Who Speaks for the Islamic World? Religion, Identity and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (Review article)): Difference between revisions
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The title is review article by Faiz Sheikh published in Politics, Religion & Ideology,, 2017, Vol. 18, No. 1, 117-121. The following is the | The title is review article by Faiz Sheikh published in Politics, Religion & Ideology,, 2017, Vol. 18, No. 1, 117-121. The following is an excerpt of the review.<ref>http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ftmp21</ref> | ||
=Religious solidarity= | |||
Religious solidarity-a shared identity-is one of the fundamental messages that Islamists, from varieties apolitical to democratic and peaceful to armed and violent, use to gather support and justify actions. One of the threats of the Islamic State, or Daesh, has been in their appeal to this shared Islamic identity to justify their resurrection of the Caliphate as a political institution, but crucially, to appeal to Muslims globally in bowing to the authority of this nascent 'state'. | Religious solidarity-a shared identity-is one of the fundamental messages that Islamists, from varieties apolitical to democratic and peaceful to armed and violent, use to gather support and justify actions. One of the threats of the Islamic State, or Daesh, has been in their appeal to this shared Islamic identity to justify their resurrection of the Caliphate as a political institution, but crucially, to appeal to Muslims globally in bowing to the authority of this nascent 'state'. | ||
The fear of an Islamic 'threat'an ideology that appeals to Muslims 'here' and 'there',educated and uneducated, male and female, young and old-is not new. A similar fear of so-called 'radicalization' of Muslims in Europe and the USA post 9/11 was and is central to counter-terrorism and espionage initiatives on Muslim communities who might be sus• ceptible to al-Qaeda's rhetoric of religious solidarity similar to Daesh's contemporary one.<ref>'Arun Kundani, The Muslims Are Coming!: Islamophobia, Extremism, and the Domestic War on Terror (London: Verso, 2014), p. 8.</ref> Indeed, al-Qaeda once had their own call and vision for a restored Caliphate, rendered obsolete by Daesh.<ref>Ibrahim Al-Marashi, 'Why the Caliphate Survives'. Accessed on 20.10.2016, at: http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2015/06/caliphate-isil-mosul-iraq-150609050758746.html.</ref> Kayaoglu reminds us that as far back as 1876 the Ottoman Sultan Abd~lhamid II attempted something similar, using his authority as Caliph to gain leadership over Muslims worldwide (p. 11). Each of these attempts has been unsuccessful; the world's 1. 7 billion Muslims have not flocked to any of the above banners, despite their assumed shared identity. | The fear of an Islamic 'threat' -an ideology that appeals to Muslims 'here' and 'there',educated and uneducated, male and female, young and old-is not new. A similar fear of so-called 'radicalization' of Muslims in Europe and the USA post 9/11 was and is central to counter-terrorism and espionage initiatives on Muslim communities who might be sus• ceptible to al-Qaeda's rhetoric of religious solidarity similar to Daesh's contemporary one.<ref>'Arun Kundani, The Muslims Are Coming!: Islamophobia, Extremism, and the Domestic War on Terror (London: Verso, 2014), p. 8.</ref> Indeed, al-Qaeda once had their own call and vision for a restored Caliphate, rendered obsolete by Daesh.<ref>Ibrahim Al-Marashi, 'Why the Caliphate Survives'. Accessed on 20.10.2016, at: http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2015/06/caliphate-isil-mosul-iraq-150609050758746.html.</ref> Kayaoglu reminds us that as far back as 1876 the Ottoman Sultan Abd~lhamid II attempted something similar, using his authority as Caliph to gain leadership over Muslims worldwide (p. 11). Each of these attempts has been unsuccessful; the world's 1. 7 billion Muslims have not flocked to any of the above banners, despite their assumed shared identity. | ||
=What the review reveals= | |||
What this brief overview reveals is that both those who would rely upon a shared Islamic identity and those who fear it, overestimate the power of that identity and its ability to help actors achieve their ends. That is not to say that the lack of effectiveness means that there is no such solidarity between (some) Muslims. As James Piscatori explains, this phenomenon I have referred to as religious solidarity or a shared identity is better labelled as pan-Islam,'an idea, a symbol, that is conditioned by modern contexts and is shamelessly used and manipulated, but nonetheless exercises a pull on the modern Muslim imagination' (p. 440).<ref>James Piscatori, 'Imagining Pan-Islam: Religious Activism and Political Utopias', Proceedings of the British Academy, 131 (2005), pp. 421-442.</ref> | What this brief overview reveals is that both those who would rely upon a shared Islamic identity and those who fear it, overestimate the power of that identity and its ability to help actors achieve their ends. That is not to say that the lack of effectiveness means that there is no such solidarity between (some) Muslims. As James Piscatori explains, this phenomenon I have referred to as religious solidarity or a shared identity is better labelled as pan-Islam,'an idea, a symbol, that is conditioned by modern contexts and is shamelessly used and manipulated, but nonetheless exercises a pull on the modern Muslim imagination' (p. 440).<ref>James Piscatori, 'Imagining Pan-Islam: Religious Activism and Political Utopias', Proceedings of the British Academy, 131 (2005), pp. 421-442.</ref> | ||
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European Muslims have gone to fight for the organization, according to an April 2016 report by the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism.<ref>International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 'The Foreign Fighters Phenomenon in the EU-Profiles, Threats & Policies', accessed on 20.10.2016, at: https://icct.nl/publication/report-the-foreign-fighters-phenomenon-in-the-eu-profiles• threats-policies/.</ref> While such numbers are sensa• tional and indeed a cause for concern regarding security, multicultural and socio-economic realities in European countries, there exists a far more tangible and wide-reaching case for Islamic solidarity, which is the topic of the three books under review: The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). | European Muslims have gone to fight for the organization, according to an April 2016 report by the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism.<ref>International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 'The Foreign Fighters Phenomenon in the EU-Profiles, Threats & Policies', accessed on 20.10.2016, at: https://icct.nl/publication/report-the-foreign-fighters-phenomenon-in-the-eu-profiles• threats-policies/.</ref> While such numbers are sensa• tional and indeed a cause for concern regarding security, multicultural and socio-economic realities in European countries, there exists a far more tangible and wide-reaching case for Islamic solidarity, which is the topic of the three books under review: The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). | ||
The OIC is an international organization which claims to represent the entire Muslim World. The first article of its | =OIC from different views= | ||
The OIC is an international organization which claims to represent the entire Muslim World. The first article of its chapter states that the organization's purpose is to '[t] o enhance and consolidate the bonds of fraternity and solidarity among the Member States'.<ref>Organization of Islamic Cooperation, 'Charter of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation', accessed on 15.04.2016, at:http://www.oic-oci.org/oicv3/page/?p_id=53&p_ref=27&lan=en.</ref> As former Secretary General of the OIC, Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, relates of the organization, it is 'the concrete manifestations of the concept of "Islamic solidarity" in the contemporary world', deriving from shared Islamic experiences (p. 13). While placing religious solidarity, and in this instance, an articulation of a global Muslim community, or ummah, as central to the organization, Naveed Sheikh argues that this is an 'ontological achievement', an "Islamization" of the political paradigm' that has augmented Islam's 'secu• larization-resistant profile not only in civil society but also in international society' (pp. 138-139). Indeed, as an inter-state organization that explicitly places pan-Islam as a motivating force while also, in the words of the OIC's charter, 'adhere our commitment to the principles of the United Nations Charter',<ref>Organization of Islamic Cooperation, 'Charter of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation'.</ref> highlights the peculiar nature of this type of pan-Islam. Unlike the challenge of Daesh, al-Qaeda or a restored Caliphate as a chal• lenge or alternative to the international system, the OIC's vision of Islamic solidarity works within the system. The blend of religion and state politics perhaps goes someway to explain• ing the lack of scholarship on the OIC, given the secular foundations and assumptions of the discipline International Relations (IR).<ref>Elizabeth Hurd, The Politics of Secularism in International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), p. 10. </ref> The three books under review do an excellent job of opening up the OIC to a wider audience, and showing the relevance of the organiz• ation to contemporary political studies. Before continuing, I will briefly outline each of the three books. | |||
Ihsanoglu's study is a broad historical and issue-based overview of the OIC. For the historical element, he begins with efforts to foster Muslim solidarity among states since before the OIC, to its founding in 1969 (then the Organisation of the Islamic Conference) all the way to 2009, outlining the key events of the time and decisions of the organization. The issues that he touches on are the policy fields of major importance to the organization during his tenure as OIC Secretary General (2005-2013), prominently the OIC's ongoing reform process and combating Islamaphobia. The Islamic World in the New Century: The Organis• ation of the Islamic Conference, 1969-2009, is recommended reading for anyone wanting to know more about the OIC as given its easy style and issue- (rather than theory-) based content, it can be read by non-academic audiences. | Ihsanoglu's study is a broad historical and issue-based overview of the OIC. For the historical element, he begins with efforts to foster Muslim solidarity among states since before the OIC, to its founding in 1969 (then the Organisation of the Islamic Conference) all the way to 2009, outlining the key events of the time and decisions of the organization. The issues that he touches on are the policy fields of major importance to the organization during his tenure as OIC Secretary General (2005-2013), prominently the OIC's ongoing reform process and combating Islamaphobia. The Islamic World in the New Century: The Organis• ation of the Islamic Conference, 1969-2009, is recommended reading for anyone wanting to know more about the OIC as given its easy style and issue- (rather than theory-) based content, it can be read by non-academic audiences. | ||
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that they tell. Ihsanoglu's book is fascinating as due to the privilege of his position as former Secretary General, he is able to provide 'blow-by-blow' accounts of the meetings, communi• cations and actions of various ministers, heads of states and international organizations, as they respond to a numerous political events. Ihsanoglu is far more generous to the OIC and trusts in the benevolence of the OIC's mission. Despite this Ihsanoglu does not shy away from the failures of the OIC and is critical, for example, of the OIC's failure in managing the situation of the Danish 'cartoon crisis', as he refers to it, in 2005-2006 (p. 160). | that they tell. Ihsanoglu's book is fascinating as due to the privilege of his position as former Secretary General, he is able to provide 'blow-by-blow' accounts of the meetings, communi• cations and actions of various ministers, heads of states and international organizations, as they respond to a numerous political events. Ihsanoglu is far more generous to the OIC and trusts in the benevolence of the OIC's mission. Despite this Ihsanoglu does not shy away from the failures of the OIC and is critical, for example, of the OIC's failure in managing the situation of the Danish 'cartoon crisis', as he refers to it, in 2005-2006 (p. 160). | ||
Kayaoglu's work, in contrast, is more critical and analytical, reading like a textbook, | Kayaoglu's work, in contrast, is more critical and analytical, reading like a textbook, complete with two text-boxes which give background information on the Sunni-Shia split and proceedings of an influential Islamic Summit of the OIC. For Kayaoglu, it seems, the OIC is genuinely attempting to address concerns of Muslims globally, but cannot do so due to the unwillingness of member states to support the organization. Despite this, Kayaoglu finds some successes for the OIC, particularly in the field of Human Rights and the organization's establishment of an Independent Permanent Human Rights Commission in 2011. Curiously, Kayaoglu maps the OIC's position on Human Rights as having moved away from Shari'a and an Islamic legal framework, allowing the OIC 'to discuss rights within the context of inter• national human rights instruments rather than exclusively within that of Islamic law and tra• dition' (p. 107). | ||
Finally, Sheikh's study is the most critical of the three, and reading it next to the rather optimistic overview of Ihsanoglu can at times leave one thinking that the two narratives presented can hardly be describing the same phenomena. Sheikh convincingly argues that the OIC is less of an actor but more of an arena, an arena in which the aggregate interests of the member states are given an Islamic legitimacy, rather than the members being 'conditioned by any "Islamic rationale'" (p. 129). Sheikh's damning appraisal of the Ole's appeal to a pan• Islamic identity, and the differences between the three studies which I have outlined here, can be illustrated with an example. I mentioned the Arab-Israeli conflict earlier as this is an issue which was central to the founding of the OIC, a response in part to the arson attack on August 21, 1969 on the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem, the third holiest site in Islam. As such, it is a telling illustration of the differences between the three studies when dealing with the genesis of the OIC. | Finally, Sheikh's study is the most critical of the three, and reading it next to the rather optimistic overview of Ihsanoglu can at times leave one thinking that the two narratives presented can hardly be describing the same phenomena. Sheikh convincingly argues that the OIC is less of an actor but more of an arena, an arena in which the aggregate interests of the member states are given an Islamic legitimacy, rather than the members being 'conditioned by any "Islamic rationale'" (p. 129). Sheikh's damning appraisal of the Ole's appeal to a pan• Islamic identity, and the differences between the three studies which I have outlined here, can be illustrated with an example. I mentioned the Arab-Israeli conflict earlier as this is an issue which was central to the founding of the OIC, a response in part to the arson attack on August 21, 1969 on the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem, the third holiest site in Islam. As such, it is a telling illustration of the differences between the three studies when dealing with the genesis of the OIC. | ||
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The plight of the Palestinians, then, was simply a convenient cause upon which more specific and decidedly un-cooperative policies could be implemented. Kayaoglu also notes that King Faisal was 'not wholly altruistic in founding the OIC' (p. 13), but maintains that the founding's most important success was that 'Muslim states had united despite their vast political, ideologi• cal, national, sectarian, and economic differences' (p. 15). | The plight of the Palestinians, then, was simply a convenient cause upon which more specific and decidedly un-cooperative policies could be implemented. Kayaoglu also notes that King Faisal was 'not wholly altruistic in founding the OIC' (p. 13), but maintains that the founding's most important success was that 'Muslim states had united despite their vast political, ideologi• cal, national, sectarian, and economic differences' (p. 15). | ||
=Conclusion= | |||
What this brief example of the Ole's beginnings reveals is that the OIC is more than an | What this brief example of the Ole's beginnings reveals is that the OIC is more than an | ||