitting agent for these agencies and groups.

Site security: This included physical and human security. Physical security meant that buildings and entrance gates had to be checked and equipment such as iron doors, strong, secure locks, alarms, closed-circuit TVs and the like were in place to ensure the safety of the buildings. Human security meant securing Savak guards.

Documents security: Documents were categorized into classified and ordinary documents on the basis of their importance, and each one was filed in a special way. Although the main personnel department was expected to look after the security of the documents, the fourth department was in charge of essuring that the task was carried out correctly.

The guards department: Guards were employed to protect Savak buildings in Tehran and the provinces as well as Savak branches abroad. These guards were selected from among those who had done their military service and who were physically strong. They worked in four shifts. The first shift worked a 24-hour day and three guards were in charge of each post, the guard changed every eight hours. The second shift was put on alert for unexpected incidents and stayed at Savak. The third shift recieved all kinds of practical and theroretical training, and members of the fourth shift were on leave. The ability to drive was an obligation for the guards as was familiarity with technical matters.

The fourth department in the provincial Savak branches also had a number of guards in proportion to the size of the branches. The guards of the fourth department were also responsible for the security of the prisons. Security for the U.S. radar bases in northern Iran also lay with the fourth department, but the personnel working within the bases were all American nationals. The radar installations had vast fences around them, and the security of these fences was in the hands of the fourth department under the supervision of the American head of the base. The guards were organized exactly like the army and were divided into uints such as battalions, companies and groups but did not use such titles. Strict regulations existed for these security units and their commanders were officers.

A two-month training period in security measures was also offered by Savak both in terms of theory and practice. Despite all these arrangements, Savak's security was in poor shape, the main reason being because of the open nature of Savak's activities. Savak was a combination of the CIA and the FBI set up by American advisers in 1956. In the US, the CIA is, to a certain extent, overtly active and the FBI even more so; this is in complete contrast to the British intelligence system where MI6 (foreign intelligence) and MI-5 (domestic intelligence) operate on a completely covert basis .

Savak's Counter-Espionage Department

The eighth department, carefully established and organized by the Americans, was Savak's counter-espionage department. This department was Of Special concern to the West and both the head of MI-6 in the British Embassy and the head of the CIA in the American Embassy were in constant touch with the department and received useful information on a regular basis.

The eighth department operated independently in the capital and set up ooun~ter- espionage sections in Savak branches throughout the country. To the bat of my memory, counter-espionage sections existed in the following branches:

Khorasan (for the Soviets and Afghans), Gorgan and Gonbad (for the Soviets and Turkmans) Anzali and Jolfa (for the Soviets) Rezaeye (for Christian Asyrians) Abadan, Ahvaz and Khorramshahr (for the Arab sheikhdoms and foreign-based consulates) Bushehr and Bandar Abbas (for the southern Arab states) Sistan and Baluchestan (for Baluches and Afghans) Isfahan (for Armenians). The Isfahan section was reinforced after the iron smelting factory began operations.

The activities of the eighth department were as follows:

•           Identification of intelligence personnel and agents of the targeted embassies: According to theeighth department, the Soviet KG.B. (which dealt with non-military intelligence) and G.R.U. (military intelligence) had the greatest number of intelligence personel in their Tehran Embassy. The number of active personnel of both agencies reached 50 and all were experienced.

•           Cheching the arrival and departure of the staff of targeted embassies to and from Iran and finding out if the person under observation had finished his tenure of office, had been replaced, or was on his way home to deliver his reports.

•           Renting houses in the vicinty of the targeted embassies in order to keep a watchful eye on the building. We always had problems with the Soviet Embassy because they quickly discovered our base and created trouble for Savak agents.

•           Checking the arrival and departure of the staff of targeted embassies and people going to and from the embassy. This was done by erecting stands opposite the main entrance to the embassy and using cameras and other devices or controlling the entrance door from a canvas-covered truck watching through a slit in the canvas.

•           Surveillance of certain members of the embassy or visitors to the embassy.

•           Contacts with the intelligence agents of friendly embassies. Top-level contacts existed between Savak and the US, British and Israeli Embassies.

Savak's Foreign Intelligence Department

The second and seventh departments were also under the command of    Foreign Intelligence Organization. This was the arrangement given to the foreign intelligence organization by the American advisers and modelled on the CIA.

In Savak, the American advisers set up intelligence organization (foreign) in the form of the second and seventh departments along side the security organization, because Iran did not need to acquire extensive foreign intelligence. In oder to create oo ordination between the two departments, a foreign intelligence chief was appointed as their head; his official title was deputy foreign intelligence chief of Savak.

Savak's second main department was the department which was concerned with acquiring foreign information which it then passed onto the eighth department for investigation.

The training for the scond department was carried out by Israeli instructors, particularly by the leader of the Israeli extra- territorial base in Khuzestan province in the south of the country, who contributed greatly towards improving the quality of this department.

The second department acquired information through two channels: first, through the extra- territorial bases. Therefore, they had a branch in all the Savak border offices and despite weaknesses, they were able to establish networks along the Iranian border with Iraq and Afghanistan and were very active in acquiring intelligence information. In fact, Iran's extra-terri~orial Polities, especially regarding the Arab States, were usually employed by the

Israeli extra-territorial bases and later instructions came from Tel Aviv .Savak really gained nothing.

The second channel was setting up bases in the targeted countries. Most of the information was acquired through this means.

Experienced agents of the second department were sent as first-secretary of Iran's embassies in the targeted countries. They participated in ceremonies in order to make friends with others like them in other embassies, they travelled to different cities to see

the situation of the people, studied news and sent back reports to central headquarters. By using these open methods they could guarantee 90% of the second department's intelligence needs.

The second department could no even guaranted %1 of its information from classified intelligence, therefore it can be said that more than %99 of the second department's intelligence information was public information provided by Savak agents established in targeted countries.

The seventh department its task was to study foreign intelligence received from the second department. Since the responsibilities of the two departments were interrelated, they were organized along the same lines. The seventh department was quite able to present monthly bulletins on the internal situation in the targeted countries by studying the intelligence reports provided by the second department reading the newspapers of the said countries and the daily radio news reports sent by the former Ministry of Information .

Savak's Internal Security Department

Providing domestic security was the responsibility of the third department.It was the most important operations department in Savak and had the most extensive facilities placed at its diposal. It was supervised by the chief of Savak. Its main responsibility was to collect information and stop attempts to topple the government. It also carried out antiespionage operations and had other responsibilities similar to those of the F.B.I. in America and MI-5 in Britain. The third department was also empowered to carry out certain operations abroad, the assassination of Teimur Bakhteyar serves as an example.

The directors of the third department were Brigadier-General Mostar Amjadi (until June 1963), Colonel Nasser Moqqaddam who was promoted to the rank of Major-General (until 1971) and Parviz Sabeti, respectively.

The first section of the third department had a special importance and such talented people as Parviz Sabeti,Atapour and Parviz Farnejad served in the section. The main responsibility this section which formed the most important part of the third department was to identify anti-government groups and counter attempts to overthrow the opposition establishments in all parts of the country including those seeking autonomy or secession.

Isreal and Trainings of SAVAK

At the time, Iran had recognized Israel as a de facto state and Tel Aviv had opened an informal diplomatic mission in Tehran. The intelligence officer at the Israeli Embassy was Lieutenant Colonel Yaqub Nimroudi who, with the approval of Mohammad Reza, had active relations with Savak. The Israeli intelligence network was very strong because some Jews occupied very sensitive intelligence posts in Europe and North America and after the creation of Israel, they had set up Israeli intelligence and security organizations. Therefore, with the help of Nimroudi, a program of training for Savak was organized which led to the establishment of a main training department under the leadership of Brigadier General Keyvani.

At the beginning, about three teams, each with ten members from the second, third and eighth departments, were sent to Israel. The training lasted about two years and was very successful. This indicated that the Israelis valued Mohammad Reza’s friendship greatly and banked heavily on the future role of Savak in the region. Thus, Savak  preferred to invite Israeli teachers to Tehran. Nimroudi helped in the arrangements and invited the necessary teachers .

SAVAK          Directors

SAVAK  , the secret intelligence organization of Iran, established in 1957 and disbanded in 1979.

·       Teymur              Bakhtiar   ( First year of operation 1957)  ( Last year of operation 1961 ) 

   

·       Hassan              Pakravan ( First year of operation 1961)  ( Last year of operation 1965 )      

·       Nematollah          Nassiri ( First year of operation 1965)  ( Last year of operation 1978 )      

·       Nasser           Moghadam ( First year of operation 1978)  ( Last year of operation 1979 )  

       

                  

     

Footnotes:

References

• Ẓuhūr va Suqūṭ-i Salṭanat-i Pahlavī (The Rise and Fall of the Pahlavi Dynasty): Memoirs of Former General Hussein Fardust, edited by  Abdollah Shahbazi published by "Political Studies and Research Institute",1990.
• Shekanjegaran   Migooyand (Torturers  Say) by : Ghasem  Hassan poor, published by  Ebart Museum of Iran, 2007.
• Vice President of Strategic Studies; Savak.
• Najarirad, Taghi; Savak, Tehran, Center for Documents of the Islamic Revolution, 1379, first edition.