View source for Challenges to lslamic Solidarity: The Case of Turkish HNGOS

The title is an article by pinar akpinar<ref>Pinar Akpinar is Scholar and Project Manager at Istanbul Policy Center, Saban  University.</ref> published in “Caucasus  International Journal”, Vol. 7  No: 2  Winter 2017. The following is the article.<ref>https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Pinar-Akpinar/publication/323219287_Challenges_to_Islamic_Solidarity_The_Case_of_Turkish_HNGOs/links/5a86b0c6aca272017e56d716/Challenges-to-Islamic-Solidarity-The-Case-of-Turkish-HNGOs.pdf</ref>


=Abstract=

This study investigates the role of Islamic solidarity in the conceptions, motivations, and  practices  of  Turkish  HNGOs.  While  Islamic  solidarity  plays  an  important  role  in the conceptions, motivations and practices of these HNGOs, it is, at times, limited by their strong sense of affiliation with Turkey  and Turkish patriotism. In this sense, Islamic solidarity can  be downplayed when there is a  stronger sense of national affiliation. Furthermore, the sustainability of these HNGOs, and therefore the extent to which they are able to extend  Islamic solidarity, is dependent upon the convergence of their ideas and  interests with Turkey's current government. In a  similar vein,  it remains under question whether these HNGOs would  feel the same level of patriotism under   a different government. As such, the support they enjoy from the government and the affiliation they feel with Turkey feed into one another. Moreover, Islamic solidarity offered  by Turkish HNGOs could  be challenged  by their  overreliance on the precarious space provided for them  by the current Turkish government.

Keywords:  Islamic solidarity, Turkish  humanitarian non-governmental organizations, patriotism,  humanitarianism, aid

=Introduction=

The  idea  of Islamic  solidarity  is as old as Islam  itself,  which instructs  its followers to care for fellow Muslims  and construct a  strong  Islamic   community,  or  Umma,  based  on  Qur'anic texts  and the teachings  of Prophet  Mohammed,  or the Sunna.1

Solidarity,  in this  sense,  refers  to  'the  group  liability  of joint debtors,    and is regarded  necessary  for group cohesion and the continuation   of order.  While  the  concept  was  originally  used to  explain  solidarity  within  small  communal   groups  such  as villages  or  tribes  where  daily,  face-to-face   interactions   were more common, technological  advances and globalization has expanded  the applicability  of the concept  to encompass  larger groups that may be geographically scattered. As such, 'solidarity may reign in small communities,  combative political movements or in entire societies,  even the whole humanity.'3  In a sense, the evolution of the concept corresponds  with that of group identity, which can now exceed the geographical  boundaries  of a person's original homeland.

One  of the  most  common  tools  of solidarity  is humanitarian diplomacy, which entails 'raising awareness, negotiating, and mobilizing   appropriate   humanitarian  aid  in  emergencies,'   by state or non-state actors.4 Until recently, the global scene of humanitarian  diplomacy   was  dominated   mainly   by  Western actors. Recent years have witnessed the rise ofperipheral countries as donors, which inter alia enabled them to become more visible and influential  in the global theatre of humanitarianism.  Several countries  from the Islamic world have also made the shift from recipients ofaid to donors, such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia or United Arab Emirates. 5   Their new donor status  corresponds  with their domestic  economic  development  and desire  to open up to new geographies  or become  more  influential  in their  existing  areas of influence.  These countries  have become  active in the field of humanitarian diplomacy via both state and non-state  agents.

As a consequence, humanitarian non-governmental organizations (HNGOs), alongside states, from the Islamic world have become increasingly  visible as agents of transnational Islamic solidarity. However,  scholarly work on Islamic HNGOs  is still scarce,  and the  literature  has  so far been  dominated  by work  on Western HNGOs.6   As  also underlined  by Kaag,  one of the reasons  for this may be 'that  the concepts  of NGOs  and  'civil  society'  are part  of the neoliberal  project'   which  relies  largely  on Western conceptualizations   of   liberal   democracy    and   development.7

From this limited perspective, peripheral  countries are at best the targets of humanitarianism. As such, there is need for alternative discussions  and more work on non-Western agents in the field of humanitarian diplomacy.

According to May, solidarity is a combination of 'conscious group identification; bonds  of sentiment; interest  in the group's wellbeing;  shared values  and beliefs; and readiness  to show moral support."" In this view, people's identification  with a group and their  enthusiasm  to act for the group's well-being  are the main components  of solidarity. As such, solidarity is, in a way, a social construct, built on how people identify themselves  with a group, which may vary significantly based on their needs, interests,  and values.  Since  identity  is a socially,  culturally,  and historically constructed concept, people  often identify with more than  one group based on their age,  gender,  ethnicity,  race or religion.9  In a similar  vein,  the value accorded  to each of these  groups may differ based on one's perceptions  and priorities,  and the strength of each association.

Relying on primary  data derived through field research conducted with four transnational Turkish HNGOs and secondary data collected  from  the  websites  of the HNGOs, reports,  scholarly work, newspapers and the social media, this study investigates the extent to which Islamic solidarity plays a role in the conceptions and  motivations   of Turkish   transnational  humanitarian  nongovernmental  organizations (HNGOs). The research  focuses on four transnational Turkish HNGOs including IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation, Doctors  Worldwide, Aziz  Mahmud  H~dayi Foundation   and  Deniz  Feneri  Foundation.  All  four  of these HNGOs are fully independent, and are responsible for the largest international  operations  among  independent,  Turkish  HNGOs with   religious   motivations."   The   study   argues   that   while Islamic solidarity plays an important  role in the conceptions  and motivations  of these  HNGOs,  this  idea  is at times  limited  by their strong group affinity with Turkey and Turkish patriotism. In order to elaborate upon this hypothesis,  the paper first examines the  emergence  of Turkey's  transnational  HNGOs  and the role that Islamic solidarity plays in their conceptions,  motivations and activities. It then moves on to discuss  the challenges  to Islamic solidarity  of these HNGOs.

=The emergence  of Turkey's transnational HNGOs=

The  emergence   of  transnational  Turkish  HNGOs   dates  back to  the   1980s,11    as  in  other  Islamic  countries   such  as  Saudi.
In addition  to the Afghan     Arabia,   Libya,   and   Sudan.12    The   Afghan   resistance resistance,  other conflicts     played  a particularly important   role  in  the  emergence such as the Chechen wars,     of transnational  HNGOs  from  the  Islamic  world.13    In the Bosnian and Kosovar crises,  and the IsraeliPalestinian  conflict have also been catalysts  in the emergence  of Turkish
HNGOs.
 
In addition to the Afghan resistance, other conflicts such as the Chechen wars, the Bosnian  and Kosovar  crises,  and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have also been catalysts in the emergence  of Turkish  HNGOs. The collapse  of the Soviet Union and the outbreak ofvarious conflicts in postSoviet countries  were  also significant  bringing  aid into these areas.14  Many of these countries  were home to significant Muslim  or Turkic populations  and were former Ottoman  lands, which contributed  to Turkey's sense of affiliation.

With respect  to domestic triggers,  while the 1980 military  coup put pressure  on civil society organizations, the post-coup period witnessed  the  acceleration  in terms  of civilian  mobilization.15
The  Turkish  society's proactive  response  to the  massive  1999 earthquake   in  Turkey   also  played   a  significant   role  in  the emergence  of several new HNGOs.  A number  of HNGOs  were established  as a response to the earthquake.16 As also underlined by Ozerdem  and Jacoby, the earthquake  significantly  expanded the maneuvering space for civilian actors.17  In this view, the earthquake   was  indeed  perceived  as a challenge  to the  state's top-down  approach towards disaster management.  Traditionally, the Turkish  state has followed a top-down  approach  to disaster management, which overlooks the empowerment ofthe local and fails to encourage  local agencies to resolve existing problems.

During  the earthquake,  the relief activities  of HNGOs  or other NGOs  in general  were perceived  as a threat  to state  authority and an indication  of its inability  to cope with the consequences ofthe earthquake. Furthermore, the government ofB~lent Ecevit feared  that  increasing  civil  society  activity  could  'allow  other political organizations  particularly the broadly Islamist Fazilet Party to secure electoral  gains."" The fact that the earthquake happened only two years after the so-called 'post-modern military coup'  of 1997  against  the government  of Necmettin Erbakan  with  its Islamic  roots  -  helped  cultivate  these  fears.  However, despite certain restrictions  upon NGOs, the state eventually  had to permit more NGO involvement, though still on a limited scale, due to  its own  inability  to cope  with  the  worsening  situation caused by the earthquake.  This also triggered  a change in public perceptions  of the state.  The earthquake,  inter alia,  gave rise to a strong sense of agency  among Turkish people  and created  an environment conducive to the emergence  of several new NGOs. The  year  1999  marked  another  significant  milestone   for  the expansion  of NGO  activity,  due to the  beginning   of Turkey's EU  candidacy  process.19  In  2002,  Turkey's ruling  Justice  and Development  Party  (AK Party)  came  to power  with  promises to  improve  Turkey's  democratic   credentials   and  expand  civic space.  The following years witnessed  an upsurge  in the number of NGOs operating  in several fields, including  the humanitarian sector.  The increasing  level of prosperity in Turkey  as a result of its  growing  economy  also  resulted  in  a rise  in  charitable activities. Globalization  also played an important  role, expanding people's   perception   of umma  and  Islamic   solidarity.  Factors such as increasing access to the Internet, social media, and international travel led to a growing  awareness  among  Turkish people regarding  problems  in distant  geographies. While  in the past, people  used  to look to their  immediate  neighborhoods or cities, today, they reach out to the needy  in distant  geographies with one click, and are even able to make donations online.

While Turkish transnational  HNGOs started to emerge in 1980s, their number  has increased  significantly  in recent  years  in line While Turkish    with Turkey's foreign policy activism and rise as a donor transnational HNGOs     country.  The AK  Party  government's  vision  entailed  a started to emerge in 1980s,     multi-dimensional and multi-track  foreign policy aiming their number has increased    to be  active  in multiple  geographies   in various  fields. significantly  in recent    This was only possible  with the expansion  of the space years in line with Turkey's     for non-state actors such as businesses or NGOs. Turkish foreign policy activism and    humanitarian  NGOs now operate in a number of regions, rise as a donor country.     stretching   from  Turkey's   immediate   neighborhood  to Africa  and East Asia.  They pursue  a range  of activities including  emergency  assistance  and medical  relief, and mid-toshort term development  projects  such as building  infrastructure and investing in social and human capital.21  In addition to relief, Turkish HNGOs  also pursue advocacy work and, recently, there have been mediation  initiatives  by the IHH in a few cases.22

Although  Turkey's  rise  as  a donor  country  had  begun  before the Arab Spring, the Syrian crisis has played a particularly important role in this process. The crisis erupted unexpectedly  on Turkey's doorstep. Turkey was faced with a great humanitarian catastrophe,  and  has  so far  absorbed  more  than  3.3  million23 refugees and spent more than 12.1  billion USD. It is now hosting the largest number  of refugees  in the world  and was names  as the 'most  generous' donor in 2016 by the Global Humanitarian Assistance  Report.24  The need for burden-sharing in the Syrian crisis  has  also  shaped  the  state's  position   towards   Turkish HNGO  involvement.  According  to 2015 statistics  from Turkish Cooperation  and Coordination  Agency,  Turkey  spent  about  5 .1 billion USD on aid in 2015, ofwhich about 475 million USD was contributed  by HNGOs.25

=Islamic solidarity  and Turkish HNGOs=

The idea of Islamic  solidarity  is important  for Turkish HNGOs in their  work.  For  instance, although  they  do not discriminate among  the recipients  during  the  actual  distribution  of the  aid, they do tend to lean towards communities  with Muslim, Turkish or Ottoman  affiliations  during  the planning  stage.  This  is not to say that they  do not ever deliver  aid to other  communities. However,  the majority  of Turkish  aid targets  communities  that have  relation  to  Turkey.  As  an  example,  in  2013,  Palestine, 
Tunisia,  Somalia,  Afghanistan  and  Pakistan  were  the top  recipient  countries  of Turkish  aid.26  As  such,  the idea of umma and a self-imposed responsibility  to reach out to fellow Muslims  are significant motivating  factors for  Turkish   HNGOs.   When   interviewed,   a  number of Turkish  NGOs  underlined   Islamic  solidarity  as  an important  motive.  Many HNGOs also refer to Turkey as the heir  of the Islamic  caliphate,  according  to which  it has a responsibility  to protect  and, when necessary, to speak out for the umma. For instance, according to a representative ofIHH, the organization  extends aid 'worthily  representing  the Ottoman Empire and Turkey.'7

The responsibility to stand up for fellow Muslims  is manifested in advocacy  work,  which is seen as complementary to aid.  One of the most popular  examples  of advocacy  by Turkish HNGOs is that of IHH during the Mavi Marmara  flotilla incident,  when the flotilla tried to violate the embargo on Gaza.28 Another recent example  is the  advocacy  activities  pursued  for  the  Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar. For instance, several Turkish HNGOs used social  media  to advocate  for the rights  of Rohingya  Muslims, and collected donations to deliver to the Rohingyas  in Myanmar and Bangladesh  during the crisis.29 In their rhetoric, these HNGO often emphasize  the  importance  of supporting  the  'oppressed' and the  'most  disadvantaged' communities. These  two  criteria are often used when referring to Muslim communities. According to the HNGOs, this is 'natural' given that Muslims  are often the most   oppressed   and  disadvantaged   communities.   Advocacy, in  this  regard,  is  seen  as  an  important  instrument  of Islamic solidarity. Referring  to their advocacy  work a representative  of IHH explains:

'When  the Prophet Mohammed  advised his followers,  'Help the oppressed  and  the  oppressor,'  his  followers  asked  in  surprise, Islamic identity is also an    'We already help the oppressed but how can we help the important toolfor Turkish     oppressor?'  he answered,  'By  stopping his cruelty.' This HNGOs  to differentiate    is why  we promote  human  rights  alongside  delivering themselves from their    humanitarian  aid.  The manmade  disasters  can be much Western counterparts,  who    worse than the natural ones."

Islamic  identity  is  also  an  important  tool  for  Turkish rhetoric as a result of    HNGOs  to differentiate  themselves  from  their  Western colonial histories.     counterparts,  who  often  face anti-Western  rhetoric  as a result of colonial histories. As a representative  of IHH outlines, Turkey's  Islamic  identity  plays  a positive  role  in  opening  up channels with African countries.31  In a similar vein, this was the reason Turkey was invited to take part in the mediation initiatives between  the Filipino  government  and Moro  Islamic  Liberation Front  (MILF).32   Islamic  solidarity  also plays  an important  role in fundraising,  given that charitable  activities  rise significantly in Turkey  during  religious  holidays  such  as Ramadan  or Eidal-Adha.  These  are  important   months  for  pious  Muslims   to fulfill the religious obligation for charity; Islam requires the donation  of a  certain  portion  of annual  income  to  people  in need in the forms of 'zakat  'obligatory  almsgiving' and sadaqa 'voluntary  almsgiving'.   Some religious humanitarian  activities of Turkish  HNGOs  include  the  distribution  of food  and meat parcels  during  religious  holidays,  distribution  of copies  of the Qur'an,   refurbishing   and  opening   mosques,   Qur'an   courses and orphanages,  and providing  free circumcision  surgeries.  As underlined  by the HNGOs, these activities generate the majority of the funding  since there is high demand  from the donors  for such  deeds.  For  instance,  helping  orphans  is regarded  a good deed  according  to Islam.  As  such,  it  is often  a central  charitable  activity among religiously  sensitive circles.

Contributing  to  the  development   of poor  and disadvantaged  Islamic communities  is another important tool of lslamic solidarity. In this view, lack of development brings  poverty,  which  is  seen  as  the  root  of  all  evil, and is a barrier  to peace  and prosperity  in the  Islamic world.  Thus  development   aid  with  a main  focus  on  building infrastructure  is a significant part of the activities of the majority of Turkish HNGOs.  This is also in line with Turkey's  domestic policy of development, which relies heavily on the construction sector.  In this respect it should also be noted that Turkey's main international  markets  for construction  sector largely correspond with the recipient countries of its humanitarian  aid. Furthermore, a closer look also reveals  that the regions  and countries  where the NGOs  operate  are also the primary  recipients  of Turkey's development  aid.  This may be due to the fact that the state and the HNGOs  open up the way for one another,  or motivate  one another to reach out to certain areas. For instance, there is always pressure  from  Turkish  civil  society  to  support  the  Palestinian cause  and  Palestine  was  the  largest  recipient  of assistance  by spending volume of Turkish aid in 2013.34



=Challenges  to Islamic solidarity=

As argued  earlier  in the text,  solidarity  is a concept  that refers to the effort people put in for the welfare of a group with which they  identify.  More  often  than not, people  identify  themselves with more than one group. Similarly, how they rank these groups may  differ  based  on their  perceptions  and priorities,  and how strongly they associate themselves  with a given group. As such, group identity, and thus solidarity, is a highly subjective concept based upon the needs, interests, and values of a given subject. In the case of Turkish  HNGOs,  the existence  of Islamic  solidarity in their conceptions, motivations and practices is clearly identifiable. However, there are also certain challenges  in regard to their understanding and practice  of Islamic solidarity.

One  of these  challenges  is that their  understanding of Islamic solidarity   can  be  limited   by  their   strong   sense  of Turkish patriotism.  As such,  'Turkishness' as a group  identity  at times
One of these challenges is     overshadows  their  'Muslimness,' and thus  may pose  a that their understanding     challenge  to Islamic  solidarity.  For  instance,  for many ofIslamic solidarity     of the  HNGOs,  'representing' and  'promoting' Turkey can be limited by their    abroad   is   of  critical   significance,   underpinning    the strong sense of Turkish     importance   of  'carrying   the  Turkish  flag  abroad'   and patriotism.     building positive associations  with Turks and Turkey.

For  instance, referring  to the  cataract  operations  they  conduct abroad, a representative  of the IHH emphasizes,  'it's terrific that the first thing the patients  see when they open their eyes is the Turkish  flag near you.     In a similar  vein, a representative of Deniz Feneri commented that when they bring disadvantaged children to Turkey as part of the '1001  Wishes of 1001  Children Project,'   those  children  return  home  'imprinting   the  Turkish flag onto their  hearts. '36   Likewise,  a representative   of Doctors Worldwide  said,  'We build a bridge of brotherhood  in the name of our country and flag."

The same interviewee  from Doctors Worldwide  also contended that they have to be careful, since any success or failure they may have in a target country could also be attributed to Turkey.38  Thus, they feel a responsibility to represent  Turkey abroad in the best possible manner.39  A representative of an HNGO also underlined that  if necessary,  their  extensive  international   network  could allow them to mobilize people on any issue important to Turkey. As  such,  when  it comes  to  'representing' Turkey  abroad,  the line between  state and non-state  actors is blurred.  The strength of national  feeling  among  Turkish  HNGOs  is  also  noted  by their counterparts; for instance, according  to an Islamic HNGO representative   from  India,  'Turkish  understanding  of Islam  is very nationalist.'

The patriotic  tendencies  of these HNGOs  also come to the fore in domestic  politics.  For instance,  all of the HNGOs  examined in this study either made patriotic  statements, joined  protests, or provided  aid to the victims  in the wake of the failed coup in 15 July 2017 in Turkey.41   The Deniz Feneri Foundation  even started a project  to build  a school  in Thailand  to be named  'July  15 Martyrs. 

Another   challenge   to  the  Islamic   solidarity   of these HNGOs    might    be   their    over-dependence   on   the approval   of  the  current  government.   Turkey's  model of  humanitarianism,   which   was   largely   constructed under  the current  government,  is supportive  of HNGO involvement.43   This  is even  more  evident  when  one compares Turkey with other emerging powers such as India or China, whose international   aid  is  channeled   primarily   through  government bodies  at the bilateral  level,  and HNGO  operations  are limited. In a similar vein,  although  several HNGOs  from Gulf countries operate  abroad, they  are established  either  by their  respective states  or  state  elites."  Interestingly,   the  activities   of many Western  HNGOs  are heavily  dependent  on government  grants and funds. As such, the independence  and  'non-governmental' characteristics   of these  HNGOs  are  highly  contentious.    By contrast, most Turkish HNGOs rely on private funds and operate independently  from the state.

However, despite  the fact that Turkish  HNGOs  enjoy  a certain level   f independence  from the state,  this study argues that the Turkic     state's laissez faire policy  is largely due to the broad convergence  of ideas  and  interests  between  the  government and    majority  of the HNGOs.  In this view,  the extent  to which states welcome  the involvement  of HNGOs  corresponds with their perceived  foreign policy  interests.  With a few exceptions,  the  majority  of Turkish  HNGOs  operating abroad  have  similar  ideational  backgrounds,  built upon an  understanding of  Islamic   solidarity   and  a  strong sense of duty to promote  Turkey abroad.  In this regard, their  motivations,  choice  of target  areas  and  activities tend  to  correspond   with  the  position   of the  Turkish government.   Consequently,   their  activities,   in  a  way, feed into the interests  of the latter.45  As such,  there  is a general  convergence  of ideas and interests  between  the Turkish government  and the majority  of Turkish HNGOs.
There  is also an overlap  in their  advocacy  work. The Turkish government  often  claims  to  advocate   for  the  rights   of the oppressed  as part  of its humanitarian diplomacy  efforts. Clear examples   of  this   include   Turkey's  advocacy   for   Somalia, Palestine,  and Bosnia, which  overlap  with the work of Turkish HNGOs.  As  such,  the  activities   of Turkish  NGOs  abroad,  in a way,  complement the  government's  aim to present  itself as a responsible actor on the international platform. Accordingly, one could  argue that the level of freedom  these HNGOs  enjoy is significantly dependent  on the convergence of their ideas and interests  with  those  of the Turkish  government.   For  instance, in contrast  to the  freedom  provided  for the  Turkish  HNGOs, recently there have been allegations of a government crackdown on foreign  HNGOs  operating  in Turkey.46

Conclusion

This  study  has  examined  the  role  of Islamic  solidarity  in the perceptions  and  motivations of    Turkish   HNGOs.  Islamic solidarity  played  an important  role  in the  emergence  of these HNGOs,  which  took place  largely  in response  to the ongoing suffering in the Muslim  world,  such as in Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Palestine. The  Islamic  obligation  to extend  aid to fellow Muslims   and  the  idea  of umma  that  extends   beyond   one's immediate   homeland   is  one  of their  main  motivations.  The idea  of Islamic   solidarity   is  also  instrumental  in  collecting donations,   since  majority   of the  donors   are  pious  Muslim. Furthermore,  many  of their  activities   -   such  as  distributing food   during   religious   holidays,    distributing  copies   of  the Qur'an, refurbishing and opening mosques,  Qur'an courses and orphanages, and providing  free circumcision surgeries  -  serve the well-being of fellow  Muslims, and thus  constitute  acts  of Islamic  solidarity.

However,  the  study  also  proposes  that  while  the  sense  of Islamic   solidarity  plays  an important role  in the perceptions and motivations of Turkish  HNGOs,  this is sometimes limited by  their  strong  sense  of affiliation  with  Turkey  and  Turkish patriotism. As such, the affiliation  they  feel with  Turkey  may eclipse   their   sense   of  belonging  to  umma.   In  this  regard, the  idea  of Islamic   solidarity  can  be  downplayed  in  favor of  national    affiliation.   Furthermore,   the   sustainability   of their  work,  and  therefore the  extent  to  which  they  are  able to extend  solidarity  to the  Islamic  world,  is dependent upon the  convergence  of their  ideas  and  interests   with  those  of Turkey's current  government. In a similar  vein, it is remains under  question   mark  whether these  HNGOs  would  feel  the same  level  of patriotism under  a different   government with different  ideas  and interests. As such, one could  argue that the government  support  they  currently enjoy and  the  affiliation they  feel  with  Turkey  feed  into  one  another.  Moreover,  the level  of solidarity they  are  able  to  extend  to  the  Islamic   is vulnerable to their  reliance on the precarious space  provided for them by the current  Turkish  government.

=References=

References are available on the website of the journal.

=Notes=