The Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation: Difference between revisions
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* Assistant Professor Nursem Keskin Aksay (Marmara University) focuses on social and cultural anthropology, including Muslim women, migration, social change, and secularism, linking anthropology with civil society issues (Dergipark, 2025)<ref>Dergipark. (2025, February 19). Journal Boards: Nursem Keskin Aksay, Mehmet Fatih Aysan, Oguzhan Goksel. https://dergipark.org.tr/en/pub/kademkad/board</ref>. | * Assistant Professor Nursem Keskin Aksay (Marmara University) focuses on social and cultural anthropology, including Muslim women, migration, social change, and secularism, linking anthropology with civil society issues (Dergipark, 2025)<ref>Dergipark. (2025, February 19). Journal Boards: Nursem Keskin Aksay, Mehmet Fatih Aysan, Oguzhan Goksel. https://dergipark.org.tr/en/pub/kademkad/board</ref>. | ||
* Dr. Oguzhan Goksel (Marmara University) researches political economy, foreign policy, and Middle Eastern studies, with publications on Turkey’s relations with the Middle East post-Arab Spring (Dergipark, 2025)<ref>Dergipark. (2025, February 19). Journal Boards: Nursem Keskin Aksay, Mehmet Fatih Aysan, Oguzhan Goksel. https://dergipark.org.tr/en/pub/kademkad/board</ref>. | * Dr. Oguzhan Goksel (Marmara University) researches political economy, foreign policy, and Middle Eastern studies, with publications on Turkey’s relations with the Middle East post-Arab Spring (Dergipark, 2025)<ref>Dergipark. (2025, February 19). Journal Boards: Nursem Keskin Aksay, Mehmet Fatih Aysan, Oguzhan Goksel. https://dergipark.org.tr/en/pub/kademkad/board</ref>. | ||
* Prof. Dr. Aysit Tansel (METU) is noted for empirical economic research on gender inequality, education, and labor force participation, contributing to TESEV’s socio-economic analyses (Tansel, 2020). | * Prof. Dr. Aysit Tansel (METU) is noted for empirical economic research on gender inequality, education, and labor force participation, contributing to TESEV’s socio-economic analyses (Tansel, 2020)<ref>Tansel, A. (2020). Resume. https://erf.org.eg/app/uploads/2015/12/1611050879_558_611543_aysittansel_cv2020.pdf</ref>. | ||
==Key Fields of Concentration (Research)== | ==Key Fields of Concentration (Research)== | ||
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TESEV’s partnerships include collaborations with Turkish universities, civil society organizations, and international research networks. Its engagement with issues such as security sector reform, minority rights, and regional diplomacy aligns with Iran’s strategic interests in the region. The foundation’s independent stance and rigorous research methodology make it a credible source for understanding Turkey’s evolving role in the Islamic world and its neighborhood, including Iran (TESEV, 2024<ref>TESEV. (2024). Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation. https://www.tesev.org.tr/en/turkish-economic-and-social-studies-foundation/</ref>; Wikipedia, 2024)<ref>Wikipedia contributors. (2024, November 1). Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation. Wikipedia. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turkish_Economic_and_Social_Studies_Foundation</ref>. | TESEV’s partnerships include collaborations with Turkish universities, civil society organizations, and international research networks. Its engagement with issues such as security sector reform, minority rights, and regional diplomacy aligns with Iran’s strategic interests in the region. The foundation’s independent stance and rigorous research methodology make it a credible source for understanding Turkey’s evolving role in the Islamic world and its neighborhood, including Iran (TESEV, 2024<ref>TESEV. (2024). Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation. https://www.tesev.org.tr/en/turkish-economic-and-social-studies-foundation/</ref>; Wikipedia, 2024)<ref>Wikipedia contributors. (2024, November 1). Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation. Wikipedia. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turkish_Economic_and_Social_Studies_Foundation</ref>. | ||
From an Iranian perspective, critiques or suspicions regarding the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) often focus on potential hidden objectives related to Turkey’s regional ambitions and its positioning vis-à-vis Iran and the broader Middle East. While TESEV presents itself as an independent think tank dedicated to democratization, governance, and regional cooperation, some Iranian analysts might view its work through a lens shaped by geopolitical rivalry and differing ideological outlooks. | |||
==Critique and Perceived Hidden Objectives== | |||
1. Alignment with Turkish Foreign Policy Interests: | |||
TESEV’s research and publications frequently emphasize Turkey’s role as a “credible and respectable” regional actor that balances power dynamics in the Middle East, often contrasting Turkey’s approach with that of Iran. For example, TESEV’s surveys and reports highlight Turkey as a stabilizing force and a model of combining Islam and democracy, implicitly positioning Turkey as an alternative to Iran’s regional influence (TESEV, 2009<ref>TESEV. (2009). Turkey: Arab Perspectives [PDF]. Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation. https://www.tesev.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/report_Turkey_Arab_Perspectives.pdf</ref>; TESEV, 2024)<ref>TESEV. (2024). Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation. https://www.tesev.org.tr/en/turkish-economic-and-social-studies-foundation/</ref>. From Iran’s perspective, this framing can be interpreted as supporting Turkey’s geopolitical ambitions to counterbalance Iranian influence in the Arab world and beyond, potentially masking a strategic agenda behind the foundation’s research outputs (TESEV, 2009)<ref>TESEV. (2009). Turkey: Arab Perspectives [PDF]. Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation. https://www.tesev.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/report_Turkey_Arab_Perspectives.pdf</ref>. | |||
2. Critical Portrayal of Iranian Politics: | |||
TESEV researchers have produced detailed analyses of Iranian domestic politics, such as the examination of principalist factions and electoral dynamics, which tend to highlight internal divisions and power struggles within Iran (Aydın, 2012)<ref>Aydın, E. E. (2012). The Principalist Divide and the Parliamentary Elections in Iran [PDF]. Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation. https://www.tesev.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/report_A_Separation_The_Principalist_Divide_And_The_Parliamentary_Elections_In_Iran.pdf</ref>. While academically valuable, such work may be viewed by Iranian observers as emphasizing Iran’s political instability or irrationality in foreign policymaking, which could serve to justify Turkey’s cautious or competitive stance toward Iran in regional affairs (Aydın, 2012)<ref>Aydın, E. E. (2012). The Principalist Divide and the Parliamentary Elections in Iran [PDF]. Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation. https://www.tesev.org.tr/wp-content/uploads report_A_Separation_The_Principalist_Divide_And_The_Parliamentary_Elections_In_Iran.pdf</ref>. | |||
3. Arab World Perceptions and Sectarian Balance: | |||
TESEV’s research often underscores Turkey’s “balanced” position in the Sunni-Shiite divide and its refusal to engage in sectarian politics, contrasting this with Iran’s perceived sectarian ambitions in the region (TESEV, 2009)<ref>TESEV. (2009). Turkey: Arab Perspectives [PDF]. Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation. https://www.tesev.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/report_Turkey_Arab_Perspectives.pdf</ref>. From an Iranian viewpoint, this narrative might be seen as an attempt to delegitimize Iran’s regional role by framing it as sectarian and hegemonic, while promoting Turkey as a more inclusive and stabilizing actor-thus serving Turkish soft power interests under the guise of independent research (TESEV, 2009)<ref>TESEV. (2009). Turkey: Arab Perspectives [PDF]. Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation. https://www.tesev.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/report_Turkey_Arab_Perspectives.pdf</ref>. | |||
4. Public Opinion Surveys and Regional Influence: | |||
TESEV’s surveys showing negative Arab public opinion toward Iran and more favorable views of Turkey could be interpreted as reflecting or reinforcing political biases aligned with Turkish state interests. Iranian critiques might argue that such surveys selectively emphasize data that supports Turkey’s regional positioning while downplaying complexities or positive perceptions of Iran (TESEV, 2009<ref>TESEV. (2009). Turkey: Arab Perspectives [PDF]. Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation. https://www.tesev.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/report_Turkey_Arab_Perspectives.pdf</ref>; CIAO, n.d.)<ref>CIAO. (n.d.). Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) / Political analysis. Columbia University. https://ciaonet.org/catalog?f%5Binstitution%5D%5B%5D=Turkish+Economic+and+Social+Studies+Foundation+%28TESEV%29&f%5Blocation%5D%5B%5D=Middle+East&f%5Btopic%5D%5B%5D=International+Relations&per_page=100&search_field=all_fields&searched=yes&sort=year</ref>. | |||
==Summary from Iran’s Perspective== | |||
While TESEV is respected for its rigorous research and policy analysis, Iranian observers may critique it as an institution that, despite its independent claim, functions partly as a soft power instrument advancing Turkey’s geopolitical interests in the Middle East. Its work is perceived as subtly promoting Turkey’s image as a democratic and stabilizing model in contrast to Iran, potentially influencing regional narratives and policy debates in ways that challenge Iranian influence. | |||
==References== | ==References== | ||
[[Category:English Wikivahdat]] | |||
[[category:Think tanks]] | |||