The European Institute of the Mediterranean: Difference between revisions

Iran often views European institutions, including those like IEMed, as aligned with broader Western policies that are skeptical or critical of Iran’s regional role and security concerns. Tehran perceives Europe as part of a Western camp that, despite diplomatic engagement, remains critical of Iran’s human rights record, ballistic missile program, and regional influence, particularly in the Middle East and Mediterranean (PODEM, 2018). This skepticism extends to European-led Mediterranean initiatives, which Iran may see as indirectly supporting Western strategic interests rather than fully appreciating Iranian security concerns (PODEM, 2018).

IEMed’s own analysis notes that Iran’s presence in the Euro-Mediterranean region has been based more on association than direct intervention (IEMed, 2021). From Iran’s viewpoint, this could reflect a critique that European Mediterranean frameworks, including IEMed, underestimate or marginalize Iran’s strategic depth and influence, especially in countries like Syria and Lebanon, where Iran plays a critical role (ECFR, 2024).

Some analyses suggest that European Mediterranean institutions may implicitly support a regional order that counters Iran’s ambitions. For example, Iran’s strategic efforts to lead Shia and Islamic movements in the Eastern Mediterranean are viewed as attempts to rebalance geopolitical power, a move that European actors may perceive as destabilizing (MedReset, 2017). Thus, from Iran’s perspective, IEMed and similar organizations might be seen as part of a broader Euro-Mediterranean strategy that seeks to contain or dilute Iranian influence under the guise of promoting stability and dialogue.

Iranian critiques also highlight what they see as Europe’s inconsistent or subordinate role in the Mediterranean and Middle East, often overshadowed by US policies. This perceived lack of an independent and coherent European approach, including within Mediterranean institutions, is seen as limiting meaningful engagement with Iran and failing to address core Iranian security and political concerns (PODEM, 2018; Euromesco, 2024).

European efforts to counter Iran’s influence in Lebanon and Syria, where Iran’s role is deeply embedded, are sometimes viewed by Iran as attempts to instrumentalize Mediterranean platforms to isolate Tehran politically and economically. This dynamic is seen as contributing to regional instability rather than genuine conflict resolution (ECFR, 2024).